Cochrane v. Board of Ed. of Mesick Consol. School Dist.

• Decision Date: 07 June 1960
• Docket Number: No. 23,J,23
• Citation: 360 Mich. 390,103 N.W.2d 569
• Parties: Ronald COCHRANE, Robert Cochrane, David Shively and Clare Shively, Plaintiffs and Appellants, and Paul L. Adams, Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Intervenor and Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE MESICK CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellee. an. Term.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 569

103 N.W.2d 569

360 Mich. 390

Ronald COCHRANE, Robert Cochrane, David Shively and Clare Shively, Plaintiffs and Appellants and Paul L. Adams, Attorney General of the State of Michigan Intervenor and Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE MESICK CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 23, Jan. Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 7, 1960.

William R. Peterson, Cadillac, for petitioners.

Paul L. Adams, Atty. Gen., Samuel J. Torina, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Maxine Boord Virtue, Asst. Atty. Gen., for intervenor-appellant.

Miltner & Miltner, by Charles H. Miltner, Cadillac, for defendant-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

KELLY, Justice.

The Attorney General intervened and appeals from a decision of the trial court holding that defendant school district and not violate the statute guaranteeing to all students an equal right to public educational facilities by excluding married high school students from participation in 'cocurricular activities.'

Intervenor and appellant states:

'The Attorney General, in the exercise of his duty, respectfully requests the Supreme Court to provide an authoritiative determination of the questions referred to, and takes the initiative in this appeal for the purpose of resolving these important public questions. * * *

'It is submitted by the Attorney General that the action of the school board, in taking what it frankly admits is punitive action, designed to humiliate and redicule the plaintiff students before their classmates so as to discourage other marriages, is violating the public policy of the state by attacking the married status of these students as 'wrongdoing', and that the rule in question is clearly void for that reason alone. The concern of the law is to protect, not to attack, the state of matrimony, and to exalt, not to undermine, the security of legal marriages * * *; they are entitled, by law and public policy, to the respect and security of community acceptance in their married status, as well as to all the benefits of equal access to all public educational facilities, including their earned status in the co-curricular activities. To deprive them of the intangible security of their pride of achievement in the 'glamor' titles and offices so important to the high school student, at a time of life when they are peculiarly sensitive to acceptance and approval by their contemporaries, is to interefere not only with their education but also with their marriages, by undermining their morale in this respect, thus condemning their marital status through the exclusionary rule * * *; instead of making the status of marriage itself an occasion for stripping students of achievement and rank, so as to deprive them of the admiration of fellow students, it is the duty of the school board to respect and exalt the status of matrimony * * *; if, however, the community is to take a position against high school marriages, the way to do it is through legislation, as by raising the age limit for marriage, not through school board interference with the prerogatives of the legislature, the parents, and the church.'

David Shively was married July 27, 1958, and at the time of the hearing was 18 years of age and a senior in defendant school.

Ronald Cochrane was also a senior, 18 years of age, in the same school at the time of the hearing, and he was married August 17, 1958.

Both boys were married with the approval of their parents and had participated in sports and physical education at defendant school and expected to do so during their senior year.

August 28, 1958, the school board adopted the following policy or rule:

'Married students attending school shall not be eligible to participate in any co-curricular activities: i. e., competitive sports, band, glee club, class and club officers, cheer leading, physical education, class plays and etc.'

A petition for writ of mandamus to compel the school board to admit the two students to co-curricular activities was filed by the two students and their fathers.

At the hearing, the superintendent of defendant school district testified in regard to David Shively and Robert Cochrane as follows:

'Q. If you were do describe these boys, briefly, how would you describe them? A. That they are top-notch boys from the standpoint of their being good students in a school.

'Q. How is their behavior? A. Above reproach.

'Q. Has there been any discipline problem with them? A. No, there has not.

'Q. Have you had any difficulty with them since they were married? As far as any discipline is concerned. A. Directly, I would say, no.

'Q. Have you heard any reports that they have improperly conducted themselves about the school premises in any way since their marriage? A. No, sir.

