Zerilli v. Bell, Civ. A. No. 77-0546.

• Decision Date: 20 June 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 77-0546.
• Citation: 458 F. Supp. 26
• Parties: Anthony T. ZERILLI et al., Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Griffin BELL et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

458 F. Supp. 26

Anthony T. ZERILLI et al., Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Griffin BELL et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 77-0546.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 20, 1978.

Sol Z. Rosen, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Stuart F. Pierson and Richard L. Cys, Washington, D. C., for Seth Kantor.

MEMORANDUM

GASCH, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. Plaintiffs Anthony T. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi bring this action under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), against the Attorney General of the United States, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Justice. Plaintiffs contend that, during criminal proceedings against plaintiffs in the District Court for the Southern District of California, the Government disclosed that it possessed wiretap logs relating to conversations of plaintiffs. Subsequently, in June, 1971, in a separate proceeding, United States District Judge Gus Solomon for the District of Oregon ordered that these logs be sealed. Plaintiffs allege that, in August, 1976, the Detroit News published excerpts from the wiretap logs in a series of articles written by Seth Kantor and other members of the newspaper staff. Plaintiffs further allege that defendants released these wiretap logs without the consent of plaintiffs or the permission of a court.

The sole discovery sought by plaintiffs prior to the termination of discovery (December 11, 1977) consisted of one set of seven interrogatories. In addition to the ample discovery allotted, the Court also granted plaintiffs special leave to take the deposition of Seth Kantor on January 25, 1978. On February 3, 1978, plaintiffs noted the depositions of three staff members of the Detroit News. Defendants moved for a protective order to end discovery on the ground that the depositions were scheduled beyond the prescribed time for discovery. On March 1, 1978, plaintiffs made an oral motion to extend discovery for the purpose of taking these depositions, and this Court denied the motion. Although Seth Kantor was deposed six weeks earlier, it was only after the Court denied plaintiffs' request to take the depositions that plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel discovery.

Plaintiffs bring this motion to compel witness Seth Kantor, a reporter for the Detroit News, to answer fourteen questions propounded by counsel for plaintiffs at his deposition on January 25, 1978 and produce certain documents. The questions sought to elicit the sources which provided information for the series of newspaper articles and, more specifically, which provided access to copies of the wiretap logs. A number of the questions requested specific information about the reporter's role and conversations in developing the articles. The witness based his refusal to answer the questions and produce the documents at issue on the First Amendment privilege "not to disclose information tending to identify confidential news sources." Deposition of Seth Kantor at 9. Plaintiffs claim that the right of plaintiffs to vindicate their legal rights in a civil case supersedes the qualified First Amendment privilege.

This discovery issue presents a conflict between the rights of civil litigants to pursue their claims in federal court and the First Amendment rights of newsmen to protect confidential sources and the editorial process. The compelled disclosure of journalist sources clearly impinges on the First Amendment, as it undeniably jeopardizes a journalist's ability to obtain information on a confidential basis. See Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966, 93 S.Ct. 2147, 36 L.Ed.2d 686 (1973). It thus interferes with newsmen's right to gather and disseminate news and the public's right to receive news. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F.Supp. 1394, 1396 (D.D.C. 1973). Similarly, disclosure of the internal editorial process impacts on the First Amendment. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently stated:

Invoking the broad words of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has never hesitated to forge specific safeguards to insure the continued vitality of the press. It has repeatedly recognized the essentially tripartite aspect of the press's work and function in: (1) acquiring information, (2) `processing' that information and (3) disseminating the information. The Supreme Court was aware that if any link in that chain were broken, the free flow of information inevitably ceases.

Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1977) (footnotes omitted).

Since the First Amendment is a "preferred" constitutional freedom, there must be a "compelling" interest in order to permit a countervailing right to take precedence over the journalist's right to protect confidential sources or the editorial process. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). The Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), determined that investigation of crime by a grand jury is such a compelling interest and therefore that the journalists would not be permitted to withhold confidential sources from a grand jury. However, Justice Powell, the fifth member of the majority, indicated in his concurring opinion that each claim of privilege under the First Amendment "should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct." 408 U.S. at 710, 92 S.Ct. at 2671.

Several courts have recognized that countervailing considerations in the context of civil litigation are less compelling. The Circuit Court in Baker v. F & F Investment, supra, 470 F.2d at 785, noted:

If, as Mr. Justice Powell noted in Branzburg v. Hayes, instances will arise in which First Amendment values outweigh the duty of a journalist to testify even in the context of a criminal investigation, surely in civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in non-disclosure of journalists' confidential news sources will often be weightier

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