Zhang v. 56 Locust Road, LLC
| Decision Date | 13 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | FST-CV-126015791-S |
| Parties | Sanle Zhang v. 56 Locust Road, LLC |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This is a case involving a claim of adverse possession which has an unusual if not unique twist. The plaintiffs purchased the property located at 40 Locust Road in Greenwich, in 2012, and are claiming adverse possession to a portion of an abutting property, with the disputed area having acreage in excess of one half acre. The defendant is the owner of 56 Locust Road the abutting property for which the deed facially includes the disputed area. The defendant acquired the property also in 2012. (In the alternative, plaintiffs are claiming a prescriptive easement to that same disputed area.)
The unusual if not unique aspect of the case is at least partially attributable to the shape of the defendant's property. 56 Locust Road is a somewhat elongated and relatively narrow, roughly rectangular parcel (approximately 100 feet wide and 2, 168 feet long), and the disputed area is located somewhat north of the middle of the parcel. If the plaintiffs establish adverse possession to the disputed area the remainder of 56 Locust Road would be split into two areas or parcels, separated by the disputed area, leaving one of the " new" parcels (the larger one) landlocked without any access to the other lot and without any access to a public road. A number of the affirmative assertions and defenses by the defendant focus on that situation as requiring either a refusal of the court to find adverse possession to have been proved or requiring the court to otherwise address the consequence of an order finding adverse possession to have been proved.
As already noted, the plaintiffs are seeking an order of the court finding adverse possession to have been proved by the requisite clear and convincing evidence; in the alternative they are seeking a prescriptive easement. The defendant has filed five special defenses (#157.00), asserting that the adverse possession claim is barred/precluded by the illegal (land use) activities of the plaintiffs' predecessors; laches based on the failure of plaintiffs' predecessors to seek a legal declaration of adverse possession earlier; that the plaintiffs' predecessors did not convey purported title to the disputed area to the plaintiffs; that the court should not recognize adverse possession given the " land use" consequences including a claimed illegal subdivision, creation of illegal lots, etc.; and that an order recognizing the plaintiffs' rights to the disputed area by adverse possession would constitute an illegal (unconstitutional) taking. The defendant also has filed four counterclaims, asserting trespass; a claim predicated on its having given notice to the plaintiffs pursuant to General Statutes § 52-575 (and § 47-38 et seq.) (seemingly seeking to quiet title); a request for declaratory relief that General Statutes § 52-575 is unconstitutional based on the unconstitutional taking implicated by a judgment of adverse possession; and a request for a determination of the existence of an easement by necessity.
With limited exceptions, the facts are not much in dispute. The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact, but instead of focusing on findings, there is more of an emphasis on the great amount of evidence that was presented rather than essential facts and ultimate facts necessary for adjudication. Thus, it was not necessary for the parties to identify multiple witnesses who testified as to the presence and particular uses of the riding ring in the disputed area over 40+ years, nor was it necessary for the parties to identify multiple witnesses who testified as to the density of vegetation making visibility of the ring difficult from certain perspectives. (There was overwhelming evidence of the existence and use of the riding ring over the decades, and the somewhat limited visibility of the riding ring from certain portions of the defendant's property was not a material factor.)
The plaintiffs are seeking to quiet title, asking the court to find title via adverse possession. Therefore, the focus is on the requirements for establishment of adverse possession.
" The essential elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of right by open, visible and exclusive possession of the claimant without license or consent of the owner." (Internal quotation marks and citation, omitted). Castro v. Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc., 158 Conn.App. 371, 376, 119 A.3d 639 (2015).
The use of the property by the adverse claimant must be " open, visible and notorious" and the elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 98 Lords Highway, LLC v. One Hundred Lords Highway, LLC, 138 Conn.App. 776, 806, 54 A.3d 232 (2012).
" If one party's period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights." (Internal quotation marks and citations, omitted.) Caminis v. Troy, 300 Conn. 297, 311, 12 A.3d 984 (2011).
[Additional legal standards will be identified in the relevant sections of this decision.]
In its post-trial submissions, the defendant raises the issue of standing and subject matter jurisdiction, based on the contention that there was no express or implied conveyance of an interest in the disputed area to the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title (Stenmetz/Cross). In effect, the claim is that the plaintiffs do not have an ability to rely on adverse use by predecessors, in pursuing their claims. Necessarily, the court must address such an issue, when it is raised, before addressing the merits of the case. A number of legal principles inform this analysis.
The court believes that the plaintiffs clearly have alleged--and offered proof--of at least a colorable claim of entitlement to adverse possession. Actual proof of the merits of their claim, by the appropriate standard, does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction and standing--and as discussed below, the court concludes that they have proved the essential elements of their claim of adverse possession, including the necessary linkage to predecessors in title.
While not directly implicated, Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 653, n.16, 974 A.2d 669 (2009) contains language that is helpful in analyzing the issue, particularly at this juncture: " When the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits of the case, the court may in its discretion choose to postpone resolution of the jurisdictional question until the parties complete further discovery or, if necessary, a full trial on the merits has occurred." Here, even if there were jurisdictional implications, we are at the merits-phase of the case and no purpose would be served by trying to analyze a claimed deficiency in plaintiffs' proof as a jurisdictional defect.
In this regard, part of the jurisdictional discussion in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544-45, 590 A.2d 914 (1991) is particularly apt. In Gurliacci, the court discussed the need to distinguish between essential elements of a cause of action and jurisdictional requirements, characterizing as " bizarre" an approach that retrospectively determined jurisdiction: Taken to an extreme, the defendant's argument here is that in every adverse possession case, if there were a claimed failure to prove an essential element (and even if just limited to claims related to tacking and/or conveyance of prior interest), the court would be required, retrospectively, to dismiss the case. The court declines to adopt such an approach which closely parallels an approach that previously has been rejected by our Supreme Court.
The ability to rely on predecessors adverse use is not a standing/subject matter jurisdictional issue, and in any event the court finds that the plaintiffs have proven their ability to so rely. Accordingly, the court rejects the jurisdictional challenge, and will now address the merits of the substantive contentions of the parties.
Although the defendant does not formally concede the point, there really is no substantial issue as to whether the plaintiffs have facially established most of the elements of a claim...
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