Zack v. Guzauskas

• Decision Date: 25 May 1976
• Citation: 171 Conn. 98,368 A.2d 193
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Rose ZACK, Executrix (ESTATE of William GUZAUSKAS), et al. v. Kathryn GUZAUSKAS.

Page 193

368 A.2d 193

171 Conn. 98

Rose ZACK, Executrix (ESTATE of William GUZAUSKAS), et al. v. Kathryn GUZAUSKAS.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

May 25, 1976.

Robert L. Hirtle, Jr., Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Dwight Owen Schweitzer, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Bruce Mayor, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

LONGO, Associate Judge.

The plaintiffs in this action ask that a trust for their benefit be imposed upon real property owned of record by the defendant, basing their claims on theories of resulting and constructive trust. The trial court concluded that the defendant is the sole legal and equitable owner of the property which is the subject of this dispute, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs have appeled to this court from that judgment. Many of the plaintiffs' assignments of error relating to correction of the court's finding have not been briefed and are therefore considered to have been abandoned. State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 55, 301 A.2d 547; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 327. The remaining assignments of error and the issues raised therein are discussed in the opinion.

The facts pertinent to this appeal, which appear in the finding and which are not subject to correction, may be summarized as follows: The plaintiff Anna Guzauskas is the widow of the deceased William Guzaskas, and the plaintiff Rose Zack is the executrix under his will. The defendant, Kathryn Guzauskas, was married to Martin Guzauskas, the son of Anna and William, from 1947 until 1968, when the marriage ended in divorce. In 1952, Martin and the defendant wanted to establish and operate a trailer park on a parcel of land on Broad Street in Bristol. The parents, Anna and William, provided $6400, which was used to purchase the parcel of land. Title to the property was taken in the names of Martin and the defendant. When the business was incorporated in 1955, it was understood by the parties that the real property would not be transferred to the corporation, but would remain the individual holding of Martin and the defendant. At that time, the parents each were issued thirty-five shares of stock and Martin and the defendant were issued forty shares each. The parents were employed by the corporation as caretakers at the trailer park for salaries totalling $300 per month, and were given the use of certain lots in the trailer park without charge. In addition, they received $6000 from their son Martin. When Anna Guzauskas consulted her attorney in 1958, she was informed that the title to the real property was in the names of Martin and the defendant. For a number of years following incorporation, the business progressed smoothly and the salaries received by the parents totalled in excess of $40,000. In 1968, as part of the property settlement and divorce decree, Martin conveyed to the defendant his forty shares of stock and his one-half interest in the real property. It is that real property which is the subject of this action and which the plaintiffs claim is held by the defendant in a resulting trust or a constructive trust for the benefit of Anna Guzauskas and her husband's estate.

' In Walter v. Home National Bank & Trust Co., 148 Conn. 635, 638, 173

A.2d 503, the principles of law involving a purchase money resulting trust . . . were clearly and succinctly stated: 'When the purchase money for property is paid by one and the legal title is taken in the name of another, a resulting trust ordinarily arises at once, by operation of law, in favor of the one paying the money. Franke v. Franke, 140 Conn. 133, 138, 98 A.2d 804; Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 195, 22 A. 149. If it can be proved that the intention of the parties was otherwise, there is no resulting trust. Wilson v. Warner, 89 Conn. 243, 246, 93 A. 533." Whitney v. Whitney, 171 Conn. 23, 33, 368 A.2d 96 p. 102 (37 Conn.L.J., No. 45, pp. 1, 4). The intent that such a trust be created will be presumed in certain instances; ¹ in others, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. In this case, the trial court found that there was no intent to create a resulting trust with regard to the real property located on Broad Street in Bristol and the court concluded that the $6400 used to purchase the property and provided by Anna and William Guzauskas to their son Martin and the defendant was intended as a loan. This conclusion is amply supported by the court's finding of fact, which, in turn, is fully supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff Anna Guzauskas claims that she had discussed the status of title to the real property on several occasions with her son Martin, and that she and her husband, William, had provided $6400 for its purchase with the mutual understanding and intent that they would have an interest in the property, and that it would be owned in part by them. The weight, if any, to be given to her testimony on the issue of intent is a matter of which the trier is the judge. See Birnbaum v. Ives, 163 Conn. 12, 21, 301 A.2d 262; Slavitt v. Ives, 163 Conn. 198, 212, 313 A.2d 13. Thus, the finding of the trial court that there was no such intent cannot be disturbed because it is based on a determination of credibility. See French v. Oberreuter, 157 Conn. 181, 184, 251 A.2d 67. The finding also reveals that the son Martin was present during the trial and sat at the plaintiffs' table. He was not offered by them as a witness although, as the court found, he was a witness the plaintiffs would naturally produce and his testimony could easily have supported his mother's claims, if true. There was no error in the conclusion that had Martin testified his testimony would have been unfavorable to the plaintiffs. See Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 674-76, 165 A.2d 598.

The circumstances surrounding this dispute indicate a typical and not...