$100 v. State
| Decision Date | 18 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A01-0310-CV-421.,82A01-0310-CV-421. |
| Parties | $100 and A Black Cadillac, VIN 1G6K52B3PU807567, Appellants-Defendants, and Abbie Ellenstein, Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana and Evansville Police Department, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
John D. Clouse, Ivan A. Arnaez, Clouse Law Offices, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellees.
Abbie1 Ellenstein appeals the forfeiture of her Cadillac pursuant to Ind.Code § 34-24-1-1 ("the forfeiture statute").2 She raises two issues on appeal, which we reorder and restate as:
1. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding Ellenstein must forfeit the Cadillac; and
2. Whether the forfeiture statute is unconstitutional.
We affirm.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. On March 5, 2003, police were conducting surveillance of a suspected drug house when Ellenstein drove a 1993 black Cadillac away from the house. A police officer followed the Cadillac and pulled it over because it was speeding and nearly caused an accident. As police were obtaining identification from Ellenstein, they detected an odor of marijuana coming from the car. Based on that probable cause, the officers searched the Cadillac and found a pound of marijuana, $100.00, and burnt marijuana roaches. Police asked Ellenstein for permission to search her house, and she consented. In the house, officers found $998.00 and a notebook resembling a drug ledger. Police arrested Ellenstein and seized the Cadillac, the $100.00 in the Cadillac, and the $998.00 found in Ellenstein's home.
Under cause number 82D02-0303-FD-205, the State charged her with two counts of dealing in marijuana as a Class D felony3 and one count of maintaining a common nuisance, a Class D felony.4 Ellenstein pled guilty to one count of dealing in marijuana as a Class A misdemeanor, and the State dismissed the other two charges. The Court entered Ellenstein's conviction and sentenced her to one year imprisonment, which the court suspended contingent on Ellenstein attending drug rehabilitation classes.
Six days after Ellenstein pled guilty and was sentenced, the State filed two forfeiture complaints against Ellenstein. The first, cause number 82C01-0305-MI-295, demanded forfeiture of the black Cadillac and the $100.00 police had found therein. The second, cause number 82C01-0305-MI-294, demanded forfeiture of the $998.00 found in Ellenstein's home.
At the forfeiture trial, the State introduced evidence that possession of one pound of marijuana is more likely associated with dealing than with personal use and that Ellenstein had pled guilty to dealing. In addition, the State presented an alleged drug ledger found in Ellenstein's home and the $998.00. Ellenstein testified she purchased marijuana in bulk for her own personal use to decrease the frequency of her exposure to arrest, she was able to purchase a pound of marijuana that day because she had received her tax refund check, the cash in her house was from the tax refund check, and the alleged drug ledger was simply a notebook to organize checks. The Court found the State had to return to Ellenstein the $998.00 found in her house and the $100.00 found in the Cadillac; however, it ordered the Cadillac forfeited.
The relevant portions of the forfeiture statute provide:
Ind.Code § 34-24-1-1 (footnote added). For a trial court to properly order property forfeited, the State "must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was within the definition of property subject to seizure under section one of this chapter." Ind.Code § 34-24-1-4(a).
Because forfeiture cases are civil in nature, we use the standard of review employed in other civil cases where an appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict. Jennings v. State, 553 N.E.2d 191, 192 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), reh'g denied. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id. We may neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Id."Only if there is a lack of evidence or evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn on an essential element of the plaintiff's claim will we reverse a trial court." Id. (quoting Martin v. Roberts, 464 N.E.2d 896, 904 (Ind.1984)).
Ellenstein argues the evidence was insufficient because "guilty plea evidence is unreliable."6 (Br. of Appellant at 15.) She claims "[g]uilty pleas have little if almost no evidentiary value due to problems inherent in them." (Id. at 16.) All of the problems Ellenstein lists are related to the premise that people plead guilty to misdemeanor convictions to avoid felony trials, convictions, and sentences. However, Ellenstein's brief provides in a footnote:
Counsel is not arguing here that his client's guilty plea was a sham or that he has knowledge that his client is innocent but rather puts forth the argument that her guilty plea for later trial use has little evidentiary value due to theoretical problems inherent in any guilty plea.
(Id. at 16 n. 1.) Accordingly, Ellenstein admits she has no complaint about the validity of her guilty plea,7 but she nonetheless wants us to presume it has little evidentiary value. This we cannot do.
Trial courts and juries frequently rely on the existence of prior convictions to support a finding that a defendant committed a crime in the past. See, e.g., Goliday v. State, 526 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ind.1988)
(). We permit the same inference regardless of whether the prior conviction rests on a finding by the fact-finder or on a guilty plea by a defendant. See, e.g., Tyson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 715, 718 (Ind.2002) (). In fact, a prior guilty plea is sufficient for the trial court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed the alleged offense even if the prior guilty plea was entered without the defendant admitting commission of the offense. Williams v. State, 695 N.E.2d 1017, 1019 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) ().
Ellenstein's guilty plea to dealing in marijuana was sufficient to permit the trial court to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that, when Ellenstein was in her Cadillac with a pound of marijuana, she was transporting it for the purpose of committing dealing in marijuana. See id. We must decline Ellenstein's request that we reweigh the evidence.
Ellenstein asserts a number of reasons why the forfeiture statute is unconstitutional. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law. Therefore, we review each argument de novo. See Willis v. State, 806 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ind.Ct.App.2004)
. We presume the statute is constitutional, and Ellenstein has the burden of proving it is not. McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Ind.2004). We must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the statute's constitutionality. State v. Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind.2000).
Ellenstein alleges the forfeiture of her Cadillac, after she was convicted of dealing marijuana as a Class A misdemeanor, constituted a second punishment for a crime, which is prohibited by the federal constitution.9 We disagree.
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Clause prohibits both successive punishments and successive prosecutions. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996). Important to Ellenstein is the fact that the Clause prohibits the government from "attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same offense." Id.
The State obtained Ellenstein's Cadillac by way of a forfeiture proceeding. Forfeiture proceedings have characteristics of both civil and criminal proceedings, as they serve both remedial and punitive goals. Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ind.1995). In fact, forfeiture of expensive or important items, such as a car or house, can have a "significant and potentially severe punitive function." Id. Therefore, we must determine whether the forfeiture proceeding by which the State confiscated Ellenstein's Cadillac constituted a "criminal punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The statute under which the State obtained title to the Cadillac was Ind.Code § 34-24-1-1, which permits the State to seize money or property that is used to commit or attempt to commit certain crimes. Causes of action filed against property rather than against a person are actions in rem.10 Accordingly, a forfeiture action under Ind.Code ch. 34-24-1 is an in rem action. C.R.M. v. State, 799 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also State v. Klein, 702 N.E.2d 771 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)
(), trans. denied 726 N.E.2d 306 (1999).
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