Ziemba v. Johns, 36945
| Decision Date | 20 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 36945,36945 |
| Citation | 183 Neb. 644,163 N.W.2d 780 |
| Parties | Theodore J. ZIEMBA, Appellee, v. L. C. JOHNS, Director of Motor Vehicles of Nebraska, Appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The same motor vehicle operation may give rise to two separate and distinct proceedings. One is a civil and administrative licensing procedure instituted by the Director of Motor Vehicles to determine whether a person's privilege to drive is revoked. The other is a criminal action instituted in the appropriate court to determine whether a crime has been committed. Each action proceeds independently of the other and the outcome of one action is of no consequence to the other.
2. A defendant's plea of guilty to a criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol does not preclude the subsequent revocation of his driver's license in the administrative proceedings before the Director of Motor Vehicles under the provisions of the Implied Consent Act.
Clarence A. H. Meyer, Atty. Gen., James Duggan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lincoln, Herbert T. White, Omaha, for appellant.
Paul E. Watts, Omaha, for appellee.
Byron J. Norval, Seward, for Seward County, Amicus Curiae.
Heard before WHITE, C.J., BOSLAUGH, SMITH, and McCOWN, JJ., and HUBKA, ACH, and GARROTTO, District Judges.
The Director of Motor Vehicles revoked appellee's license to operate a motor vehicle under the provisions of the Implied Consent Act. On appeal to the district court, that court found for the appellee, and the Director of Motor Vehicles has appealed.
The issue is whether a plea of guilty to a criminal charge of drunken driving under section 39-727, R.R.S.1943, is sufficient to establish the reasonableness of a refusal to submit to a chemical test for alcohol in an administrative proceeding under the Implied Consent Act.
On December 4, 1966, appellee was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was advised of the requirements of the Implied Consent Act and informed of the consequence of refusal. He refused the test. The arresting officer filed his affidavit with the appellant pursuant to section 39-727.08, R.R.S.1943. Thereafter, on March 23, 1967, after proper notice, the appellant held a hearing to determine whether the appellee's refusal to take the test was reasonable or unreasonable.
Appellee's claim of reasonableness was based on the fact that on February 7, 1967, in the municipal court of Omaha, the appellee had pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; had paid a fine of $100; and had his driver's license suspended for 6 months by that court.
The hearing officer for the appellant ruled that the later plea of guilty to the criminal charge was not a reasonable ground for refusal to submit to the chemical test for alcohol. On March 27, 1967, the appellant entered an order revoking the driver's license of appellee for the mandatory 1-year period from that date.
The appellee contends that a plea of guilty to a criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ought to obviate the administrative proceeding under the provisions of the Implied Consent Act because that law is merely an implementation of the criminal drunk driving statutes. We cannot agree.
It is well established that the same motor vehicle operation may give rise to two separate and distinct proceedings. One is a civil and administrative licensing procedure instituted by the Director of Motor Vehicles to determine whether a person's privilege to drive is revoked. The other is a criminal action instituted in the appropriate court to determine whether a crime has been committed. Each action proceeds independently of the other and the outcome of one action is of no consequence to the other. See, Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 140 N.W.2d 866; Bowers v. Hults, 42 Misc.2d 845, 249 N.Y.S.2d 361; Marbut v. Motor Vehicle Department, 194 Kan. 620, 400 P.2d 982.
In Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75, 88 A.L.R.2d 1055, this court held that the fact of acquittal of the criminal charge did not preclude the subsequent...
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...of one is of no consequence to the other." Joyner v. Garrett, supra 279 N.C. at 238, 182 S.E.2d at 562, Quoting Ziemba v. Johns, 183 Neb. 644, 646, 163 N.W.2d 780, 781. (Emphasis added.) See also Creech v. Alexander, supra; Vuncannon v. Garrett, 17 N.C.App. 440, 194 S.E.2d 364 (1973). Elsew......
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