Zlokower v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities

• Decision Date: 17 June 1986
• Citation: 200 Conn. 261,510 A.2d 985
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Sandra ZLOKOWER v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, et al.

Page 985

510 A.2d 985

200 Conn. 261

Sandra ZLOKOWER v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 12, 1986.

Decided June 17, 1986.

Roger E. Koontz, Stamford, with whom, on brief, was David Silverstone, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas P. Clifford III, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Robert W. Garvey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (named defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J. and SHEA, SANTANIELLO, CALLAHAN and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.

SANTANIELLO, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether a prospective tenant must show that he is qualified for certain housing as part of his prima facie case of discrimination under General Statutes § 46a-64(a). On March 26, 1982, a hearing officer appointed by the state commission on human rights and opportunities (hereinafter the CHRO) found that the plaintiff, Sandra Zlokower, had denied the complainant, Conrad Pelletier, full and equal access to a public accommodation, in violation of General Statutes § 46a-64(a). ¹ The plaintiff appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, but the court, E. O'Connell, J., affirmed the agency's findings. The plaintiff now appeals the judgment of the Superior Court, claiming that the court erred: (1) in affirming the hearing officer's finding that the complainant had established a prima facie case of discriminatory action; (2) in concluding that the officer applied the correct standard in evaluating the plaintiff's nondiscriminatory reasons for refusal to rent; (3) in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the officer's finding that the plaintiff had engaged in discriminatory practices; and (4) in affirming the officer's order of relief. We find error on the first of these issues and remand the matter for further proceedings.

After conducting a formal hearing on December 18, 1981, the hearing officer found the following facts. In 1972, the complainant, his sister, his brother and their parents moved into a six room, second floor apartment [200 Conn. 263] at 137 Whitney Street in Hartford. The building is a three-family structure and is located in a residential neighborhood. In 1976 the plaintiff purchased the property and executed a written lease with the complainant's parents. As of May 1, 1981, only the complainant and his mother, Lumina Pelletier, remained as tenants in the apartment. The complainant contributed at least half of the rent at that time.

In early May, 1981, the plaintiff notified the complainant and his mother that the rent would be increased by $105 per month. A meeting was held among the three at which Lumina Pelletier told the plaintiff that she would be vacating the apartment. The complainant offered to remain in the apartment if he were allowed roommates to share in the rent, and offered to give the plaintiff the opportunity to interview potential roommates and check their references. No specifics as to the complainant's offer were discussed at this time and no particular names were mentioned as possible roommates. The plaintiff refused the offer, whether or not the roommates were made parties to the lease, stating that she preferred couples or families because they were more "stable." The plaintiff never offered the complainant a lease and later agreed to rent the apartment to a married couple. Another married couple who applied for the apartment had been rejected because they were students and were unwilling to stay in the apartment for more than a year.

On the basis of these and other facts, the tribunal concluded that the plaintiff had discriminated against the complainant because he was a single male in violation of General Statutes § 46a-64(a). On March 26, 1982, it ordered that, inter alia, the complainant be allowed to rent the apartment with a roommate for the term of one year and that he recover attorney's fees in the amount of $500 for the costs of defending an illegal entry and detainer complaint filed by the plaintiff, plus the amount incurred in prosecuting the administrative complaint.

The plaintiff's primary claim on appeal is that the complainant failed to make out a prima facie case of prohibited discriminatory action and that the tribunal applied an incorrect standard in assessing whether such a case had been established.

This case presents the first occasion for us to consider the burden of proof a complainant must bear under General Statutes § 46a-64. In addressing claims brought under the statute, we are properly guided by the case law surrounding the federal fair housing laws, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 through 3631, even though there may be differences between the state and federal statutes. ² This approach is consistent with our practice of looking to federal employment discrimination law for guidance in enforcing our own antidiscrimination statute. See Department of Health Services v. CHRO, 198 Conn. 479, 489, 503 A.2d 1151 (1986); Wroblewski v. Lexington Gardens, Inc., 188 Conn. 44, 53, 448 A.2d 801 (1982).

The federal courts in construing the federal fair housing laws have uniformly adopted the evidentiary requirement articulated by the United States Supreme Court in federal employment discrimination cases, that the complainant must at the outset establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Assn., 685 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir.1982); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir.1979); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corporation, 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir.1976); In re Malone, 592 F.Sup 1135, 1166 n. 21 (E.D.Mo.1984); see also McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Only when such a threshold has been reached does the burden shift to the respondent to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Assn., supra; see also McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, supra. These standards have been adopted by this court in state employment discrimination cases; Wroblewski v. Lexington Gardens, Inc., supra, 88 Conn. 53, 448 A.2d 801; and are applicable in actions brought under General Statutes § 46a-64.

The plaintiff claims that as part of his prima facie case, the complainant was required to show that he was willing to accept the legitimate business terms established by the plaintiff as a condition of leasing. She argues that it was made clear that no subleasing would be allowed and that the complainant never offered to make the proposed roommates parties to the lease. The hearing officer ruled and the Superior Court affirmed that the complainant had no burden under General Statutes § 46a-64 to show that he had met these terms. We agree with the plaintiff that the complainant must, as part of his initial burden, introduce evidence that he was ready to accept the legitimate objective requirements of tenancy and we therefore conclude that the hearing officer erred in holding to the contrary.

Under federal law an individual who alleges intentional discrimination in housing may meet his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by proving that: (1) he is a member of the statutorily protected class, (2) he has applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase the unit involved, (3) he was rejected by the respondent, and (4) the housing opportunity remained available thereafter. Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Assn., supra; Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., supra; Davis v. Mansards, 597 F.Sup. 334, 345 (N.D.Ind.1984); see generally Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law, pp. 405-406 (1983). An individual is deemed "qualified" if he meets the legitimate objective criteria established by the landlord. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., supra; Duckett v. Silberman, 568 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir.1978); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corporation, supra; Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir.1974). The element that the individual meet the objective business requirements of tenancy is a common sense threshold for making out a case of discrimination. No relief is justified unless the complainant can show that, in the absence of discriminatory intent, he would have been qualified. Although we ordinarily will grant an administrative agency a measure of deference in...