Zedrick v. Kosenski

Decision Date25 April 1963
Docket NumberNo. 36313,36313
Citation380 P.2d 870,62 Wn.2d 50
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesJoe ZEDRICK and Lily Zedrick, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Leo J. KOSENSKI and Helen E. Kosenski, husband and wife, Respondents.

Stanley J. Krause, Aberdeen, for appellants.

Schumacher & Charette, Aberdeen for respondents.

WEAVER, Justice.

Fundamentally, this is an action upon a promissory note executed by defendant and held by plaintiff. There are two other causes of action, in theory, the same as the first. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment of dismissal.

At the center of this case is a single question of law.

October 1, 1957, plaintiff and defendant entered into a written partnership agreement. Their contributions to the partnership were to be equal. Plaintiff contributed the assets of his business, known as 'Joe Zedrick Tidewater Oil Co., Distributor'; defendant contributed $25,000 cash and executed the promissory note here involved for $30,394.26 payable to the partnership. The note did not bear interest. Subsequently, the partnership established two new businesses--the Olympic Truck Service, and the Blue Flame Gas Company.

The association was not a happy one. March, 1961, defendant commenced an action praying for an accounting and dissolution of the partnership. Zedrick, plaintiff (in the instant case), answered, praying, inter alia, that the partnership have judgment against defendant for $25,108.68, the balance unpaid on defendant's promissory note of October 1, 1957.

June 1, 1961, with the lawsuit at issue, the parties entered into a written agreement whereby defendant agreed to sell to plaintiff

'* * * all of [his] interest and ownership in and to that partnership doing business as the Joe Zedrick Tidewater Oil Distributors, Olympic Truck Service and Blue Flame Gas Company, including * * * assets as shown on the company records as of the 1st day of June, 1961. * * *'

Plaintiff, as buyer, agreed to indemnify and hold defendant harmless from any and all debts, liabilities, taxes or other obligations of the partnership. Plaintiff also agreed

'* * * to obtain and deliver to the Sellers a release of that real property mortgage heretofore executed by the Sellers by way of security for a partnership loan and which is a lien upon non-partnership real property owned by the Sellers.' (Italics ours.)

The $45,000 purchase price was payable $10,000 upon execution of the agreement, $15,000 in 30 days, and $20,000 in 90 days, which made the final payment due September 1, 1961.

Pursuant to the agreement, the pending lawsuit was dismissed by the superior court June 30, 1961. The order recited that the parties had

'* * * entered into an agreement through which the defendant [plaintiff in the instant case] is purchasing the plaintiff's interest in the partnership involved in litigation and through which the partnership is being wound up and all of the rights and duties of the plaintiff and defendant are being set forth in said agreement * * *'

and that

'* * * the rights and duties of the parties are settled through the above mentioned agreement.'

The purchase price having been paid, defendant executed and delivered to plaintiff a warranty deed and a bill of sale of his partnership interest, both dated September 11, 1961.

Four days later--September 15, 1961--plaintiff commenced the instant action, praying for (1) judgment for $25,108.68 and $3,000 attorney's fee, based upon defendant's promissory note dated October 1, 1957; (2) Judgment for $1,152.42, based upon an alleged account owed by defendant to Blue Flame Gas Company; and (3) return of a propane gas tank belonging to the partnership, or in the alternative, for a $240.24 money judgment, the alleged value of the tank.

The rule dispositive of this appeal is succinctly stated in Barnes v. Moore, 80 Cal.App.2d 39, 42, 180 P.2d 740, 742 (1947).

'* * * In the absence of fraud or a special agreement there is no occasion for a further account when one partner buys out the interest of the other on specific terms. This is especially true where the buyer knows the facts which might otherwise call for a further accounting. Such a sale and purchase includes and is, in itself, a form of accounting which is ordinarily sufficient, and which should be conclusive unless good reason is shown to the contrary. * * *' (Italics ours.)

In Wilbur v. Wilbur, 197 Cal. 1, 14, 239 P. 332, 337 (1925), the court said:

'It is the law of partnerships that when one partner purchases the interest of the other the transaction presumptively includes a final settlement of all partnership indebtedness existing between the partners. Bates on Partnership, §§ 629, 630, pp. 664, 665; Hattenhauer v. Adamick, 70 Ill.App. 602; Edens v. Williams, 36 Ill. 252.'

The New Jersey Court of Chancery expressed the rule thus:

'The purchase by one partner of all the interest of another partner, in the absence of fraud, must of necessity be an adjustment, as between seller and purchaser, of the accounts of the former with the firm.' (Schlicher v. Vogel, 61 N.J.Eq. 158, 162, 47 A. 448, 450 (1900), affirmed, Schlicher v. Whyte, 65 N.J.Eq. 404, 54 A. 1125 (1903)).

Numerous jurisdictions have espoused the same rule 1 as have the text writers. 2

Recognizing the rule we have discussed, the trial judge in the instant case said:

'When you settle it, you settle it, and you take into account when you pay off the departing partner, the amount by which he may have been indebted to the partnership.'

Plaintiff does not claim fraud, deceit, or coercion. Plaintiff knew of the promissory note; he had pleaded it as a defense in the former action. It cannot be assumed that defendant sold or intended to sell his own indebtedness to the...

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16 cases
  • Kinnear v. Hertz Corp.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • January 29, 1976
    ...the trial court were legal in nature, it was proper to decide the case on the motion for summary judgment. See Zedrick v. Kosenski, 62 Wash.2d 50, 54, 380 P.2d 870 (1963); Capitol Hill Methodist Church v. Seattle, supra ; Hodgins v. State, 9 Wash.App. 486, 491, 513 P.2d 304 We have reviewed......
  • Wold v. Wold
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • November 20, 1972
    ...and upon which the outcome of litigation depends. Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wash.2d 195, 381 P.2d 966 (1963); Zedrick v. Kosenski, 62 Wash.2d 50, 380 P.2d 870 (1963); Hansen v. Sandvik, 128 Wash. 60, 222 P. 205 (1924). Ultimate facts are the essential and determining facts upon which the conc......
  • In re Orantes, 66891-9-I
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • August 13, 2012
    ...on which the litigation's outcome depends." (quoting Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104, 108, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977))); Zedrick v. Kosenski, 62 Wn.2d 50, 54, 380 P.2d 870 (1963) ("'material facts' are those '. . . upon which the outcome of the litigation depends.'" (quoting Capitol Hill Methodis......
  • In re Personal Restraint Petition of Orantes, 66891-9-I
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    • August 13, 2012
    ...on which the litigation's outcome depends." (quoting Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104, 108, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977))); Zedrick v. Kosenski, 62 Wn.2d 50, 54, 380 P.2d 870 (1963) ("'material facts' are those '. . . upon which the outcome of the litigation depends.'" (quoting Capitol Hill Methodis......
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