'Q. Have you heard any reports that they have been guilty of any indiscreet language around the school, or in the presence of students, since their marriage? A. No, sir.'

There was introduced in evidence an exhibit entitled, 'Reasons for Adoption of Board Policy Concerning Married Students,' containing the following:

'1. Adopted for the possible bad influence when married students are forced to be closely associated with their unmarried peers in any way other than the more formal circumstances; that is, classrooms, under the immediate supervision of a teacher.

'2. Students today are more ready to accept the actions of their peers as the thing to do. If any married students are in a position of idolization the more desirous is the group to mimic.

'3. It is felt that married students need all the extra time available to provide a proper family life and time spent in co-curricular activities is not conductive to this end.

'4. When a student enters into marriage he assumes adulthood and consequently enters into another society, removed from the less mature students and also removed from parental guidance.'

Sections 355 and 356 of the school code of 1955 (C.L.S.1956, §§ 340.355, 340.356 [Stat.Ann.1959 Rev. §§ 15.3355, 15.3356]) provide that all students over 5, if resident of a school district, shall have an equal right to attend school. The sole limitation on this right is that portion of section 355 authorizing the grading of schools according to the intellectual progress of the pupil and section 613 (C.L.S.1956, § 340.613 [Stat.Ann.1959 Rev. § 15.3613]) empowering the board to suspend or expel 'any pupil guilty of gross misdemeanor or persistent disobedience, or one having habits or bodily conditions detrimental to the school, whenever in its judgment the interests of the school may demand it.' This right is qualified, in the case of physical handicap, by the requirements that a certified statement be obtained from a physician, and in the case of a mental handicap by the requirement that a psychiatrist or other appropriate agency approved by the superintendent of public instruction make a statement that the child is incapable of benefiting from public school attendance.

Local school boards are authorized to make rules and regulations by section 614 of the school code (C.L.S.1956, § 340.614 [Stat.Ann.1959 Rev. § 15.3614]), which provides:

'Every board shall have authority to make reasonable rules and regulations relative to anything whatever necessary for the proper establishment, maintenance, management and carrying on of the public schools of such district, including regulations relative to the conduct of pupils concerning their safety while in attendance at school or en route to and from school.'

In Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510, 33 A.L.R. 1175, this Court reviewed the propriety of expulsion of an 18-year-old Michigan State normal college student and defined the rights of school authorities to suspend or expel and the review of such action by the courts. We reiterate and adopt the following from that decision (226 Mich. at page 249, 197 N.W. at page 512):

"The enjoyment of the right of attending the public schools is necessarily conditioned on compliance by pubils with the reasonable rules, regulations, and requirements of the school authorities, breaches of which may be punished by suspension or explusion. Ordinarily the school authorities have the right to define the offenses for which the punishment of exclusion from school may be imposed, and to determine whether the offense has been committed, the limitation on this authority being that it must in both respects be reasonably exercised. * * *' 24 R.C.L. p. 646.'

"Acting reasonably within the powers conferred, it is the province of the board of education to determine what things are detrimental to the successful management, good order and discipline of the schools and the rules required to produce these conditions. The presumption is always in favor of the reasonableness and propriety of a rule or regulation duly made. The reasonableness of regulations is a question of law for the courts.' 24 R.C.L. p. 575.'

This Court in Attorney General ex rel. Wendrow v. Knapp, 310 Mich. 385, 391, 17 N.W.2d 223, 225, commented on legislative action recognizing the importance and integral part of physical education in the general plan of education, by stating:

'The statute, 2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 7568 (Stat.Ann. § 15.608), provides:

"Any school district may operate a system of public recreation and play grounds; acquire, equip, and maintain land, buildings, or other recreational facilities; employ a superintendent of recreation and assistants; vote and expend funds for the operation of such system * * *.'

'It has been well said that education of a child means much more than merely communicating to it the contents of textbooks. This need is recognized by the mentioned statute relative to physical education as a component part of the public school curriculum.'

The right to contract marriage at an age when the majority of our youth are attending high school was granted by the legislature when it provided (C.L.S.1956, § 551.103 [Stat.Ann.1957 Rev. § 25.33]):

'Every...