Zucker v. Zucker, s. 89-2059

Decision Date05 February 1991
Docket NumberNos. 89-2059,89-2632,s. 89-2059
Citation16 Fla. L. Weekly 391,577 So.2d 591
Parties16 Fla. L. Weekly 391 Judith ZUCKER, Appellant, v. Jules ZUCKER, M.D., Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Rehearing Denied April 24, 1991.

Susan R. Cohen, Daniels and Hicks and Robert S. Glazier, Miami, for appellant.

Klein & Tannen and Norman Klein, Hollywood, for appellee.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and GERSTEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the wife Judith Zucker from a final judgment of marriage dissolution which was entered after protracted proceedings below. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

First, we conclude that the trial court erred in valuing the husband's interest in the North Miami Medical Center at $30,816; the evidence, without material dispute, establishes that such interest is valued at $40,816. Moreover, we further conclude that the trial court erred in failing to include a $20,000 note owned by the North Miami Medical Center as part of the marital estate herein. Inasmuch as the trial court determined in the final judgment that each party should receive a 50% equitable distribution of the marital assets, the aforesaid valuation errors mean that the wife is entitled to $15,000 more in equitable distribution than that which she received below; upon remand, the trial court is directed to award the wife an additional $15,000 in marital property as equitable distribution. See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 550 So.2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Buttner v. Buttner, 484 So.2d 1265, 1266-67 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 494 So.2d 1149 (Fla.1986); Craig v. Craig, 404 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); cf. Clemson v. Clemson, 546 So.2d 75, 77-78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).

Second, we find no merit in the balance of the wife's points on appeal. In particular, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to award the wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $3,000 a month for three and a half (3 1/2) years and $2,500 a month for three (3) years thereafter--and to award the wife $1,500 a month in permanent alimony at the expiration of the rehabilitative alimony. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13, 16-17 (Fla.1976); Vasquez v. Vasquez, 443 So.2d 313, 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 851 (Fla.1984); Creel v. Creel, 378 So.2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1111 (Fla.1980); Donner v. Donner, 281 So.2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 287 So.2d 679 (Fla.1973); Harrell v. Harrell, 171 So.2d 214, 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); cf. In re J.R.K., 541 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Griffin v. Griffin, 510 So.2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GERSTEN, J., concur.

HUBBART, Judge (concurring in part; dissenting in part).

I agree with the court's disposition of the instant case save for its conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the hybrid rehabilitative/permanent alimony award in this cause. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the husband, it was established below that (a) this was a twenty-two (22) year marriage; (b) the husband is a successful cardiologist who grosses approximately $240,000 a year and nets approximately $130,000 a year in income through his professional association; (c) the wife, 44 years old, kept house and cared for the parties' three minor children during the marriage; (d) the wife is a part-time school teacher grossing $11,400 a year in income, could gross $17,000 a year in income if she worked full time, and has a potential, with the help of the awarded rehabilitative alimony, to gross approximately $25,000 a year in the future; (e) the parties enjoyed a relatively affluent, but not extravagant, life style during the marriage; and (f) the wife received, after this court's adjustments, one half of the marital assets [none of which are income producing]...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Polley v. Polley, s. 91-1405
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 22, 1991
    ...the trial court's valuation constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Marcoux v. Marcoux, 464 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla.1985); Zucker v. Zucker, 577 So.2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Sheffield v. Sheffield, 522 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Addington v. Addington, 522 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA The wife ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT