Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 July 1985 |
| Citation | 493 N.Y.S.2d 102,482 N.E.2d 898,65 N.Y.2d 513 |
| Parties | , 482 N.E.2d 898 Charles T. ZIMMER, Jr., Appellant, v. CHEMUNG COUNTY PERFORMING ARTS, INC., Respondent, and Elcon Contractors, Inc., et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. Mac-Dan Erectors, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. John HUNT, Respondent, v. WERNER SPITZ CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, et al., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff. Railing Supply Company, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
We are called upon on these appeals to determine the extent to which Labor Law § 240(1) 1 imposes liability upon an owner or contractor who has failed to provide any safety devices for workers at a building worksite, and the absence of such devices is the proximate cause of injury to a worker. Based on the clear language of the statute and its purpose as articulated by the Legislature, we hold that an owner or contractor under these circumstances is absolutely liable in damages for injuries sustained by such worker.
In Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 102 A.D.2d 993, 477 N.Y.S.2d 873, plaintiff, an ironworker, was injured while working as a member of a crew erecting a steel skeleton for an addition to a building owned by defendant Chemung County Performing Arts. Plaintiff's duties as a "connector" involved his assembling beams and columns that formed the skeleton. The accident occurred when plaintiff, in the manner usually employed by connectors in performing this task, scaled a 31-foot vertical column in order to direct a crane operator who was raising a horizontal beam to a position where plaintiff could reach it and effect the connection with the vertical column. In pulling himself over the top of the beam, plaintiff lost his grip and fell. He struck a horizontal beam in his descent and landed in an excavation outside of the structure's perimeter.
Ladders were present at the worksite, but none had been erected for plaintiff's specific task. In addition, it is uncontroverted that no safety devices were erected or provided to plaintiff. Defendants, the building owner and several contractors, presented evidence at trial that various devices, such as netting, metal decking and lifelines, normally are not used during the early stages of construction projects such as this where the steel skeleton has not yet been plumbed and securely bolted and that it would have been infeasible, even dangerous, to have used any such devices. At the close of the evidence, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict, and the jury returned a verdict in defendants' favor. Plaintiff's motions to set aside the verdict and for a new trial were denied.
The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, affirmed, holding that questions of fact as to whether defendants had violated the provisions of the Labor Law were raised by the conflicting expert testimony concerning the utility and feasibility of safety devices at this early stage of the construction, which issues of fact were properly submitted to the jury and resolved adversely to plaintiff.
In Hunt v. Spitz Constr. Co., 99 A.D.2d 671, 472 N.Y.S.2d 46, the plaintiff ironworker sustained serious injuries when he fell 25 feet from the flat roof of a building on which he was welding corrugated decking. Plaintiff sought to recover damages from Kelview, Incorporated, the owner of the property, and Werner Spitz Construction Company, Inc., the general contractor, asserting their liability grounded both in negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and § 241(6). As in Zimmer, it is conceded that no safety device was furnished to plaintiff. Defendants introduced evidence of industry custom and usage in an attempt to establish that devices such as scaffolding, nets, safety lines and safety belts were never used on the type of building involved. They also presented evidence of various State and Federal regulations that require safety devices for work places, which they argue are either inapplicable to the situation here presented or were satisfied, thus negating any claimed violation that would constitute negligence.
Decision was reserved on plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the evidence and the issue of defendants' liability was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action under either a negligence theory or violation of the Labor Law. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a directed verdict on liability, reasoning that in view of the uncontroverted proof that no safety devices were provided, there was no view of the evidence by which the jury could reasonably find that defendants' failure to provide safety devices was not a contributory factor in bringing about plaintiff's injuries and thus that there was a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Trial Term's order and judgment were affirmed by the Appellate Division (99 AD2d 671) and the ensuing trial on damages resulted in a judgment of $450,000 for plaintiff. We granted defendants leave to appeal from the final judgment pursuant to CPLR 5602(a)(1)(ii). We now reverse the Appellate Division's order in Zimmer and affirm the order in Hunt.
We begin our analysis by again observing that the legislative history of the Labor Law, particularly sections 240 and 241, makes clear the Legislature's intent to achieve the purpose of protecting workers by placing "ultimate responsibility for safety practices at building construction jobs where such responsibility actually belongs, on the owner and general contractor" (1969 NY Legis Ann, at 407), instead of on workers, who "are scarcely in a position to protect themselves from accident" (Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Co., 298 N.Y. 313, 318, 83 N.E.2d 133).
We gave early recognition to this legislative intent when we declared with respect to section 240, which was then substantially in its present form, that "this statute is one for the protection of workmen from injury and undoubtedly is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed" (Quigley v. Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68, 100 N.E. 596, quoted in Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Co., supra, 298 N.Y. at p. 319, 83 N.E.2d 133).
Thus, we held unavailable to a defendant owner charged with a violation of section 240 the defense of the worker's contributory negligence, noting that "both sound reason and persuasive decisions, involving statutes whose content and purpose are similar to section 240, require the conclusion that that statute does not permit the worker's contributory negligence to be asserted as a defense [citations omitted]" (Koenig, supra, at p. 317, 83 N.E.2d 133). So, too, in Joyce v. Rumsey Realty Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 118, 122, 269 N.Y.S.2d 105, 216 N.E.2d 317, in considering the liability of a contractor for a violation of section 241(1) as it existed prior to 1962, which required that the contractor complete the flooring as the building progresses, we cited Koenig in holding that "[t]he duty imposed by the statute and violated by defendant [contractor] was 'a flat and unvarying' one * * * '[F]or breach of that duty, thus absolutely imposed, the wrongdoer is rendered liable without regard to his care or lack of it' " (Joyce v. Rumsey Realty Corp., supra, at p. 122, 269 N.Y.S.2d 105, 216 N.E.2d 317). We held that a violation of such a statute is conclusive evidence of negligence and conclusive evidence of negligence calls for a directed verdict (Joyce v. Rumsey Realty Corp., supra; see, Major v. Waverly & Ogden, 7 N.Y.2d 332, 334, 197 N.Y.S.2d 165, 165 N.E.2d 181).
Further support for the conclusion that the failure to provide any protective devices for workers at the worksite establishes an owner or contractor's liability as a matter of law is found in our previous holdings regarding the defenses available to an owner or contractor charged with a violation of section 240(1) and the first five subdivisions of section 241, as contrasted to those available where the charge is a violation of a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to section 241(6). In Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, 55 N.Y.2d 154, 448 N.Y.S.2d 132, 433 N.E.2d 115, the issue was whether the contributory (now comparative) negligence of the plaintiff is a defense in an action based upon the violation of administrative rules adopted pursuant to the authorization of section 241(6). We held that although the Legislature had placed the ultimate responsibility for safety practices at the worksite on the owner and general contractor where such responsibility actually belonged, the owner and general contractor's "ultimate responsibility" or "ultimate liability" under section 241(6) was "unavoidable" only in the sense that it could not be delegated to another and not in the sense that it precluded an owner or contractor from raising any defense to the imposition of...
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