Zahn v. Graff, 950078
Decision Date | 05 April 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 950078,950078 |
Citation | 530 N.W.2d 645 |
Parties | Douglas D. ZAHN, Petitioner, v. Benny A. GRAFF, District Court Judge and the State of North Dakota, Respondents. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Benjamin C. Pulkrabek, Mandan, for petitioner.
Rick L. Volk, Asst. State's Atty., Bismarck, for respondents.
Douglas Zahn petitioned for a supervisory writ requiring the Burleigh County District Court to review his finding of guilt of a speeding charge. We conclude that Zahn is entitled to a review of the finding of guilt and direct Judge Benny Graff, Presiding Judge of the South Central Judicial District, to assign a district judge to hear the appeal as provided by statute.
The facts, as briefly stated for purposes of this opinion, are that on February 9, 1995, Thomas J. Schneider, Judge of the District Court for Burleigh County, found by the greater weight of the evidence that Zahn had exceeded the speed limit and assessed fees of $31.00. A notice of appeal was filed under section 39-06.1-03(5)(a), N.D.C.C.
On March 1, 1995, Judge Graff dismissed the appeal concluding that:
Section 39-06.1-03(5)(a), N.D.C.C., provides in part:
Section 39-06.1-03, N.D.C.C., provides that the initial hearing is to be held before an "official". Subsection 7 defines the term "official" to mean "a district judge, a municipal judge, or, when provided by statute, a person appointed by a district judge to serve as such official for all or a specified part of a judicial district."
In construing statutes, words are to be understood in their ordinary sense. N.D.C.C. Sec. 1-02-02. Our primary goal when interpreting statutes is to give full effect to legislative intent. E.g., Van Raden Homes v. Dakota View Estates, 520 N.W.2d 866 (N.D.1994). Our conclusion in this matter is dictated by these principles.
A plain reading of section 39-06.1-03(5)(a), N.D.C.C., is that the initial hearing may be held before a district judge and a finding that a person committed a violation may be appealed to a district judge. This plain reading of the statute is not an accident of court consolidation. It apparently was an intended result. See SB2026--minutes of Governmental Subdivisions Committee 1991 Report of the Legislative Council.
Legislative intent is further developed in the Interim Judiciary Committee Report for the 54th Legislative Assembly, 1995. The Committee did not recommend deletion of appeal but rather recommended enactment of SB2048 1, amending section 39-06.1-03, N.D.C.C., which reads:
"The committee recommends Senate Bill No. 2048 to provide that a person cited for a noncriminal traffic violation may appeal to the district court from the initial hearing held before a municipal judge, a magistrate, or other qualified person, including a district judge appointed by the presiding judge of the judicial district." [Emphasis supplied].
Report of the North Dakota Legislative Council Fifty-Fourth Legislative Assembly 1995 at page 106.
Judge Graff may be correct in concluding that the process is inefficient and duplicative, but that is a matter for the Legislature to consider.
Assuming for purposes of discussion that the procedure is an exercise of the appellate function of the district court, the Legislature's authority to permit an appeal from the decision of one district judge to another district judge is clearly expressed in Article VI, Sec. 8, of the North Dakota Constitution: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes, except as otherwise provided by law, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law or by rule of the supreme court." [Emphasis supplied].
Under similar statutes, this court indicated that an appeal from a justice court to the district court involves the original jurisdiction of the district court rather than the appellate jurisdiction of the district court. E.g., Nomland Motor Co. v. Alger, 77 N.D. 29, 39 N.W.2d 899 (1949). Section 27-05-06, N.D.C.C., describing the jurisdiction of the district courts, does not limit the jurisdiction of the district court. E.g., Evanson v....
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