Zimmerman v. Stotter

• Citation: 207 Cal.Rptr. 108,160 Cal.App.3d 1067
• Parties: Nancy ZIMMERMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Hollie STOTTER, Defendant and Respondent. B002784.
• Decision Date: 16 October 1984
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 108

207 Cal.Rptr. 108

160 Cal.App.3d 1067

Nancy ZIMMERMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Hollie STOTTER, Defendant and Respondent.

B002784.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Oct. 16, 1984.

Hartman, Hosp, Richard & Schlegel, South Pasadena, and J. Phillip Moorhead, Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

STEPHENS, Acting Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff Nancy Zimmerman (hereinafter appellant) appeals from an order entering summary judgment in favor of defendant Hollie Stotter (hereinafter respondent). Of principal concern is whether triable issues of fact exist in a dispute arising out of a judgment of unlawful detainer and subsequent satisfaction of that judgment, or whether the merits of appellant's contentions were completely barred from additional contestation by the doctrines of res judicata/collateral estoppel.

In 1977, appellant took occupancy of one-half of a duplex ¹ located in the community of Venice pursuant to an oral rental agreement with the then owner of the property (respondent's predecessor). In the summer of 1980, respondent purchased the subject property for $175,000. The purchase had been arranged by codefendant Fred Sands Realtors.

In August 1980, appellant received from respondent a thirty-day notice to quit the aforementioned premises. In pertinent part, the purported purpose of the notice to quit was for the new owner to remove the property from the rental market. ² While appellant remained in possession, respondent filed declarations with the Rent Stabilization Unit of the Community Development Department of the City of Los Angeles declaring that she sought possession of the duplex for use by her mother in one unit and her son in the other.

Appellant, acting in pro. per., answered the complaint for unlawful detainer and requested a jury trial. ³ At trial, respondent testified that she intended to permanently remove both apartments from the rental market so that the two apartments could be occupied by her mother and son. Appellant's attempt to testify about the prior notices of termination of the tenancy and their communications with respondent's real estate agent Bernard were denied on grounds of relevancy and hearsay, respectively.

On February 6, 1981, the jury reached its verdict in favor of respondent and against appellant. ⁴ On February 11, appellant retained counsel. Two days later, on February 13, counsel filed with the municipal court substitutions of attorney, notices of appeal, and notice of motion and motion to stay execution of judgment scheduled to be heard on February 24, 1981, pending appeal. That same day, however, respondent caused a writ of execution for possession of the premises to be issued. Appellant was served with a notice to vacate not later than February 23, 1981. On February 19, appellant made an ex parte application for an order staying execution of the judgment. That motion was denied. Appellant vacated said premises shortly thereafter.

Some two months later, in late April 1981, two women moved into the respective units. Each moved in pursuant to separate but identical agreements to act as caretakers of the property in return for no rent being owed. In May 1981, respondent then entered into a listing agreement with codefendant Fred Sands Realty to sell the property. A selling price of $240,000 was sought, which was $65,000 more than respondent had paid less than a year prior to that time.

On June 24, 1981, appellant, as coplaintiff, filed the instant action against respondent, alleging that her eviction was wrongful, malicious and in bad faith, an abuse of process, and in contravention of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance. It was also alleged that the eviction resulted in an intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Appellant sought damages, restoration of her apartment, and an injunction against further interference with the quiet enjoyment of her tenancy. Respondent answered, denying most of the allegations.

On June 26, 1981, appellant's appeal of the unlawful detainer judgment originally filed with the municipal court was transferred to the appellate department of the superior court. In February of 1982, a Fred Sands Realty "For Lease" sign was posted on the property. The caretaker-tenants moved out soon thereafter.

On March 15, 1982, more than one year after the writ of possession was enforced, the superior court appellate department affirmed the judgment against appellant in the unlawful detainer action. Two days later, respondent entered into a one-year lease with Paul and Heidi Williams to rent one side of the duplex at a rental rate of $275 more per month than what appellant had paid at the time she was evicted.

In April 1983, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment against appellant in the present action. It was asserted that appellant's complaint lacked merit as a result of the prior municipal court action between the two on the same cause in which judgment was entered in favor of respondent. Thus, it was argued that the present action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Support of the motion was limited to the declaration of respondent's attorney, Richard Schlegel. In opposition, appellant countered with her own declaration reciting facts as noted earlier in this opinion, i.e., that events subsequent to the entry of judgment raised a triable issue of fact. The court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of respondent. It found that had respondent obtained possession by fraud, and likewise had used fraud as a device to wrongfully increase the rent, the City and not appellant had the power to deal with these frauds. Finally, the court indicated that "this case can't be used as a basis for determining whether the jury verdict should be upheld against a claim that [respondent] lied to the jury." This appeal followed.

Appellant initially contends that the doctrine of res judicata may only be applied to bar litigation of issues which could have been raised in the prior action. Her complaint alleged wrongful conduct by respondent after judgment was entered in that case. Alternatively, it is argued that should the prior judgment establish conclusively that respondent was acting in good faith for an authorized purpose up until the time judgment was entered, that judgment does not establish that she was acting in good faith for any authorized purpose at the time she engaged the process of the court to evict appellant from her home. Appellant's second premise is merely that the doctrine of res judicata should not be mechanically applied to deny the litigants substantial justice and defeat important considerations of public policy. Respondent contends that appellant's complaint clearly seeks to relitigate the propriety of respondent's motives in her ouster of appellant.

Whenever one judgment is raised as a bar to a subsequent action under the doctrine of res judicata, the issue becomes whether the same cause of action is involved in both suits. We focus on the "primary right" at stake, that being, if the two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant. The fact that the second action involves the pleading of different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery is immaterial. (Eichman v. Fotomat Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1170, 1174, 197 Cal.Rptr. 612.) Underlying this policy of barring subsequent litigation on a previously tried and finalized issue is the consideration of seeking the most reasonably efficient and economic use of judicial resources as well as the desire to promote peace and tranquillity in the minds of those who might otherwise suffer with the fear of constantly recurring litigation. (De Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100, 105, 162 Cal.Rptr. 259.) However, this doctrine is not without certain legal limitations encompassing situations in which justice would be circumvented. This is especially true where the judgment is conditional or where the claim sought to be asserted in the second action encompasses activities not directly connected with the original action. In such a case, application of collateral estoppel or res judicata, at best, is unclear. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 256, 142 Cal.Rptr. 414, 572 P.2d 28.)

The primary purpose of the unlawful detainer action is to further one party's right to possession in situations specified by statute. (Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 746, 139 Cal.Rptr. 72.) Yet the purpose remains procedural. The landlord's property rights are statutorily implemented by permitting him or her to recover possession once the consensual basis for the tenant's occupancy is at an end. (People v. Little (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 18, 192 Cal.Rptr. 619.) Accordingly, all rights of the respective parties concerning any ouster arise from and must comport with the applicable provisions and restrictions of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance.

Section 151.09, subparagraph A of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance states that "A landlord may bring an action to recover possession of a rental unit only upon one of the following grounds:

"8. The landlord, seeks in good faith to recover possession of the rental unit for use and occupancy by the landlord, or the landlord's spouse, children, or parents ...,

"10. The landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession in order to remove the rental unit permanently from rental housing use." (Emphasis added.)

In order to comply with the requirements of Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance section 151.09, respondent filed a declaration with the Rent Stabilization Unit which indicated that she was seeking possession of the duplex for use by her son and mother. Based upon that declaration, the matter of respondent's right to possession was submitted by respondent, countered by appellant and determined by the trier of fact.

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