Zavala v. Strack
| Decision Date | 11 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-19-00201-CV |
| Parties | SALVADOR ZAVALA, TDCJ NO. 1447730, Appellant, v. SVEN STRACK, ET AL., Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
On appeal from the 36th District Court of Bee County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Appellant Salvador Zavala, a Texas inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit against appellees Sven Strack, David M. Rios, Christie L. Garcia, Corey Furr, Claudia Y. Becerra, Braulio Sanchez, Melissa J. Stengel, M. Blalock, Gene E. Miller, Grievance Investigator ID #1950, Grievance Investigator ID #1312, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ). By two issues, appellant argues the trial court erred when it (1) dismissed his suit under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and (2) declared him a vexatious litigant. We affirm.
Appellant is an inmate at the McConnell Unit of TDCJ in Beeville, Texas. On May 7, 2018, appellant filed suit against appellees in their official and individual capacities. In his petition, appellant alleged that he was given a false disciplinary charge by Strack and that the hearing on the disciplinary charge did not comply with TDCJ policy and rules, denying him due process of law. Appellant also alleged Strack broke his typewriter and illegally confiscated it in retaliation for filing grievances. Appellant sought judicial review of the disciplinary ruling and asserted claims for "denial [of] a fair disciplinary hearing," retaliation, breach of contract, "participatory liability - assisting and encouraging," conspiracy, common law fraud, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
Appellant submitted to the trial court the report from his disciplinary hearing, his level 1 and 2 grievances, a declaration of previously filed suits, and a "Request to pay for suit through my inmate trust fund." The report from the hearing on the disciplinary charge stated that appellant possessed contraband, "namely, freeworld pens, markers, and highlighters, which are items no [sic] allowed or assigned to an offender, and not bought by [appellant] for his use from the commissary." Appellant lost recreation and commissary privileges for thirty days as punishment. In his level 1 grievance, appellant complained that: the alleged violation was not investigated within the time frame provided by TDCJ'srules; he was never in possession of contraband or it did not belong to him; and Strack falsified the disciplinary case to justify the illegal confiscation of his typewriter.
The Texas Attorney General filed an amicus curiae brief advising the trial court to dismiss appellant's suit because his claims had no arguable basis in law or in fact and recommending that the trial court declare appellant a vexatious litigant. The attorney general submitted copies of nine civil judgments rendered against appellant in the preceding three years. After a hearing at which appellant participated via telephone, the trial court dismissed appellant's lawsuit with prejudice and declared him a vexatious litigant. This appeal followed.
By his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his claims under chapter 14.1
Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to any action brought by an inmate in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs has been filed, other than one brought under the family code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002; Thomas v. Knight, 52 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2001, pet. denied).2 A trial court may dismiss a suit under chapter 14 if it is frivolous, considering whether:
(1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannotprove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(b).
Generally, we review a trial court's dismissal of a lawsuit under chapter 14 for an abuse of discretion. In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d 273, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 238, 341-42 (Tex. 1985). "The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred." Id. at 242.
In our review of whether a claim has an arguable basis in law, we take the inmate's allegations as true and determine whether, as a matter of law, the petition stated a cause of action that would authorize relief. Brewer v. Simental, 268 S.W.3d 763, 770 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.); see Hamilton v. Williams, 298 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). We review pro se pleadings "by standards less stringent than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Brewer, 268 S.W.3d at 770; see Minix v. Gonzalez, 162 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). A claim has no arguable basis in law only if it is based on (1) wholly incredible or irrational factual allegations, or (2) an indisputably meritless legal theory. Nabelek v. Dist. Attorney of Harris Cty., 290 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). An inmate's claim may not be dismissed merely because the court considers the allegations "unlikely." Id.
Appellant first argues that Chapter 14 does not apply to him because he filed a "request to pay for suit through my inmate trust fund unable to pay court costs upfront." Chapter 14 applies to an action brought by an inmate "in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs is filed by the inmate." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002(a). In the event that an inmate files such a declaration—and, thus, chapter 14 applies—the trial court may order an inmate to pay the total amount of court fees and costs from an inmate's trust account. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.006(a), (c), (d).3
Here, appellant is an inmate who filed an unsworn declaration of his inability to pay court costs and submitted a copy of his inmate trust account indicating that his balance at the time he filed suit was $2.78. The record indicates that the court costs and fees incurred were $309. Appellant requested that the trial court assess court costs against his inmate trust account, and the trial court did, as provided by chapter 14. See id. Finally, appellant's suit does not arise under the family code. Therefore, chapter 14 applies, and we reject appellant's argument. See id. § 14.002; Thomas, 52 S.W.3d at 294.
Appellant next challenges the dismissal of his claims for violation of his due process rights, retaliation, conspiracy, breach of contract, "participatory liability - assisting and encouraging," common law fraud, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
Appellant argued in his petition that he was not allowed to confront his accuser, cross-examine or present witnesses, or provide any documentary evidence at his disciplinary hearing, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the State "without due process of law." Covarrubias v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice-Inst'l Div., 52 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 531 (1981)). The opportunity to be heard is the fundamental requirement of due process; it is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. The Due Process Clause promotes fairness by requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. Id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)).
However, not all penalties imposed on inmates implicate due process rights. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000) (); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1997) (); Hamilton v. Williams, 298 S.W.3d 334, 341 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (). Here, appellant's punishment was the loss of recreation and commissary privileges for thirty days; therefore, his due process rights were not implicated. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958; Madison, 104 F.3d at 767-68; Hamilton, 298 S.W.3d at 341.
On appeal, appellant argues that a liberty interest was implicated because he could be denied parole as a result of the guilty TDCJ violation finding. We disagree. This also does not implicate his due process rights. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958-59; see also Vargas v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, No. 03-12-00119-CV, 2012 WL 5974078, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 30, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("Texas law does not create a liberty interest in being...
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