Zucht v. City of San Antonio

• Decision Date: 05 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 04-83-00217-CV,04-83-00217-CV
• Citation: 698 S.W.2d 168
• Parties: A.D. ZUCHT, III, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 168

698 S.W.2d 168

A.D. ZUCHT, III, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Appellee.

No. 04-83-00217-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

San Antonio.

Sept. 5, 1984.

Craig L. Austin, San Antonio, for appellants.

Harvey L. Hardy, William H. Robinson, San Antonio, for appellee.

Before ESQUIVEL, BUTTS and TIJERINA, JJ.

OPINION

TIJERINA, Justice.

This is a land condemnation case. The court rendered judgment for appellee, the City of San Antonio, based on the jury's answers to special issues, holding that appellee had title as a matter of law, to a disputed tract of land.

Initially, appellee filed administrative proceedings in County Court at Law No. 6 of Bexar County to acquire by eminent domain, for flood control purposes, title to a tract of land which included 2,241 square feet, claimed by appellants under a deed. The land was situated on the bed and bank of the San Antonio River. The special condemnation commission awarded appellant $10,250.00. Appellant timely filed his objections and withdrew the award. Appellee, prior to trial in county court, filed an amended petition, claiming ownership of the 2,241 square feet of bed and bank of the San Antonio River within its original city limits by virtue of a grant from the king of Spain. The county court at law, considering that the question was title to the disputed tract, granted appellee's motion to transfer and transferred the case to the district court. Appellant's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was denied. He was awarded compensation for the taking of 240 square feet, the easement rights, and damages to the remainder of the property.

It is appellant's contention that the county court at law and the district court have only appellate jurisdiction in appeals from the awards of the Special Commissioners. Specifically, he complains that the county court at law was authorized to determine only the issues raised at the administrative hearing and that the court should have dismissed the proceedings when appellee injected the question of title.

TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 3266, § 4 (Vernon 1981) provides in pertinent part, viz:

In any eminent domain case pending in a county court at law, whenever the judge of the court determines that the controversy involves a genuine issue of title or any other matter which cannot be fully adjudicated in the county court at law, he shall transfer the case to the district court.

See City of Houston v. West, 520 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.1975).

Article 3266a was enacted by the Legislature in 1971 and captioned as an Act relating to jurisdiction of eminent domain cases and proceedings. This statute was repealed effective January 1, 1984, and the provisions of section 4 have been codified in Title 4, Action and Remedies, Chapter 21, Eminent Domain, Subchapter A--Jurisdiction, § 21.002 of the new property code. TEX.PROP.CODE ANN. § 21.002 (Vernon 1983).

In State v. Frost, 456 S.W.2d 245, 255 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court stated:

A condemning authority has the right to dismiss as to a portion of the land sought to be condemned or to relinquish rights originally sought by condemnation when this may be done without injury to the landowner.... [Cites omitted.] The law is clear that the condemnor has the right to amend its pleadings and take less.

In this case there was a genuine issue as to title to the tract of land being condemned, and the trial court was required by the statute in effect to transfer the case to the district court. Point of error one is overruled.

Appellant in his second point of error argues that the denial of the landowner's title required dismissal of the administrative proceedings. On the third point he contends that the denial of the landowner's title constitutes a voluntary implied abandonment of the administrative proceeding and that as a result he is entitled to compensation for his costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees. The central issue arises from the trial amendment filed in county court at law No. 6, wherein appellee asserted a claim of title to part of the land sought to be condemned. Appellant contends that if the admission of the landowner's title is abrogated, jurisdiction terminates and the administrative proceeding must be dismissed, citing Houston North Shore Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 128 Tex. 248, 98 S.W.2d 786, 793 (1936).

Prior to the enactment of the present statute, the Supreme Court in Pearson v. State, 315 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex.1958), held that the county court did not have general jurisdiction in condemnation proceedings, but only special jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of article 3266, supra, then in effect. Subdivision 6 of article 3266, supra, was amended in 1961, providing that condemnation cases shall be tried and determined as in other civil causes in the county court. Article 3266a was again amended in 1981, and section 1 provides that the district courts shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the county courts...