Zurstrassen v. Stonier
Decision Date | 16 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 4D00-294.,4D00-294. |
Citation | 786 So.2d 65 |
Parties | Klaus ZURSTRASSEN, Appellant, v. David STONIER, Edward Wihlborg and Diane Wihlborg, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Wayde P. Seidensticker, Jr. and Katy L. Koestner of Seidensticker & San Filippo, LLP, Naples, and Cohen, Conway, Copeland & Paiva, P.A., Stuart, for appellant.
Matthew G. Brenner of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A., Orlando, for appellees-Edward Wihlborg and Diane Wihlborg.
The trial court entered summary judgment in this suit to quiet title, finding that appellant waived the right and/or was estopped from asserting the forgery of his signature on a deed conveying the property to his brother. It further found that appellant ratified his brother's subsequent sale of the property. Because we conclude material issues of fact remain, we reverse.
Appellant, Klaus Zurstrassen, a citizen of Germany, and his brother, Rolf, a citizen of the United States, acquired title to two vacant lots in Indian River County in June 1997. The brothers intended to build on the lots and then sell them. On September 10, 1997, Klaus returned to Germany, leaving Rolf in charge of commencing construction. While construction commenced on one lot, a deed was recorded in the public records on September 25, 1997, purportedly conveying Klaus's ownership in the lots to his brother Rolf. Klaus claims that the deed was a forgery and that he had no knowledge of it.
Klaus returned from Germany in October, and construction on the one lot continued. Just before Klaus left again for Germany, the brothers agreed to sell the constructed home. Klaus met with a realtor to prepare a listing. The realtor researched the title and informed Klaus that his name did not appear on the last deed in the chain of title. He was not shown any deed and did not know that title was vested in his brother's name alone. Klaus asked Rolf about it, and Rolf told Klaus that he did not know why Klaus's name did not appear on the deed but that he should not be concerned with it. Because of the uncertainty created by the revelation of some title problems and the necessity of Klaus to return to Germany, the brothers signed a document between them recognizing Klaus's interest and the terms of the brothers' initial agreement regarding the properties.1 The agreement stated that title to the properties was in Rolf's name alone and it outlined the process of selling the properties and distributing the proceeds. Klaus then returned to Germany.
In June of 1998, Rolf transferred both lots to David Stonier by quitclaim deed. Stonier was unaware that Klaus made any claim to the property. Then in August of 1998, Stonier executed a warranty deed on one lot to the Wihlborgs. The deed to the Wihlborgs was mistakenly recorded in Brevard County and was not recorded in Indian River County until November 23, 1998.
While in Germany, Klaus was notified that the lots had been sold. However, when he returned to the United States, he immediately began investigating the title to the property and uncovered the forged deed and the subsequent deeds. He instituted suit to quiet title to the property and for rescission on November 9, 1998, and filed a notice of lis pendens on November 10, 1998, thirteen days before the Wihlborg deed was recorded in Indian River County. Both Stonier and the Wihlborgs answered the suit and claimed that Klaus was estopped from asserting any rights because he had acknowledged in the February 1998 agreement that title to the property was in his brother's name and he had delayed in objecting to any purported fraud. Stonier also alleged that he was a bona fide purchaser for value and filed a counterclaim for slander of title and damages.
Stonier and the Wihlborgs moved for summary judgment and conceded for purposes of the motion only that Klaus's deed to Rolf was a forgery. The trial court entered summary judgment in their favor on the quiet title and rescission claims, concluding that because Klaus was aware as of February 1998 that the property was titled solely in Rolf's name and failed to object, Klaus had waived or was estopped from asserting any right to object to any subsequent sale to Stonier. This appeal ensued.
Equitable Estoppel:
We think Klaus is correct in his assertion that the forged deed is void and thus creates no legal title nor affords protection to those claiming under it. See McCoy v. Love, 382 So.2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1979); Lloyd v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 310, 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). See also Jamnadas v. Singh, 731 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)(forged mortgage is void and a legal nullity); Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Sapp, 554 So.2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(same). In Wright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940), relied on in McCoy, the court said of the effect of such deeds, "`[a] forged deed, in the sense defined above, is absolutely void and wholly ineffectual to pass title, even to a subsequent innocent purchaser from the grantee under such forged deed.'" Id. at 91 (quoting 16 Am Jur. 451-2).
Appellees rely on Sunrise Savings and Loan Ass'n of Florida v. Giannetti, 524 So.2d 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In Giannetti, a person forged Giannetti's signature on a satisfaction of mortgage which was relied upon to the detriment of Sunrise Savings and Loan which made a subsequent loan believing it to have priority. This court held that because Giannetti was negligent in not discovering the forged satisfaction of mortgage, as between two "innocent" parties, Giannetti was more blameworthy and therefore should suffer the loss. This court relied on two cases, United Service Corp. v. Vi-An Construction Corp., 77 So.2d 800 (Fla.1955), and Jones v. Lally, 511 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). However, neither Vi-An nor Jones involved a forgery. As McCoy pointed out, where fraud in the inducement is present, a deed may be voidable in equity, but it can still convey title. 382 So.2d at 649. Giannetti was criticized in Sapp which pointed out that the opinion gave no consideration to the law regarding forged instruments. See Sapp, 554 So.2d at 1196. Giannetti, however, relies on estoppel arguments to reach its result. As we hereinafter explain, equitable estoppel principles apply, even to void deeds. Thus, Giannetti is not inconsistent with McCoy, Lloyd, and Jamnadas.
Because the deed conveying title from Klaus to Rolf is void, it had no legal effect to transfer Klaus's ownership of the property to Rolf. Nevertheless, appellees still argue that Klaus should be estopped from asserting his claim that the deed was a forgery because of his subsequent knowledge of the forgery. The elements of estoppel are: (1) representation of a material fact by the party estopped to the party claiming the estoppel that is contrary to the fact later asserted by the estopped party; (2) reliance on that representation by the party claiming the estoppel; and (3) the party claiming the estoppel detrimentally changed their position due to such reliance. See Jewett v. Leisinger, 655 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In the context of title to disputed land, estoppel prevents a party who by acts, words, or silence allows another to purchase title to property "under an erroneous opinion of title, without making known his claim," from afterwards exercising his or her legal right against such person. Coram v. Palmer, 63 Fla. 116, 58 So. 721, 722 (1912).
Robertson v. Robertson, 61 So.2d 499 (Fla.1952), suggests that in certain circumstances a party may assert equitable estoppel against a claim that conveyances are void as a result of forgery. In Robertson, a sister forged her brother's name to a deed purporting to convey the property to her. She then executed several mortgages on the property to obtain funds. After the sister encountered other problems, one of the mortgagees disclosed the forged deed to the brother at the sister's request. The sister then executed a conveyance back to the brother. The deed recited that it was subject to the mortgages. Upon later foreclosure by one of the mortgagees, the brother filed an action for declaratory and other relief on the ground that the mortgage was based upon the forged deed. The mortgagee asserted that the brother was equitably estopped to assert the forgery. In ruling in favor of the brother, the court said:
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