Zagklara v. Sprague Energy Corp., 2:10–cv–445–GZS.

• Decision Date: 04 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:10–cv–445–GZS.,2:10–cv–445–GZS.
• Citation: 919 F.Supp.2d 163
• Parties: Eirini ZAGKLARA, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Ioannis Zagklaras, Plaintiff, v. SPRAGUE ENERGY CORP., Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff, v. Leopard Shipping et al., Third Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

919 F.Supp.2d 163

Eirini ZAGKLARA, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Ioannis Zagklaras, Plaintiff,

v.SPRAGUE ENERGY CORP., Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff,

v.Leopard Shipping et al., Third Party Defendants.

No. 2:10–cv–445–GZS.

United States District Court,

D. Maine.

Jan. 22, 2013.

Order Denying Reconsideration Feb. 4, 2013.

Preempted

18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-804(b).

Carolyn M. Latti, David F. Anderson, Latti & Anderson LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey Ian Carton, Joanna Frances Sandolo, Meiselman, Denlea, Packman, Carton & Eberz, P.C., White Plains, NY, Michael X. Savasuk, Troubh Heisler, Portland, ME, for Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff.

John R. Bass, II, Thompson, Bull, Furey, Bass & MacColl, LLC, P.A., Portland, ME, for Third Party Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR APPLICATION OF GENERAL MARITIME LAW

GEORGE Z. SINGAL, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Application of General Maritime Law (ECF No. 130). Defendant Sprague Energy Corp. (“Defendant” or “Sprague”) has filed an opposition to the Motion (ECF No. 144) arguing that Maine state law applies with respect to determination of Plaintiff's damages. For reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

There is no dispute in this case that Plaintiff's claims fall within the Court's admiralty jurisdiction.¹ “With admiralty jurisdiction ... comes the application of substantive admiralty law.... The exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, however, does not result in automatic displacement of state law.” Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In fact, in Yamaha, the Supreme Court expressly indicated that the damages available for wrongful death of a nonseafarer on navigable waters could be “properly governed by state law.” Id. at 216, 116 S.Ct. 619. More recently, the Supreme Court also has affirmed that there is a general maritime law remedy for negligence resulting in the wrongful death of nonseamen in state territorial waters. See Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 820, 121 S.Ct. 1927, 150 L.Ed.2d 34 (2001).

As the First Circuit generally explained in Southworth Mach. Co., Inc. v. F/V Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.1993):

[C]laimants in an admiralty case are not restricted to maritime relief but may also pursue remedies provided by state law. However, the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called ‘reverse- Erie’ doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal maritime standards. Thus, where the subject-matter falls within the admiralty jurisdiction, state law may ‘supplement’ federal maritime law but may not directly contradict it.

Id. at 41 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Rogers v. Coastal Towing, L.L.C., 723 F.Supp.2d 929, 936 (E.D.La.2010) (finding general maritime law preempted application of state rescuer doctrine upon finding that the rescuer doctrine interfered “with the proper harmony and uniformity of the general maritime law”).

II. BACKGROUND

In this case, Plaintiff has the following pending claims against Defendant Sprague Energy, which operates the Merrill Marine Terminal: (1) a general maritime negligence survival action for the personal injuries Captain Zagklaras suffered prior to his death (Count I), (2) a wrongful death claim seeking pecuniary support for his surviving spouse (Count III), (3) a separately stated wrongful death claim seeking medical and funeral expenses (Count IV), (4) a separately stated claim by Mrs. Zagklara for emotional distress and loss of society as a result of the death of her husband (Count V), and (5) a claim seeking to recover for conscious pain and suffering experienced by Captain Zagklaras between the time of the accident and his death (Count VII). As the parties agree, these claims all arise from an accident that occurred on October 6, 2008, when Captain Zagklaras was aboard the M/V CALYPSO while the ship was discharging cargo at the Merrill Marine Terminal in Portland, Maine. Captain Zagklaras died on March 13, 2009. Under this factual scenario, the parties do not dispute Captain Zagklaras is deemed a nonseafarer pressing claims for torts that occurred in territorial waters.²Given this categorization, it is important to note that this case falls outside the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301– 30306, and the Longshore & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. Rather, Plaintiff has pled all of her claims under general maritime law and Maine state law.

