Zion Lutheran Church of Prairie Village v. Kansas Com'n on Civil Rights, 66660

• Decision Date: 22 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 66660,66660
• Parties: , 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 755 ZION LUTHERAN CHURCH OF PRAIRIE VILLAGE, Kansas, Appellee, v. KANSAS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 334

821 P.2d 334

16 Kan.App.2d 237, 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 755

ZION LUTHERAN CHURCH OF PRAIRIE VILLAGE, Kansas, Appellee, v. KANSAS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Appellant.

No. 66660.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Nov. 22, 1991.

Review Granted Dec. 17, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A party may institute an action in the district court to contest the exercise of jurisdiction over it by an administrative agency without first having exhausted all administrative remedies available.

2. A sectarian corporation is not an employer within the purview of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination by virtue of the provisions of K.S.A. 44-1002(b) and is exempt from the provisions of that Act.

3. The Kansas Commission on Civil Rights has no jurisdiction to act on a complaint filed against a sectarian corporation, which alleges that such corporation has violated the Kansas Act Against Discrimination by engaging in unlawful employment practice as defined by K.S.A. 44-1009(a)(1).

Arthur W. Solis, Senior Legal Counsel, Kansas Com'n on Civil Rights, Topeka, for appellant.

David J. Waxse and Barbara A. Harmon of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Overland Park, for appellee.

Before LEWIS, P.J., LARSON, J., and ROBERT C. HELSEL, District Judge Retired, Assigned.

LEWIS, Judge:

In this action, the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights (KCCR) is attempting to assert jurisdiction over the Zion Lutheran Church of Prairie Village, Kansas (Church). Senate Bill 456 changed the name of KCCR to "Kansas Human Rights Commission," effective July 1, 1991. For the purposes of this opinion, however, we will continue to refer to the commission as "KCCR." A complaint was filed before KCCR, alleging race and sex discrimination was practiced by the Church in the operation of a child day care center.

The trial court determined that KCCR had no jurisdiction over the Church and enjoined KCCR from proceeding on the discrimination claim noted above. KCCR appeals from that ruling.

The Church is a non-profit religious corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Kansas, with its principal office located in Prairie Village. The Church is a sectarian corporation whose articles of incorporation state that its purpose is "to carry on religious, benevolent, educational and missionary work in agreement with the principles of the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, as set forth in the Unaltered Augsburg Confession." In pursuance of that purpose, the Church owns and operates a church facility at 7501 Belinder in Prairie Village.

The Church also operates a child day care program in the Church building at the address listed above. This program is administered by the Zion Child Care Administrative Board.

The Church employed various individuals in the operation of its child care program. One of those individuals, a former employee, filed a verified complaint, alleging that race and sex discrimination was practiced by the Church when his employment was terminated. This complaint was filed under the Kansas Act Against Discrimination (KAAD) before KCCR, which took jurisdiction over the complaint.

KCCR determined that probable cause existed to conduct a hearing on the complaint and notified the Church of that decision.

Prior to any hearing being conducted or to any discovery procedures being conducted, the Church filed a motion to dismiss the pending KCCR action on the grounds that KCCR lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Church. Attorneys for KCCR opposed that motion and filed an appropriate response to it.

The hearing examiner for KCCR concluded that he would defer all action on the After the hearing examiner failed to rule on the Church's motion to dismiss, the Church resorted to the courts of this state by filing the instant matter in the district court, seeking injunctive relief.

motion to dismiss until the conclusion of the public hearing on the complaint.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the Church's petition and ruled that the petition was meritorious. Accordingly, the trial court held that KCCR has no jurisdiction over the Church and enjoined KCCR from further proceedings on the complaint filed against the Church.

JURISDICTION

The first issue we must determine is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the action filed by the Church.

KCCR argues that the Church failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. It relies on the decision of Jarvis v. Kansas Commission on Civil Rights, 215 Kan. 902, 906, 528 P.2d 1232 (1974), for the proposition that all administrative channels must be exhausted before a trial court would have jurisdiction to issue orders in a case of this nature.

We agree with KCCR that the Church had not exhausted its administrative remedies prior to the filing of the present action in the district court. We further agree that Jarvis, in general, does require a litigant to exhaust all administrative remedies available before seeking relief from the courts. Despite our general agreement on these issues, we hold that, in this case, KCCR's argument is misplaced. We conclude that this case is governed by an exception to the general rule stated in Jarvis and that the trial court did have jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief.

Determining whether the trial court had jurisdiction in the present controversy is a question of law and, as such, our review is unlimited. Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Brown, 12 Kan.App.2d 673, 674, 753 P.2d 1299, rev. denied 243 Kan. 778 (1988).

We hold that the question in this case is controlled by our decision in R.D. Andersen Constr. Co. v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 7 Kan.App.2d 453, 643 P.2d 1142, rev. denied 231 Kan. 801 (1982). In that case, we held:

"It is a well-recognized exception to the rule in Jarvis that judicial review of interlocutory rulings of an administrative agency is proper if the agency has exercised authority in excess of its jurisdiction or acted in some manner that is contrary to its statutory grant of authority. [Citations omitted.]" 7 Kan.App.2d at 456, 643 P.2d 1142.

In R.D. Andersen, a claim for wages was filed against Andersen before the Kansas Department of Human Resources. Andersen responded to that claim by seeking injunctive relief from the district court on the theory that an administrative agency had no jurisdiction over it. The district court agreed and granted the relief sought.

In that case, as here, the decision was appealed to this court on the theory that administrative remedies had not been exhausted. We affirmed the action of the trial court and said: "The rule of Jarvis is not questioned in this case, but it has no application here. The issue in this case is whether there were any administrative remedies provided at all, not whether they had been exhausted." 7 Kan.App.2d at 456, 643 P.2d 1142. We went on to say that the rule of law allowing "extraordinary judicial remedies to curtail or prohibit unlawful action by an administrative agency" has been recognized by the Kansas Supreme Court since 1916, where, in State, ex rel., v. Mohler, 98 Kan. 465, 472, 158 P. 408 (1916), the court stated: " 'If this power is abused, the courts are open to the aggrieved party, if not by some statutory review, then by the extraordinary and prerogative remedies of injunction or mandamus.' " 7 Kan.App.2d at 457, 643 P.2d 1142.

The present action mirrors R.D. Andersen. The Church claims that, as a sectarian corporation, it is exempted from the coverage of KAAD and, as a result, the issue presented to the trial court was whether KCCR had jurisdiction to proceed through the administrative process. Based upon our decision in R.D. Andersen, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear and rule on the Church's petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

DOES KAAD APPLY TO SECTARIAN CORPORATIONS?

In ruling in favor of the Church, the trial court in the present matter held that KCCR had no jurisdiction over a sectarian corporation. KCCR argues that, even assuming the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the issues involved, it erred in its determination that KCCR had no jurisdiction over the Church.

KCCR argues that the legislature intended for sectarian organizations to be subject to the provisions of KAAD. It additionally contends that, in this case, the child care program does not serve any religious purpose and that it should at least have jurisdiction over that aspect of the Church's operation.

K.S.A. 44-1009(a) provides:

"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice:

"(1) For an employer, because of the race, religion, color, sex, physical handicap, national origin or ancestry of any person to refuse to hire or employ, or to bar or to discharge from employment such person or to otherwise discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; or to limit, segregate, separate, classify or make any distinction in regards to employees; or to follow any employment procedure or practice which, in fact, results in discrimination, segregation or separation without a valid business motive."...