Zack v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 09 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 09–12717.,09–12717.
• Citation: 704 F.3d 917
• Parties: Michael Duane ZACK, III, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Kenneth S. TUCKER, Pam Bondi, Respondents–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

704 F.3d 917

Michael Duane ZACK, III, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Kenneth S. TUCKER, Pam Bondi, Respondents–Appellees.

No. 09–12717.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 9, 2013.

Martin J. McClain (Court–Appointed), Linda McDermott (Court–Appointed), McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, FL, for Petitioner–Appellant.

Charmaine M. Millsaps, Office of the Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, FL, Carol M. Dittman, Florida Atty. General's Office, Tampa, FL, for Respondents–Appellees.

Michael A. Rotker, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Crim. Div., Washington, DC, for United States of America, Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS, WILSON, PRYOR, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

DUBINA, Chief Judge:

Petitioner Michael Duane Zack's appeal from the district court's order denying him federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 presents this court with the opportunity to revisit our precedent in Walker v. Crosby, 341 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir.2003), and the rule it established with regard to the limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). We now overrule Walker to the extent it holds that § 2244(d)(1) provides a single statute of limitations that applies to the habeas corpus application as a whole and that individual claims within an application cannot be reviewed separately for timeliness. We conclude, based on the text and structure of the statute, Supreme Court precedent, decisions of our sister circuits, and Congressional intent, that the federal statute of limitations requires a claim-by-claim approach to determine timeliness. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying Zack federal habeas relief.

I. BACKGROUND

A Florida jury convicted Zack of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and robbery. After the sentencing phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court imposed a death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Zack's conviction and death sentence on direct review. Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9 (Fla.2000). On October 2, 2000, Zack's convictions and sentence became final when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Zack v. Florida, 531 U.S. 858, 121 S.Ct. 143, 148 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000). More than one year passed before Zack filed post-conviction motions in state court. On December 26, 2001, Zack filed his first state collateral motion, asking for an extension of time for filing a motion for collateral review under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court granted the motion and extended the deadline to May 2002, when Zack filed a Rule 3.850 motion raising numerous issues.

While Zack's collateral motion was pending in state court, the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (holding that the execution of a mentally retarded person is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Shortly thereafter, Zack amended his Rule 3.850 motion to include a claim based on Atkins. In June 2003, the trial court denied Zack's Rule 3.850 motion, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed this ruling on appeal. Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190 (Fla.2005).

Zack then proceeded to federal court, filing a federal habeas petition that raised multiple claims for relief, including a claim under Atkins. The district court dismissed all of Zack's non-Atkins claims as untimely and denied the Atkins claim on the merits. Zack filed a motion for a certificate of appealability, and the district court granted it as to whether Zack's non-Atkins claims were timely under the habeas statute of limitations. A panel of this Court vacated and remanded the case. Zack v. Tucker, 666 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir.2012). The panel stated that our prior panel precedent in Walker requires courts to evaluate the timeliness of federal habeas applications as a whole, and that limitations period begins to run from the latest of the triggering events established in § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D). Id. at 1268. The panel held that Zack's timely assertion of his Atkins claim made timely all the other claims asserted in his petition. Id. at 1269. We vacated the panel opinion and reheard the case en banc. Zack v. Tucker, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir.2012).

II. ISSUE

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides a single statute of limitations that applies to the application as a whole or whether the timeliness of claims must be evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Statute

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1966), sets forth a limitations period for state prisoners filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.¹ This statute of limitations “quite plainly serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgements.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2128, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001); see alsoJones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir.2002) (noting that the fixed time limit was designed to further AEDPA's “signal purpose” of bringing greater “finality [to] criminal cases”). According to the statute, a one-year period of limitations applies “to an application for a writ of habeas corpus,” and it runs “from the latest of”:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D).

Relying on the plain language of the statute, Zack argues that his habeas petition was timely, under § 2244(d)(1)(C), because he filed it within one year after the Supreme court decided Atkins. Zack contended that this was the latest of the four possible dates under the statute, and it marked the start of the one-year period that applied to his application. Relying heavily on this court's holding in Walker that the one-year limitation period applies to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a whole, not to the separate claims in the petition, Zack contends that his application as a whole was timely, and the district court erred in dismissing his non-Atkins claims as untimely.

The State also relies on the plain language of the statute, contending that there is no ambiguity and the district court properly dismissed Zack's untimely claims—the non-Atkins claims. The State urges this court to view the entire statutory context, not look at one word or term in isolation. See Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.2010) (citations omitted). It contends that this court, like the Supreme Court in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 415–16, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1813, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005), should analyze the statute in a subsection by subsection manner rather than analyzing only the word “application” in subsection(d)(1). When carefully considering each subsection, the State asserts that the clear textual indication is that Congress meant for courts to determine timeliness based on a claim-by-claim basis. For example, subsection (C)'s reference to “ the constitutional right” is clearly a reference to a singular right, § 2244(d)(1)(C) (emphasis added), and subsection (D)'s reference to “claim or claims” indicates that Congress meant for courts to determine timeliness on a claim-by-claim basis, id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Furthermore, the State argues that the phrase “from the latest of” is the introduction to four separate time periods. See id. § 2241(d)(1). The State contends that the statute provides for one time limitation for the judgment as a whole, and has three exceptions to that time period, each of which also has a time limitation. The State asserts that these “time limitations within time limitations” address the realities of habeas litigation, such as the effect that newly found evidence and rights newly recognized by the Supreme Court have on a habeas petitioner's quest for relief.

Alternatively, assuming that this court perceives ambiguity in the statute, the State posits that this court should interpret the statute based on practice and policy within the civil realm, of which habeas corpus is a remedy. The normal practice in the civil litigation arena is for courts to apply statutes of limitations on a claim-by-claim basis, and the policy promoted by Congress with the passage of AEDPA was finality in criminal cases. See Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir.2011) (observing that “Congress's overriding purpose in enacting AEDPA ... [was] to achieve finality in criminal cases, both federal and state” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The State contends that, in light of the stated purpose behind AEDPA and the ordinary application of statutes of limitation, the Walker interpretation that the statute of limitations should be applied to the application as a whole cannot be correct. This interpretation would create a “loophole” in habeas jurisprudence “which is contrary to the legislative intent of insuring a greater degree of finality” in criminal cases. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the State proffers that such an interpretation would not comport with the practicalities of habeas litigation. Hence, the State urges this court to adopt a claim-by-claim approach for timeliness determinations in habeas litigation and to affirm ...