III. DISCUSSION

With the just discussed legal standard in mind, the parties, while agreeing that general maritime law governs liability, disagree to what extent Maine law may supplement the rules governing the remedies and damages that Plaintiff may seek at trial. As it relates to the upcoming jury trial, the briefing on the present motion queues up the following specific questions: (1) Whether the surviving spouse Plaintiff in this case may state a general maritime claim for loss of society as stated in Count V? (2) Whether the collateral source rule applies to Count IV? (3) Does the Maine Wrongful Death Act in any way supplement Plaintiff's wrongful death claims? and (4) Whether general maritime law provides the applicable comparative negligence rule? The Court considers each of these questions in turn.

A. Count V: Emotional Distress & Loss of Society Claims Brought by Mrs. Zagklara

Assuming for the sake of argument that general maritime law governs Plaintiff's claims (which is the premise of the pending motion), Defendant maintains that general maritime law does not allow Mrs. Zagklara to press a claim for loss of society as asserted in Count V. In connection with this argument, both sides draw the Court's attention to the Supreme Court's decision in Sea–Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), which expressly allowed recovery for loss of society by the dependent spouse of a longshoreman via a general maritime wrongful death action. As both sides acknowledge, Gaudet was superceded by statutory amendments to the Longshore & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 31 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990) (explaining that the amendments to LHWCA “have rendered Gaudet inapplicable on its facts”). Defendant argues that the combination of these amendments and the Supreme Court's subsequent acknowledgement of them in Miles renders Gaudet essentially overruled. See id. at 31, 111 S.Ct. 317 (“The holding of Gaudet applies only in territorial waters, and it applies only to longshoremen.”) Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that because the LHWCA does not control this action, Gaudet remains applicable to this case and expressly allows Plaintiff's loss of society claim to proceed under general maritime law. In the Court's opinion, Defendant's argument reflects an overstatement of the impact of the Miles decision. See, e.g., Atlantic Sounding Co. Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 419–24, 129 S.Ct. 2561, 174 L.Ed.2d 382 (2009).

Nonetheless, as other courts of have recognized, “[t]here is reason to doubt the continued applicability of Gaudet.” In re Am. River Transp. Co., 490 F.3d 351, 356 n. 27 (5th Cir.2007) (collecting cases struggling to reconcile the precedential value of Gaudet given the language of Miles );see also In re Maryland Marine, Inc., 641 F.Supp.2d 579, 582 & 585 (E.D.La.2009) (concluding that “loss of society damages are not recoverable by representatives of nonseafarers killed in territorial waters under the general maritime law” but nonetheless indicating a willingness to present a loss of society claim to the jury due to “movement of the law in this area”). In the absence of any express precedent overruling Gaudet or otherwise indicating that general maritime law does not recognize a loss of society claim by a dependent surviving spouse, the Court will not prohibit Plaintiff from presenting her loss of society claim under general maritime law at the upcoming jury trial. Cf. Tucker v. Fearn, 333 F.3d 1216, 1223 & n. 10 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that “nondependent survivors of nonseamen cannot recover loss of society damages under general maritime law). Even in the absence of a general maritime basis for her loss of society claim, the Court notes that Plaintiff would be able to pursue loss of society damages under Maine law as a supplemental claim in accordance with 18–A M.R.S.A. § 2–804, a statute that was duly pled in her Complaint.³See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216, 116 S.Ct. 619.

In short, to the extent that Plaintiff sought to proceed to trial with Count V as a loss of society claim seeking damages under general maritime law, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED over Defendant's proffered objections.

B. Count IV: Collateral Source Rule

Specifically, with respect to Count IV, Defendant also argues against the application of the collateral source rule and asserts that Plaintiff should be barred from recovering medical bills that were incurred by Captain Zagklaras but were allegedly paid by his employer. Defendant specifically asks the Court to exclude any evidence of Captain Zagklaras' medical costs at the upcoming trial.

Under maritime law or Maine law, the collateral source rule generally would apply to bar a tortfeasor from suggesting that the amount of damages awarded should be reduced because of payments received from a third party. See, e.g., Hinton v. Outboard Marine Corp., D.Me. No. 1:09–cv–554–JAW, 2012 WL 215183 at *1 (D.Me. Jan. 24, 2012) (discussing the collateral source rule as “settled law” in Maine and collecting cases); Falconer v. Penn Maritime, Inc., 397 F.Supp.2d 144, 147–50 (D.Me.2005) (discussing the collateral source rule under...