Zemple, Matter of
| Decision Date | 29 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. C7-92-1099,C7-92-1099 |
| Citation | 489 N.W.2d 818 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Loren Lyle ZEMPLE. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Trial court may properly take judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
2. Trial court may not take judicial notice of testimony at prior proceeding.
3. Finding that appellant slapped his father was sufficient to sustain conclusion that appellant poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others.
James W. Brandt, St. Peter, for appellant Zemple.
W.M. Gustafson, Nicollet County Atty., Todd W. Westphal, Asst. County Atty., St. Peter, for respondent.
Considered and decided by HUSPENI, P.J., and LANSING and KLAPHAKE, JJ.
Appellant challenges his commitment as mentally ill on the grounds that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a prior proceeding and that the court's finding of dangerousness is not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.
In March of 1992, appellant Loren Lyle Zemple's father filed a domestic abuse action under Minn.Stat. ch. 518B (1990) in district court. At the hearing on the petition, appellant's father testified that appellant slapped him in the face. Appellant was not represented by counsel at this action and did not cross-examine his father. The trial court found that appellant had, in fact, slapped his father in the face and on March 16, 1992, the trial court issued an order for protection.
On March 27, 1992, the trial court issued appellant a citation for violation of the order for protection, and ordered that appellant undergo a competency evaluation. This evaluation had not been completed at the time of this appeal.
On April 23, 1992, a petition for judicial commitment was filed against appellant. At the hearing on the petition, upon respondent's request and over appellant's objection, the court took judicial notice of the file and the testimony given in the domestic abuse action.
Upon completion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that appellant was mentally ill. In its memorandum accompanying the order for commitment, the trial court found that appellant exhibited "grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions" both before the court and in a psychiatric evaluation. The trial court also found that "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that [appellant] poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to others." In reaching this conclusion, the trial court referred specifically to testimony of appellant's father at the domestic abuse action.
1. Did the trial court err in taking judicial notice of the domestic abuse action?
2. Is the trial court's finding that appellant poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others supported by sufficient evidence on the record?
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the domestic abuse file. "[R]ulings on the admissibility of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court." In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn.1984).
[Minnesota Rule of Evidence] 201(b) allows the court to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts:
"A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
In re Miner, 424 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. July 28, 1988) (quoting Minn.R.Evid. 201(b)).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained:
The function of judicial notice is to expedite litigation by eliminating the cost or delay of proving readily verifiable facts (citation omitted). Judicial notice of records from the court in which a judge sits would appear to greatly serve this function and satisfy the requirement of [Minnesota Rule of Evidence] 201(b)(2).
In re Welfare of Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn.1980).
In its memorandum, the trial court stated that it took judicial notice of the entire domestic abuse action file. This file included the finding that appellant slapped his father in the face. While the trial court did not specifically refer to this finding in its memorandum, it impliedly incorporated the finding in its conclusion that appellant "poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to others." Significantly, appellant's counsel conceded at oral argument that taking judicial notice of the adjudicated outcome of the domestic abuse proceeding was not erroneous. We agree and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it took judicial notice of the finding that appellant slapped his father in the face. 1
Appellant also claims that the trial court erred when it took judicial notice of testimony given at the domestic abuse proceeding. We agree.
In its memorandum, the trial court made several references to testimony given by appellant's father at the domestic abuse proceeding. This testimony was not properly the subject of judicial notice. While the testimony given at the hearing was properly transcribed and readily verifiable, the facts as testified to by appellant's father are not beyond dispute. Therefore, they do not satisfy the requirements of Minn.R.Evid. 201(b).
The testimony given by appellant's father was inadmissible hearsay. The record reveals that appellant's father was not unavailable to testify at the commitment hearing. Therefore, his statements were not admissible in the commitment proceeding under the "former testimony" exception to the hearsay rule. See Minn.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). Nor does the testimony satisfy any of the other hearsay exceptions contained in the rules of evidence. Thus, the trial court erred in admitting the prior testimony at the commitment hearing; an error which could have been avoided by calling appellant's father as a witness in the commitment hearing.
Appellant claims that the evidence on the record is insufficient as a matter of law to support the trial court's finding that appellant posed a substantial likelihood of physical harm to others. We do not agree.
Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.02, subd. 13 (1990) defines a "mentally ill person" as
any person who has an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or understand, which
(a) is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions; and
(b) poses a substantial...
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Jakab v. Jakab, 94-348
...V.R.E. 201(b). The content of the testimony in the CHINS proceeding does not fit within the limits of the rule. See In re Zemple, 489 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Minn.Ct.App.1992) (testimony in prior related proceeding "not properly the subject of judicial notice" because "not beyond dispute" and thus......
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Geske v. Marcolina
... ... every two weeks, had a net monthly income of $2,207.92, and "listed monthly expenses of $2,644 for herself and the two children[.]"4 See In re Zemple, 489 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Minn.App. 1992) (holding district court may take judicial notice of prior ruling but not prior testimonial assertions). Thus, ... ...
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In the Matter of J.M., No. COA07-1246 (N.C. App. 5/6/2008)
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