County of Blue Earth v. St. Paul & Sioux City Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 23 December 1881 |
| Citation | 11 N.W. 73,28 Minn. 503 |
| Parties | County of Blue Earth v. St. Paul & Sioux City Railroad Company |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Blue Earth county, Dickinson, J., presiding, refusing a new trial. The case is stated in the opinion.
Order affirmed.
E. C Palmer, for appellant.
The county could not acquire title in fee-simple, with the full power of a private owner to dispose of and use it for business purposes. Its title is that of a trustee for limited and special public uses. Williams v. Lash, 8 Minn 441 (496;) Shelley v. Lash, 14 Minn. 498; James v. Wilder, 25 Minn. 305; City of Winona v Huff, 11 Minn. 75 (119;) Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 10 Minn. 59 (82;) Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 5.
The trial court erred in allowing the witnesses to give estimates of value, considering the "Court-House Square" as private, marketable property, divisible into lots; and in allowing the jury to base their verdict upon such evidence. Burt v. Wigglesworth, 117 Mass. 302; Chandler v Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 122 Mass. 305; Presbrey v. Old Colony & Newport R. Co., 103 Mass. 1; Isom v. Miss. Central R. Co., 36 Miss. 300, 313; Searle v. Lackawanna & Bloomsburg R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 57.
E. P. Freeman, for respondent.
Counties are authorized to purchase and hold real estate for the use of the county. Gen. St. 1878, c. 8, § 83. By taking the proper steps under Laws 1855, c. 7, and also by adverse possession for twenty years, the county now has a legal title to the premises in question, and may dispose of them for business or other purposes, as it sees fit. 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 513 and note; Seebold v. Shitler, 34 Pa. St. 133; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 12 Ind. 620; Van Ness v. City of Washington, 4 Pet. 232; City of Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 431.
This was an action for damages for an alleged trespass by defendant, in building and operating a railroad upon the premises of plaintiff. The defendant, by its answer, converts the action into one for the condemnation of the premises for the purposes of its road, pursuant to the provisions of Gen. St. 1878, c. 34, §§ 33, 34, thus rendering the amount or measure of compensation which plaintiff was entitled to recover the main question of the case. The controlling consideration in the determination of this question is the nature and extent of plaintiff's interest and estate in "Court-House Square," in the city of Mankato, of which the locus in quo is a part. The plaintiff's contention is that the fee-simple absolute is vested in the county of Blue Earth, while that of defendant is that the county holds under a dedication of the premises by the owners, for the special and sole purpose of a site for a court-house, and hence that it has only a limited and qualified interest in the property, without any power of alienation, and that it is a mere trustee for a certain limited and special public use, and no other.
The material facts bearing upon this question are as follows:
In 1852, ten persons, pursuant to a common purpose, settled upon the lands embraced in the town-site of Mankato -- some 320 acres -- and made improvements on the same, and made and filed a plat thereof, showing a dedication to public use of the streets, alleys and squares marked for that purpose, on which plat the premises in controversy were marked "Court-House Square;" such settlement was made for "town-site purposes," (whatever those were,) under the town-site act of congress of May 23, 1844. They then procured the judge of the county court to enter the same, March, 1858, as trustee, for the benefit of the occupants, pursuant to the said "town-site act" of May 23, 1844. The county of Blue Earth, at least as early as 1856, went into possession and occupancy of this block or square, and constructed a jail upon it, and in 1857 erected upon it a fence and county buildings, and has continuously and exclusively occupied the premises for such purposes from that time down to the present. They were never occupied or improved by any one else, the county being the first and only occupant. On the 4th of May, 1858, the county made application to the trustee for a deed, claiming to be entitled to a deed of conveyance in fee-simple. On the 17th of September, 1858, the trustee executed to the county an absolute and unconditional deed in fee of the block or square, in which it is recited, among other things, that proceedings had been had by virtue of and pursuant to the act of the legislative assembly of the territory of Minnesota, entitled "An act prescribing rules and regulations for the execution of the trust arising under the" aforesaid act of congress, (Laws 1855, c. 7; Gen. St. 1878, c. 42,) by which it had been duly determined that the county of Blue Earth was the corporate body for whom the land in question was held in trust, and who owned and were entitled to a deed of conveyance of the title in fee.
We think it clear that, under this state of facts, the county of Blue Earth is the owner in fee-simple absolute of the premises in question. There is nothing in the evidence to show that these so-called "town proprietors" ever acquired or had any interest or estate whatever in this square, or that they ever were occupants of it, within the meaning of the "Town-Site Act;" nor, in fact, that they ever dedicated it to public uses. Neither is there anything tending to show that the county ever entered or held under any dedication. According to the evidence in this case the county was the actual and only occupant of the square, and claimed and received from the trustee a deed in fee-simple absolute, under the provisions of the act of congress, which it could only do as an actual occupant. This vested the absolute title in the county, and is conclusive upon that question, unless it be in an action brought directly for the purpose of having the conveyance to the county set aside as having been executed by the trustee in violation of the trust, for the purposes of which the title was vested in him. There is nothing in the act of congress to prevent a county, or any other municipal corporation, if an actual occupant of any part of a town-site, from being a beneficiary under its provisions. Any "occupant," capable of acquiring title to real estate, might be a beneficiary under this act. The statute of the territory, enacted in pursuance of the act of congress, and to carry out the trust created thereby, uses the words "persons," "associations" or "company," in defining those entitled to its benefits, and, according to another provision of statute, the word "person" may apply to bodies politic and corporate. Under our statutes then, as now, counties were authorized to purchase and hold real estate for the use of the county, and to sell and convey the same. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the county of Blue Earth acquired as...
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