Zeigler v. Maddox

• Decision Date: 31 March 1858
• Citation: 26 Mo. 575
• Parties: ZEIGLER, Defendant in Error, v. MADDOX, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

26 Mo. 575

ZEIGLER, Defendant in Error,

v.MADDOX, Plaintiff in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1858.

1. Where it appears from the face of a deed that it is a conveyance in trust to the use of the grantor, the courts will, as a matter of law, declare it void as against creditors.

2. If it be sought to impeach a deed for fraud as against creditors, and the fraudulent intent be not apparent upon the face of the deed, it must be established by extraneous evidence; the triers of the fact--the jury, or the court sitting as a jury--must respond to the issue raised as to the existence of the alleged fraudulent intent.

Error to St. Louis Circuit Court.

This was an action (commenced September 25, 1855) against Turner Maddox, sheriff of St. Louis county, to recover possession of a stock of drugs, medicines, &c., in possession of said Maddox by virtue of a levy of an execution against one William L. Maddock. Zeigler, plaintiff in the present suit, claimed title to said stock of drugs by virtue of a deed of trust executed by said Maddock to secure certain promissory notes. Zeigler was trustee in the deed of trust. The cause was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts. The notes were admitted to be bona fide notes. The deed of trust was duly recorded. It appears from the agreed statement that it was understood between Maddock, Zeigler and the cestui que trust, at the time of the execution of the deed of trust, that “Maddock should retain possession of said goods until the maturity of said notes, and sell and dispose of them in the usual course of trade;” that said “Maddock did keep possession of said goods and fixtures, and sold in the usual course of trade, for his own benefit, from the time he executed said deed of trust to plaintiff till the day of the levy and seizure of defendant.” The deed itself was not in evidence.

The court simply found from the agreed statement “that the property in question belongs to the plaintiff,” and gave judgment accordingly

Jones & Sherman, for plaintiff in error.

I. The deed of trust was absolutely void as a trust for the use of the grantor. (R. C. 1845, p. 525; 15 Mo. 459; Brooks v. Wimer, 20 Mo. 506; Martin v. Rice & Maddox, 24 Mo. 581; 24 Mo. 575; Walter v. Wimer, 24 Mo. 63.) It does not change the character of the deed that the agreement that the grantor should keep possession of the goods and sell, &c., was not incorporated into the body of the deed. It is agreed that there was such an agreement.

Hudson & Thomas, for defendant in error.

I. The deed of trust was valid upon its face, was duly acknowledged and recorded. It was made in good faith to secure the payment of a just debt. The parol agreement or understanding, if it could be considered at all, could not affect the legality of the deed. It is not pretended that there was any fraud in fact. The finding of the court is decisive of that question. (See Kneeland v. Cowles, 4 Chand. 46; 7 Mo. 245; 11 Mo. 369; 11 Gratt. 778; 8 Gratt. 148; 21 Ala. 333.)

SCOTT, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The only issue in this case was whether the deed was fraudulent as having been made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or purchasers. That issue was one of fact to be tried by a jury. As the court assumed the task of a jury and took upon itself to try the issue in the cause, its finding should have shown how the fact in dispute stood between the parties. We do not see that there is any conflict between our cases on this question if the section of the statute concerning fraudulent conveyances, under which they were severally made, be regarded in their...