Zuckerman v. Tatarian

• Decision Date: 08 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 11280-A,11280-A
• Citation: 291 A.2d 421,110 R.I. 190
• Parties: Ida ZUCKERMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Abraham Zuckerman v. Rita L. TATARIAN. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 421

291 A.2d 421

110 R.I. 190

Ida ZUCKERMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Abraham Zuckerman v. Rita L. TATARIAN.

No. 11280-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 8, 1972.

Martin Malinou, Providence, for plaintiff

Francis V. Reynolds, Paul V. Reynolds, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This is a civil action brought to recover consequential damages sustained by Abraham Zuckerman by reason of medical expenses and loss of services of Louis Zuckerman, a minor son of Abraham, who was injured in a collision between an automobile operated by Louis and one operated by the defendant's agent, a minor. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by a justice of the Superior Court, and the plaintiff is now prosecuting an appeal from that judgment in this court.

It appears from the record that Louis Zuckerman, hereinafter referred to as Louis, was seriously injured in 1964 as a result of the motor vehicle collision. Louis thereafter brought suit against defendant and three others in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. During the trial in the Federal District Court the judge struck all medical bills from the record and charged the jury to make no award for medical expenses, lost wages, or lost earning capacity during Louis's minority. The jury then considered Louis's claim to damages for his pain, suffering, and loss of future earning capacity but returned a verdict for the defendant in each case. Louis appealed these judgments to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, where they were affirmed, 418 F.2d 878 (1969), and his subsequent petition to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari was denied, 397 U.S. 1069, 90 S.Ct. 1511, 25 L.Ed.2d 691 (1970).

Abraham was precluded from bringing his claim in the Federal District Court for medical expenses and the loss of wages of his son because the claim failed to meet the jurisdictional requirement as to the amount in controversy. Therefore, Abraham subsequently brought the instant action in the Superior Court of this state to recover the cost of medical expenses and the loss of services arising out of his son's injuries. ¹ In December of 1969 defendant moved for summary judgment, invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel in seeking to bar plaintiff's prosecution of this action.

The defendant contended that plaintiff's right to recover consequential damages was derivative and depended entirely upon the issue of defendant's liability to Louis, which issue had been heard and determined in defendant's behalf by the judgment of the Federal Court in the trial of Louis's actions. Basically, defendant argues that the issue upon which the right of plaintiff to recover rests is the liability of defendant to Louis, which in turn depended upon the negligence of defendant and the freedom from contributory negligence of Louis, which issue was fully heard and decided in a court of competent jurisdiction, namely, the Federal District Court, and that it should bar recovery by plaintiff in the instant action on the basis of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The plaintiff contends that the trial justice erred in concluding that the judgment for defendant in the action brought by Louis constituted a bar to her subsequent suit to recover consequential damages. She bases her contention primarily on the argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable only where there is an identity of or privity between the parties to the prior action and that this court has long held to the view that the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child does not normally give rise to privity for the purposes of judicial finality.

It is generally recognized that privity that will justify an application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not normally arise from the marital relationship nor from the relationship between parent and child. Thus, under the general rule a judgment for or against a child is not conclusive in a subsequent suit in which the parent is a party or vice versa. 1B Moore, Federal Practice 0.411(11) at 1660 (2d ed. 1965).

In this court plaintiff questions whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should apply in view of the fact that under the general rule there was no privity between the father and the son which would warrant an application of that doctrine. She relies primarily on the rule stated in Brierly v. Union R.R., 26 R.I. 119, 58 A. 451 (1904), wherein this court expressed its adherence to the general rule, so called. In Brierly, the husband of a woman injured in an accident involving a streetcar brought suit to recover damages for his expenses and loss of his wife's services. The defendant offered in bar of the husband's action the judgment entered for the same defendant against the wife in a prior suit for her damages and requested the trial justice to charge the jury to that effect. This the trial justice refused to do. On appeal this court sustained him in that refusal, saying: 'The cause of action which the husband claimed, though based upon the same occurrence, was not the cause of action which the wife had sued on. He had no control over her claim or her suit (Cooney v. Lincoln, 20 R.I. 183, 186, 37 A. 1031, 1032 (1897)), and was in no way estopped by the judgment against her. He was not privy to her in blood, estate, or law.' Id. at 120, 58 A. at 451.

The text writer, Moore, points out that the rule that estoppel will not apply where there is no privity as between husband and wife or between parent and child has had general application even where the cause of action asserted by the husband or parent derives from and is dependent upon the validity of the cause of action asserted against the defendant by the wife or child. It is important to note, however, that the text writer goes on to say in 0.411(11) at 1662 that there have been in recent times cases involving such derivative claims wherein courts have departed from the majority rule and have held that '* * * a judgment adverse to the wife's personal injury claim is conclusive against the husband in his suit for consequential damages.' Fischbach v. Auto Boys, Inc., Sup., 106 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1951); Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574, 367 S.W.2d 417 (1963); McFadden...