Zidron v. Metts
| Decision Date | 28 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15AP–1049,15AP–1049 |
| Citation | 87 N.E.3d 783,2017 Ohio 1118 |
| Parties | Amy M. ZIDRON, D.O., Appellant, v. Bradley METTS, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Ohio University Heritage College of Osteopathic Medicine, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
On brief: Hanna, Campbell & Powell, and Douglas G. Leak ; Poling Law Firm, and Frederick A. Sewards, Columbus, for appellant. Argued: Douglas G. Leak.
On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Brian M. Kneafsey, Jr., for appellee Ohio University Heritage College of Osteopathic Medicine. Argued: Brian M. Kneafsey, Jr.
DECISION
{¶ 1} Appellant, Amy M. Zidron, D.O. ("Dr. Zidron"), appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio finding that she was not entitled to personal immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On March 7, 2014, plaintiffs-appellees, Bradley Metts ("Bradley"), a minor, and his father, Mark Daniel "Danny" Metts, II ("Danny" and the plaintiffs together, "Metts"), filed a complaint against defendant-appellee, Ohio University Heritage College of Osteopathic Medicine ("OU–HCOM"). Metts asserted a claim for medical negligence, alleging that OU–HCOM and/or OU–HCOM's employees failed to "diagnose and properly treat" Bradley's "significant ear infection" and that this resulted in severe, permanent injury, including "mastoiditis
, meningitis, cerebral edema, myocardial infarction, muscle atrophy and immobility, impaired cognition, and incontinence." (Mar. 7, 2014 Compl. at ¶ 6–7.) Metts also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. The Court of Claims entered an order of reference, pursuant to Civ.R. 53, for a magistrate to manage and preside over the case.
{¶ 3} On August 28, 2014, Metts, already being in the Court of Claims, requested an immunity determination of a doctor who had treated Bradley, Dr. Zidron, pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(F) to decide whether Dr. Zidron was entitled to personal immunity under R.C. 9.86. Dr. Zidron had asserted personal immunity in a related action captioned Metts v. Nationwide Children's Hospital, Franklin C.P. No. 14CV–002543. The magistrate in the Court of Claims granted Metts' motion and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for February 18, 2015.
{¶ 4} The facts presented at the hearing demonstrated that Bradley went to the offices of University Medical Associates, Inc. ("UMA") on October 28, 2013 complaining of an earache and a fever. Bradley's appointment was at 10:45 a.m. and scheduled with Dr. Zidron. Although Bradley was "[a] patient of the pediatrics group" at UMA, Dr. Zidron had never personally treated Bradley before October 28, 2013. (Feb. 18, 2015 Hearing Tr. at 85.) Dr. Zidron was in her fourth month in UMA's employment at that time.
{¶ 5} UMA is a private, non-profit organization with its own board of directors. UMA is the exclusive practice group through which OU–HCOM faculty members are permitted to practice medicine. UMA leases office space from Ohio University. Dr. Zidron's employment with UMA commenced on July 1, 2013.
{¶ 6} Dr. Zidron was also employed by OU–HCOM as an assistant professor in the department of pediatrics. Dr. Zidron's duties as an assistant professor included "active classroom and laboratory teaching" and "clinical teaching." (Dr. Zidron Ex. 4 at 2, Feb. 18, 2015 Hearing.) Dr. Zidron's employment with OU–HCOM was conditioned on her entering into an employment agreement with UMA. (Dr. Zidron Ex. 4.) Dr. Zidron's employment with OU–HCOM began a month after her employment with UMA on August 1, 2013.
{¶ 7} Dr. Zidron's annual salary from UMA was $123,000; her annual salary from OU–HCOM was $27,000. (OU–HCOM Ex. A, Feb. 18, 2015 Hearing.) OU–HCOM agreed to "reimburse UMA for [Dr. Zidron's] annual clinical salary" for "two consecutive years" beginning "from the UMA clinical practice hire date." (Dr. Zidron Ex. 4 at 1.)
{¶ 8} Dr. Zidron testified that most of her clinical teaching for OU–HCOM occurred at the UMA offices. On October 28, 2013, Dr. Jacqueline Fisher accompanied Dr. Zidron in her rounds at the UMA offices as part of Dr. Fisher's resident physician training. Dr. Fisher was a resident participating in the Centers of Osteopathic Research and Education ("CORE") program. Dr. Zidron testified that residents involved in CORE would "come to UMA as part of their residency program requirements to rotate through and learn their CORE requirement of pediatrics." (Hearing Tr. at 72–73.) Although Dr. Zidron recalled that a resident accompanied her at the UMA offices on October 28, 2013, Dr. Zidron stated that she had "no recollection one way or the other" of whether Dr. Fisher was present in the room during Bradley's appointment. (Hearing Tr. at 53.)
{¶ 9} On June 9, 2015, the magistrate of the Court of Claims issued a decision finding that Dr. Zidron was not entitled to the immunity afforded by R.C. 9.86. The magistrate observed that Dr. Zidron's duties (June 9, 2015 Mag.'s Decision at 5.) The magistrate reviewed the evidence in the record and concluded that Dr. Fisher was not present when Dr. Zidron treated Bradley. As such, the magistrate found that Dr. Zidron was not engaged in clinical teaching when she treated Metts, and she was, therefore, acting manifestly outside the scope of her state employment with OU–HCOM.
{¶ 10} Dr. Zidron filed objections to the magistrate's decision on June 23, 2015. OU–HCOM filed a response to Dr. Zidron's objections on July 6, 2015.
{¶ 11} On October 14, 2015, the Court of Claims entered judgment overruling Dr. Zidron's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision as its own. Dr. Zidron's first objection was that the magistrate erred by shifting the burden of proof from OU–HCOM to Dr. Zidron. The Court of Claims observed that the magistrate's decision did not mention anything about shifting the burden of proof, and it could find "no evidence to support the assertion that the magistrate incorrectly placed the burden of proof on Dr. Zidron." (Oct. 14, 2015 Decision at 2.) Dr. Zidron's second objection was that the magistrate erred in finding that Dr. Zidron was not acting within the scope of her employment when the alleged malpractice occurred. The Court of Claims stated that Dr. Zidron had testified that she could not recall if Dr. Fisher was present when she treated Bradley and that the electronic medical record demonstrated that Dr. Fisher never accessed Bradley's chart on October 28, 2013. The Court of Claims concluded that there was "more evidence from which the court [could] infer Dr. Zidron was not teaching and therefore not acting within the scope of her employment with OU–HCOM when she treated [Bradley] Metts." (Decision at 7.)
{¶ 12} For cogency of analysis, we address Dr. Zidron's second assignment of error first.
{¶ 13} Dr. Zidron argues in her second assignment of error that the Court of Claims' denial of her defense of immunity was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶ 14} As a preliminary matter, Civ.R. 53 governs proceedings before a magistrate, including objections to a magistrate's decision. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides that "[i]f one or more objections to a magistrate's decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections." "In reviewing objections to a magistrate's decision, the trial court must make an independent review of the matters objected to in order ‘to ascertain [whether] the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.’ " Randall v. Eclextions Lofts Condo. Assn., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-708, 2014-Ohio-1847, 2014 WL 1777995, ¶ 7, quoting Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). See also Roe v. Heap, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-586, 2004-Ohio-2504, 2004 WL 1109849, ¶ 34, quoting Nolte v. Nolte, 60 Ohio App.2d 227, 396 N.E.2d 807 (8th Dist.1978), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 15} "If objections are filed, a trial court undertakes a de novo review of a magistrate's decision." Meccon, Inc. v. Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-899, 2013-Ohio-2563, 2013 WL 3198111, ¶ 15, citing Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-541, 2010-Ohio-2774, 2010 WL 2433119, ¶ 15. " ‘However, the appellate standard of review when reviewing a trial court's adoption of a magistrate's decision is an abuse of discretion.’ " Id. A court of appeals may only reverse a trial court's adoption of a magistrate's decision if the trial court acted unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner. Id. As such, an abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). Claims of trial court error must be based on the trial court's decision and judgment, as opposed to the magistrate's findings. Mayle at ¶ 15.
{¶ 16} "With respect to manifest weight challenges, judgment supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. " Meccon at ¶ 15, citing Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-606, 2012-Ohio-1017, 2012 WL 831094, ¶ 31, citing C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus. "Under this standard of review, the appellate court weighs the evidence in order to determine whether the trier of fact ‘clearly lost its way and created such...
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