Zander v. Morsette
| Decision Date | 13 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20200211,20200211 |
| Citation | 959 N.W.2d 838 |
| Parties | Lee ZANDER, individually and as Executor of the Estate of Taylor Goven, deceased; and Lee Zander on behalf of the heirs and next of kin of Taylor Goven, deceased; and Jason Renschler, individually and as Executor of the Estate of Abby Renschler, deceased; and Jason Renschler and Sandra Renschler on behalf of the heirs and next of kin of Abby Renschler, deceased; and Shayna Monson, Plaintiffs and Appellees v. Jordan MORSETTE, Defendant and Appellant |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Chad C. Nodland (argued), Bismarck, North Dakota, for plaintiff and appellee Lee Zander, individually and as Executor of the Estate of Taylor Goven, deceased, and Lee Zander on behalf of the heirs and next of kin of Taylor Goven, deceased.
Thomas A. Dickson (appeared), Bismarck, North Dakota, for plaintiffs and appellees Jason Renschler, individually and as Executor of the Estate of Abby Renschler, deceased, and Jason Renschler and Sandra Renschler on behalf of the heirs and next of kin of Abby Renschler, deceased.
Jeffrey S. Weikum (argued), Bismarck, North Dakota, for plaintiff and appellee Shayna Monson.
Kay N. Hunt (argued), Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Sean F. Marrin (appeared), Bemidji, Minnesota, for defendant and appellant.
Steven J. Leibel and Tyler J. Siewert, Bismarck, North Dakota, for amicus curiae Mothers Against Drunk Driving in support of plaintiffs and appellees.
[¶1] Jordan Morsette appeals from an amended judgment ordering him to pay $242 million in compensatory damages and $885 million in punitive damages to Shayna Monson; Lee Zander, individually and on behalf of Taylor Goven, deceased; and Jason Renschler, individually and on behalf of Abby Renschler, deceased (Plaintiffs). Morsette argues the district court erred in admitting evidence of his intoxication, erred in its instructions to the jury, and erred by granting the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint to add a punitive damages claim. Morsette also argues the jury's verdict was excessive. We reverse the amended judgment and remand for a new trial.
[¶2] In June 2015, while driving on the wrong side of the Bismarck Expressway, Morsette's vehicle collided head on with Monson's vehicle. Monson suffered serious bodily injuries, and Goven and Renschler died at the crash scene. Morsette's blood alcohol concentration was 0.295 percent at the time of the collision.
[¶3] The Plaintiffs sued Morsette for negligence, seeking damages for their injuries. Morsette answered and admitted liability for the accident. The Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add a punitive damages claim, alleging Morsette's conduct was oppressive and malicious. The district court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion, finding they "met the threshold of malice necessary to amend the complaint to request punitive damages."
[¶4] Before trial, Morsette moved to exclude references at trial to his intoxication at the time of the accident. The district court denied Morsette's motion, concluding Morsette's intoxication was relevant to the Plaintiffs’ compensatory damages. The court bifurcated the trial for separate proceedings on compensatory and punitive damages. The jury awarded $36 million in compensatory damages, more than $2 million in interest on past damages, and $295 million in punitive damages to each of the Goven and Renschler plaintiffs. The jury awarded $170 million to Monson in compensatory damages, more than $5.2 million in interest on past damages, and $295 million in punitive damages.
[¶5] Morsette moved for a reduction of damages and a new trial. He argued the district court erred in the compensatory damages phase of trial by admitting evidence of his intoxication, the court erred in its jury instructions, the jury's verdict was excessive, and the Plaintiffs’ references to his absence at trial should have been excluded. After a hearing, the court reduced the punitive damages awarded to the Goven and Renschler plaintiffs to $72 million each as required by N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-11(4). The court denied Morsette's motion for a new trial, concluding his intoxication was relevant at trial regarding the Plaintiffs’ damages.
[¶6] Morsette argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial. He asserts the court erred in admitting evidence of his intoxication in the compensatory damages phase of trial and claims his intoxication was not relevant to the Plaintiffs’ damages after he admitted liability. Morsette also argues the court erred in its jury instructions and the jury's verdict was excessive.
[¶7] We review a district court's decision on a motion for a new trial under the abuse of discretion standard. Rentz v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 2020 ND 254, ¶ 12, 952 N.W.2d 47. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, when it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. Id.
[¶8] Morsette claims the district court erred in admitting evidence of his intoxication. He argues his intoxication was not relevant to the Plaintiffs’ compensatory damages after he admitted liability.
[¶9] A district court has broad discretion in admitting or excluding evidence at trial. Flynn v. Hurley Enterprises, Inc. , 2015 ND 58, ¶ 5, 860 N.W.2d 450. Generally, relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not admissible. N.D.R.Ev. 402. "Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." N.D.R.Ev. 401. Under N.D.R.Ev. 403, the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury. Even if the court errs at trial, N.D.R.Civ.P. 61 states:
Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence, or any other error by the court or a party, is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.
See also N.D.R.Ev. 103(a) ().
[¶10] The Plaintiffs sued Morsette for negligence, claiming he failed to follow the law and rules of driving, failed to properly observe the roadway, failed to maintain proper control of his vehicle, failed to maintain the appropriate lane of travel, and operated a vehicle while heavily intoxicated. The Plaintiffs alleged Morsette's negligence caused their damages. In his answer, Morsette admitted that he was negligent and that his negligence proximately and directly caused the Plaintiffs’ damages. Before trial, Morsette admitted liability for the "violent, high speed head-on collision" with Monson's vehicle. At trial, the district court stated to the jury:
Mr. Morsette has admitted fault in causing the accident, so the only issue for you to decide are whether the accident caused the alleged injury or injuries or losses and, if so, what is the proper amount of compensation, if any, that should be paid for the alleged injury or injuries or losses.
[¶11] The Plaintiffs sought damages for their injuries under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-04, relating to economic and noneconomic damages for wrongful death or injury to person:
In a wrongful death action, "the jury shall give such damages as it finds proportionate to the injury resulting from the death to the persons entitled to the recovery." N.D.C.C. § 32-21-02.
[¶12] The Plaintiffs claim the method by which they were injured, or by which their child died, was relevant to the nature and extent of noneconomic damages they suffered. The Plaintiffs assert Morsette's intoxication directly impacted their noneconomic damages because they suffered unique pain and mental anguish stemming from the fact that Morsette was intoxicated while driving.
[¶13] This Court has not addressed whether a defendant's intoxication is relevant to a plaintiff's damages when the defendant admits liability. Other courts have held evidence of intoxication is irrelevant and prejudicial when a defendant admits liability for an accident. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Dixon , 209 So. 3d 77, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (); Swanson v. Robles , 128 So. 3d 915, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) ; Parker v. Artery , 889 P.2d 520, 524 (Wyo. 1995) ; Puent v. Dickens , 245 Va. 217, 427 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1993) (); Anderson v. Amundson , 354 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (...
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