Alexander v. City of Greensboro
Decision Date | 13 July 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 1:09–CV–934.,1:09–CV–934. |
Citation | 801 F.Supp.2d 429 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Parties | Lawrence ALEXANDER Jr., Ellis Allen, Mitchell Alston, Frances R. Banks, Ahmed Blake, Michael O. Brodie, Kevin E. Chandler, Charles E. Cherry, Ernest Cuthbertson, Darrin Davis, Steven A. Evans, William Graves, Milford J. Harris Ii, Jonathan Heard, Antuan Hinson, Stephen L. Hunter, Brian James, Demetrius W. Johnson, John O. Legrande, George M. Little, Darrell McDonald, C.L. Melvin, Stacy A. Morton Jr., Willie Parker, Larry Patterson Jr., William A. Phifer, Joseph Pryor, Norman Rankin, Wayne Redfern, Alexander Ricketts, Ronald Rogers, Steven Snipes, Calvin Stevens Jr., Eric Stevenson, Jermeir Jackson–Stroud, Julius Tunstall, Allen Wallace, Frank Young and Michael Wayland Wall, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF GREENSBORO, Defendant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jason Andrew Knight, Knight & Free, PLLC, John F. Bloss, Sr., Robertson Medlin & Blocker, PLLC, Greensboro, NC, for Plaintiffs.
Alan W. Duncan, Smith Moore, L.L.P., Allison O. Van Laningham, Smith Moore LLP, Greensboro, NC, for Defendant.
Before the court is the motion for judgment on the pleadings of Defendant The City of Greensboro (“the City”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 29.) Plaintiffs oppose this motion. (Doc. 37.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are all African–American/black police officers employed by the City through the Greensboro Police Department (“GPD”) when David Wray (“Wray”) was promoted to Chief of Police and Gilmer Brady (“Brady”) to Deputy Chief. Both Wray and Brady are white.
Plaintiffs commenced this action on December 7, 2009, bringing claims against the City for discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), based upon alleged discriminatory actions taken or directed by Wray, Brady, and other nonblack GPD officers.1 (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on March 15, 2010. (Doc. 4.) This court's January 4, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order contains a detailed summary of the Amended Complaint's factual allegations, which will not be repeated here. See Alexander v. City of Greensboro, No. 1:09–CV–934, 2011 WL 13857, at *1–*3 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 2011).
The City moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 7.) The motion was granted in part and denied in part: all Title VII claims by Plaintiffs Ahmed Blake, Larry Patterson Jr., Frank Young, Darryl Stevenson, and Mitchell Alston were dismissed, and all Title VII claims by the remaining thirty-five Plaintiffs were dismissed except (1) each remaining Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, (2) Plaintiff Steven A. Evans' disparate treatment claim, and (3) Plaintiff Lawrence Alexander Jr.'s disparate treatment claim. See Alexander, 2011 WL 13857, at *23.
The City subsequently filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) and now moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Doc. 29). This motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 30, 37, 38) and is ready for decision.
II. ANALYSISA. Standard for Rule 12(c) Motions
A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405–06 (4th Cir.2002). Thus, the court assumes the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint to be true and draws all reasonable factual inferences in Plaintiffs' favor as the nonmoving parties. See id. at 406.
Unlike on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, on a Rule 12(c) motion the court may consider the Answer as well. Rinaldi v. CCX, Inc., No. 3:05–CV–108, 2008 WL 2622971, at *2 n. 3 (W.D.N.C. July 2, 2008). The factual allegations of the Answer “are taken as true only where and to the extent they have not been denied or do not conflict with the complaint.” Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D. 330, 331 (M.D.N.C.1991). “For the purposes of this motion [the defendant] cannot rely on allegations of fact contained only in the answer, including affirmative defenses, which contradict [the] complaint,” because “Plaintiffs were not required to reply to [the] answer, and all allegations in the answer are deemed denied.” Id. at 332; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b)(6) ().
“The test applicable for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, genuine issues of material fact remain or whether the case can be decided as a matter of law.” Smith v. McDonald, 562 F.Supp. 829, 842 (M.D.N.C.1983), aff'd, 737 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985); accord Med–Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F.Supp.2d 721, 728 (E.D.N.C.2008); Jadoff, 140 F.R.D. at 331; 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368, at 223 (3d ed. 2004); see id. § 1368, at 248 ().
B. Plaintiffs' Rule 12(g)(2) Argument for Summary Denial
Plaintiffs argue preliminarily that the City's motion should be summarily denied pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2), which provides:
Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(g)(2). Plaintiffs argue that the City's Rule 12(c) motion falls squarely within this prohibition, because the defenses raised in the Rule 12(c) motion were allegedly available when the City filed its Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but the City chose not to raise them at that time. The City responds that Rule 12(g)(2) does not apply to Rule 12(c) motions and that the arguments in the pending motion were not available to the City at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
As the City points out, Rule 12(g)(2) begins with the phrase “[e]xcept as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3).” Rule 12(h)(2) provides in pertinent part:
Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... may be raised ... by a motion under Rule 12(c)....
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2)(B). Thus, Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings based upon failure to state a claim are explicitly exempted from the prohibition in Rule 12(g)(2).2 Cf. Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 1:02–CV–373, 2007 WL 1612580, at *6 .
The only case law cited by Plaintiffs in support of their argument is inapplicable, because it involves successive motions brought pursuant to Rule 12(b) . See Partington v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. 1:03–CV–1084, Doc. 15 at 1–2 ; cf. Wright & Miller, supra, § 1384, at 479–80 ( .
Therefore, Rule 12(g)(2) does not bar the City's Rule 12(c) motion, and it is unnecessary to determine whether the City's present arguments were available at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Consequently, the court will proceed to the merits of the City's motion. In so doing, however, the court will not reconsider issues that it addressed fully at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
C. The City's Arguments for Dismissal
The City presents three arguments in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings: (1) Eleven Plaintiffs did not satisfy the prerequisites for a Title VII suit, because they did not file a proper Charge of discrimination (“Charge”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”); (2) two of these Plaintiffs, even if they filed proper Charges, filed them outside the applicable 180–day limitations period; and (3) all thirty-five remaining Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed under the doctrine of laches, because Plaintiffs were not diligent in pursuing their claims and the City was prejudiced as a result. Each argument will be examined in turn.
The City argues that eleven Plaintiffs did not file Charges of discrimination with the EEOC and thus failed to satisfy the prerequisites for a Title VII action.3 These Plaintiffs respond that the evidence presented by the City cannot be considered at the Rule 12(c) stage and, alternatively, that the Intake Questionnaires Plaintiffs submitted to the EEOC constituted sufficient Charges of discrimination.
The City's argument for judgment on the pleadings relies upon over 4,000 pages of documents that it obtained from the EEOC pursuant to Freedom of Information Act requests and that the City attached to its Answer. The City argues that these documents constitute the entire EEOC files for all thirty-five Plaintiffs (minus certain internal EEOC communications that are deliberative in nature, certain personal information about third parties, and certain settlement-related information) ( see, e.g., Doc. 21 ¶ 45; Doc. 21, Ex. A at 2–4; Doc. 21, Ex. C at 2–4; Doc. 21, Ex. L–1...
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