Zellmer v. State
| Decision Date | 11 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. S00A0927, No. S00A0950. |
| Citation | 534 S.E.2d 802,272 Ga. 735 |
| Parties | ZELLMER v. The STATE. Spickler v. The State. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Marc D. Cella, Jimmy D. Berry, Marietta, John R. Greco, Atlanta, Mitchell D. Durham, Marietta, for appellants.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Jack E. Mallard, Russell J. Parker, Dana J. Norman, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Allison B. Vrolijk, Assistant Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
This is an interim appellate review of a case in which the State seeks the death penalty. Michael Zellmer and Robert Spickler allegedly killed Bruce Belville by striking him on the head during a robbery. Pursuant to the unified appeal procedure for capital felonies, OCGA § 17-10-35.1, we granted their applications for interim appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in ruling that appellants did not have the right to voir dire prospective jurors regarding their willingness to consider both of the non-death sentencing options, life without parole and life imprisonment.
1. Prior to the adoption in 1993 of OCGA § 17-10-31.1, which sets forth a three-tiered sentencing structure for murder that includes life without parole as a sentencing option, this Court allowed trial courts to limit voir dire questioning on the topic of parole because jurors' views on the appropriateness of parole eligibility were "extraneous to [their] ability to serve." Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 780(3), 450 S.E.2d 680 ( 1994); Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5(7), 426 S.E.2d 844 (1993). However, pursuant to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-31.1, juries in capital cases are required to determine the parole eligibility of those defendants who do not receive a death sentence in that subsection (d) obligates the trial court to instruct the jury on the meaning of and differences between life with parole and life without parole and the defendants' parole eligibility under these two alternatives. Turner v. State, 268 Ga. 213(6), 486 S.E.2d 839 (1997).
OCGA § 15-12-133 authorizes criminal defendants and the State to examine individual jurors concerning "any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the action...." Because determining whether parole eligibility is part of the subject matter of the sentencing phase of death penalty trials, we hold that criminal defendants and the State are statutorily entitled to examine jurors concerning their inclinations, leanings and biases regarding parole in order to ascertain whether the jurors hold "any prejudices or biases" for or against the possibility of parole that might "seriously impair[ ] [their] performance of [their] duties...." Turner v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at 217(6), 486 S.E.2d 839. However, voir dire examination concerning parole should be limited to jurors' willingness to consider both a life sentence that allows for the possibility of parole and a life sentence that does not. Exposure to the complexities of the future role of the Board of Pardons and Paroles should the sentence allow for the possibility of parole, is not an appropriate matter for voir dire. Likewise, because OCGA § 17-10-31.1(d) authorizes the trial court to charge the jury on the meaning of life imprisonment without parole and life imprisonment, "the juror[s'] beliefs regarding the meaning of those options [are] not a proper subject for voir dire." Turner v. State, supra. See King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir.1988).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the following voir dire questions are proper:
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Riley v. State
...sentence for a defendant (any defendant, not the particular defendant on trial) who is convicted of murder. See Zellmer v. State, 272 Ga. 735(1), 534 S.E.2d 802 (2000); OCGA § 15-12-133. However, the record reveals that Riley did not object to the court's preventing him from asking such que......
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...to capital punishment is no different from excluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which result in bias...."); Zellmer v. State, 272 Ga. 735, 534 S.E.2d 802 (2000). Here, the unwaivering biases of two of the prospective jurors against a death sentence, which arose both from personal ......
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...that he be permitted to conduct voir dire about potential jurors' views on the meaning of a life sentence. In Zellmer v. State, 272 Ga. 735(1), 534 S.E.2d 802 (2000), this Court held that criminal defendants and the State are entitled to examine potential jurors on their inclinations and bi......
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