Zapata v. Davidson
| Decision Date | 11 April 1972 |
| Citation | 24 Cal.App.3d 823,101 Cal.Rptr. 438 |
| Parties | Alphonso ZAPATA, Sandy Knoll, and on their behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., etc., Petitioners, v. Rene C. DAVIDSON, in his official capacity as Registrar of Voters for the County of Alameda, Respondent. Civ. 31144. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Marjorie Gelb, Hayward, Vernon W. Salvador, William R. Petrocelli, John Erickson, Oakland, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, for petitioners.
Richard J. Moore, County Counsel, James E. Jefferis, Asst. County Counsel, County of Alameda, Oakland, for respondent.
This is a proceeding brought pursuant to section 6403 of the Elections Code. 1
Section 6403 provides, in relevant part, that 'Whenever it is made to appear by affidavit . . . that an error or omission has occurred or is about to occur in the placing of any name on, or in the printing of, an official primary election ballot, or that any wrongful act has been or is about to be done by any person charged with any duty concerning the primary election, or that any neglect of duty has occurred or is about to occur, the court shall order the officer or person charged with the error, wrong or neglect forthwith to correct the error, desist from the wrongful act or perform the duty, or show cause why he should not do so. . . .' 2
No appeal lies from an order made pursuant to this section and such order is final on entry. (Matter of Snyder, 158 Cal. 218, 219, 110 P. 820; Donnellan v. Hite, 139 Cal.App.2d 43, 45, 293 P.2d 158.) The statute 'has to do solely with errors or omissions of others charged under the law with duties relative to the matter of the primary election, and the relief expressly provided for therein is an order requiring 'the officer or person charged with such error, wrong or neglect to forthwith correct the error, desist from the wrongful act or perform the duty.'' (Sinclair v. Jordan, 183 Cal. 486, 488, 191 P. 910, 911.)
In the instant case petitioners, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed the petition pursuant to section 6403 on March 8, 1972. The petition alleges that respondent Registrar of Voters 3 refused to accept for filing the declaration of petitioners Alphonso Zapata and Sandy Knoll for the office of supervisor of the County of Alameda at the June 6, 1972 primary election without the payment of filing fees by each in the sum of $295.76. The petition alleges that Zapata and Knoll advised respondent that they were financially unable to pay such fee and that these candidates meet all legal requirements to have their names placed upon the ballot for said office at said primary election, except that they are too poor and unable to pay said filing fee.
The petition also alleges that the County of Alameda intends to charge each candidate for supervioso at said primary election between $383.40 and $633.30 as the cost for including in a 'voter's pamphlet' prepared by the county containing a 'statement of qualifications' with respect to candidates in such election. It is alleged that Zapata and Knoll are unable to pay said charges because of indigency.
The gravamen of the petition is that statutes requiring the payment of such fees and charges are unconstitutional because, in requiring the payment of monetary fees to run for political office, these statutes discriminate against petitioners on account of their poverty, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution (art. I, §§ 11 and 21) and the provision of the latter Constitution providing that 'No property qualification shall ever be required for any person to vote or hold office.' (Art. I, § 24.) The equal protection violation is also asserted on the basis that impoverished voters are denied the right to vote for candidates of their same economic strata. Unconstitutionality is also alleged on the basis that the subject statutes restrain the right of political advocacy and association in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Petitioners pray in said petition that sections 6551 to 6555, inclusive, and section 10012.5, insofar as they require the payment of filing fees, be found unconstitutional and void and further pray that an order be issued by this court directing respondent to issue, transmit and process all papers required by the Elections Code to allow Zapata and Knoll to run for public office and be included in the voter's pamphlet or show cause why he should not be required to do so.
On the basis of the petition we issued an order on March 8, 1972, directing respondent to grant petitioners the relief prayed for or to show cause before this court on March 9, 1972, why he should not be required to do so. On March 9, 1972, respondent appeared in response to the order to show cause to oppose the petition. The hearing proceeded and both parties presented arguments. We then determined that the matter could not be adequately adjudicated and resolved in view of the shortness of time within which to determine the several issues presented, the last date for the filing and acceptance of the declaration of candidacy for Zapata and Knoll being the next day, i. e., March 10, 1972. Accordingly, we issued a conditional order directing respondent to accept the nomination papers of Zapata and Knoll if offered in proper form and accompanied by an affidavit of indigency, reserving to this court jurisdiction under section 6403 to determine whether the printing of the name of such candidate on the ballot shall be conditioned upon his or her paying the prescribed fee, and to accept a candidate's statement from Zapata and Knoll upon the same conditions without requiring any deposit therefor. We thereupon continued the matter to March 28, 1972, for further proceedings and to permit respondent to present points and authorities and such affidavits as he might deem appropriate directed to the issues of whether the fee and deposit in question are reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of a legitimate state objective, and, if so, whether either Zapata or Knoll could be expected to fulfill such fee and deposit from his or her own resources or modest contributions from others. Petitioners were granted leave to file a reply and counteraffidavits.
At the hearing on March 9, we orally declared that section 6403 embraced only the rights of Zapata and Knoll and that we deemed the proceeding one which directly concerned only these petitioners. Accordingly, we orally announced that we were not treating the petition as a class action but only as a proceeding between Zapata and Knoll, on the one hand, and respondent registrar on the other. We here reiterate this holding. We interpret section 6403 to apply to particular situations involving an error or omission in the placing of a name on, or the printing of, an election ballot or where any wrongful act has been or is about to be done by any person charged with a duty concerning the primary election, or that any neglect of duty has occurred or is about to occur by such person. In the instant case the proceeding is concerned only with whether an error or omission has occurred, or is about to occur, on the County of Alameda ballot insofar as it concerns Zapata and Knoll, or whether any wrongful act has or is about to be committed by respondent affecting the right of Zapata or Knoll to run for public office or whether respondent is neglecting a duty owing them. No other parties are involved or can be involved. We, accordingly, do not have the practical necessity and paramount convenience upon which class actions are predicated, nor do we have an ascertainable class and a well-defined community interest in questions of law and fact that are necessary requirements in a class action. (See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 703-704, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732; Chance v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 275, 291-292, 23 Cal.Rptr. 761, 373 P.2d 849)
On March 17, 1972, respondent moved to dismiss the instant proceeding on the ground that Zapata and Knoll were ineligible to be candidates for the office involved and that they have no standing to maintain this proceeding. The basis of Zapata's asserted ineligibility is that he is not a resident or the 5th Supervisorial District for which district he sought to file a declaration of candidacy. The declaretion in support of the motion declared that Zapata withdrew his demand for the declaration of candidacy forms directed to be issued to him by this court pursuant to our conditional order made on March 9.
The basis of Knoll's asserted ineligibility is that she does not satisfy the requirements of section 4 of the Charter of the County of Alameda which requires that each member of the Board must have been an elector for at least one year immediately preceding his election. It is alleged that in her declaration of candidacy Knoll states that she was born on June 1, 1952, and became an elector on July 5, 1971, the date on which article XXVI of the Constitution of the United States became effective. 4 Accordingly, respondent asserts that Knoll will not have been an elector of the district in which she seeks election for at least one year immediately preceding June 6, 1972, the date of the primary election. Respondent alleges that he has accepted the nomination papers from Knoll pursuant to the conditional order of this court, without the payment of fees or deposits, and that these forms are properly filled out in all respects, except that the statement of qualifications contains particular political matters reading as follows: 'I am a mimber of the Young Socialist Alliance and the Young Socialists for Linda Jenness for President and Andrew Priley for Vice President of the...
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