Zabrucky v. McAdams

Decision Date18 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. B167590.,B167590.
Citation28 Cal.Rptr.3d 592,129 Cal.App.4th 618
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesJohn ZABRUCKY, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Lloyd McADAMS, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Funsten & Franzen and Don Erik Franzen, Beverly Hills; Joshua Kaplan, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Rosario Perry, Santa Monica, for Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Robert S. Gerstein, and Christopher Rolin, Woodland Hills, for Defendants and Respondents.

WOODS, J.

Plaintiffs John Zabrucky and Jaylene Zabrucky and defendants Lloyd McAdams and Heather Baines are adjoining neighbors in the Marquez Knolls area of Pacific Palisades. Amicus curiae Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association ("MKPOA") is a non-profit homeowners association for that area. Plaintiffs sued defendants alleging defendants' proposed addition to their residence would violate Paragraph 11 of the relevant covenants, conditions and restrictions ("CC & Rs") by obstructing plaintiffs' view of the ocean. The court interpreted Paragraph1 11's prohibition against erecting any structure which obstructs a view as only prohibiting structures of the landscape type and not dwellings. Plaintiffs challenge the court's interpretation. We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS
I. Factual Background

The Marquez Knolls CC & Rs include provisions, which (1) in Paragraph 1, limit residences built on the property to one story (except that a two-story residence could be approved by the architectural committee if it did not detract from anyone else's view); (2) in Paragraph 2, require all buildings and any alterations to be preapproved by the architectural committee and later by the MKPOA, the powers of which lapsed permanently on December 31, 1995; (3) in Paragraph 3, restrict how a residence can be built on the lot by side and front yard setbacks; (4) in Paragraph 11, provides that no "tree, shrub, or other landscaping [shall] be planted or any structures erected that may at present or in the future obstruct the view from any other lot"; and (5) in Paragraph 16, provide construction of a residence must commence within two years of recording the deed.

When appellants purchased their home in 1993, they were primarily induced to do so by what they claimed was the incredible, unobstructed ocean view. Respondents purchased their home in 1994. In 1995, respondents started making plans for an addition to their house. The plans called for two levels, one tucked under the main level so it would have a one-story character. Appellants learned about the planned remodel in 1999. John Zabrucky met with McAdams and objected to the addition because it would be visible from his property and destroy the unobstructed view for which he had paid.

After the meeting, McAdams asked the MKPOA for advice and, as a result, he reduced the size of the project. The footprint of the addition was shown by a stick frame structure and yellow rope on the property. The frame represented the project as reduced from the original plan. The yellow rope showed a further reduction offered by respondents as a compromise, which was also reflected in the set of plans for the addition current at the time of trial.2 The roof of the addition would be lower than the existing roof line.

II. Procedural History

Appellants filed their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on November 26, 2001, alleging that respondents' landscaping encroached on appellants' view in violation of Paragraph 11 and that respondents had begun framing an addition which would further encroach upon their view, also in violation of Paragraph 11. Respondents filed an answer and a cross-complaint.

In December 2002, the parties filed a joint stipulation of facts, which stated the controversy between the parties was over the application of Paragraph 11 to respondents' landscaping and proposed addition.

During a court trial, the court conducted a view of the tract. The court filed a statement of decision. On the basis of the view and photographic exhibits, the court found respondents' addition would obstruct a portion of the view from appellants' lot, respondents' existing home partially blocked appellants' view, and various other homes in the tract also partially blocked other owners' views. The court concluded it would have been impractical for the original drafters of the CC & Rs to have intended that no house be built which obstructed any other owner's view. The court held that neither the planned addition nor the landscaping on respondents' property constituted a violation of Paragraph 11 or a nuisance.3 The court also denied relief on the cross-complaint.

The court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration or new trial and entered judgment on the complaint for respondents and on the cross-complaint for appellants.

Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
I. Relevant paragraphs

Paragraph 1:

"All said lots shall be known and described as residential lots, no structure shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any building plot other than one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed one story in height and a private garage, for not more than three cars; except where, in the judgment of the Declarant [Marquez Knolls Inc.] and approved by the Architectural Committee, one two story single-family dwelling may be erected where said dwelling will not detract from the view of any other lot."

Paragraph 2:

"No building shall be erected, placed or altered on any building plot in this subdivision until the building plans, specifications, and plot plan showing the location of such building have been approved in writing as to conformity and harmony of exterior design with existing structures, in the subdivision, and as to location of the building with respect to topography and finished ground elevation by an Architectural Committee...."

Paragraph 11:

"No fences or hedges exceeding three feet in height shall be erected or permitted to remain between the street and the front set-back line nor shall any tree, shrub or other landscaping be planted or any structures erected that may at present or in the future obstruct the view from any other lot, and the right of entry is reserved by the Declarants to trim any tree obstructing the view of any lot."

II. Interpretation of the CC & Rs

The court stated: "Reading the CC & Rs as a whole, the court concludes that the main dwelling structure is governed by Paragraph 1 and not Paragraph 11. The wording of Paragraph 11 clearly addresses structures relating to fences, hedges and landscaping, and not the main dwelling." Appellants contend the court misinterpreted Paragraph 11 and should have used the plain meaning of "structure" as a broad term.

"[W]e must independently interpret the provisions of the document. It is a general rule that restrictive covenants are construed strictly against the person seeking to enforce them, and any doubt will be resolved in favor of the free use of land. But it is also true that the `"intent of the parties and the object of the deed or restriction should govern, giving the instrument a just and fair interpretation."' The intention of the parties is to be determined from the document as a whole, and if possible still give effect to every part." (Citations omitted.) (White v. Dorfman (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 892, 897, 172 Cal. Rptr. 326; see also Ezer v. Fuchsloch (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 849, 861, 160 Cal. Rptr. 486 ["`[P]articular words or clauses must be subordinated to general intent.'"].)

In the instant case, in determining that "any structure" was limited to landscape-type structures, the superior court found support for its interpretation in the rule of construction of ejusdem generis as discussed in White v. Dorfman, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 892, 172 Cal.Rptr. 326.

Appellants assert that Paragraph 11 absolutely prohibits, i.e., has a zero tolerance for, anything that obstructs the view of another lot in any manner and that the court's interpretation defeats the intent or main goal of the CC & Rs to protect views. In appellants' opinion, if a residence is destroyed or demolished, any replacement must be built within the footprint of the original approved plan unless any extension or change does not obstruct the view of another lot in any manner whatsoever.

Appellants assert this case is governed by Seligman v. Tucker (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 691, 86 Cal.Rptr. 187. In Seligman, the court was called upon to interpret a recorded restriction for a subdivision, which provided in pertinent part: "`No ... structure shall be ... erected ... upon any lot in such location or in such height as to unreasonably obstruct the view of any other lot....'" (Id., at p. 693, 86 Cal.Rptr. 187.) In concluding that the term "unreasonably obstruct" was not too vague or uncertain to be enforced, the court reasoned: "It is clear from the surrounding circumstances and the timing of the filing of the declaration of restrictions that the views dealt with in the `view-protection' clause were those which the residences had upon their completion, by reason of their orientation on the lots and their room and window locations and of the open spaces left on other lots." (Id., at pp. 697, 699, 86 Cal.Rptr. 187.)

However, other paragraphs of the instant CC & Rs prohibit certain trades, activities, and uses of the lots. Thus, reading the CC & Rs as a whole, it is evident that protecting views was one of their purposes, not their only or their main purpose. Accordingly, the question is how much protection was intended.4

In common with most coastline housing in Southern California, the prime thing the Marquez Knolls development sold its prospective homeowners was a beautiful ocean view. In fact, like most such housing, much of the value of any property within the development depends on the quality of the view. To significantly...

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