Doe v. American Nat. Red Cross

Decision Date02 May 1997
Docket NumberNos. 95-16658,95-16764,s. 95-16658
Parties97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3245, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5637 Jane DOE, for and on behalf of herself, surviving spouse, and on behalf of the surviving children, A Doe, B Doe, and C Doe, of decedent John Doe, and independently as representative of the Estate of John Doe, and as the Representative of Plaintiff Classes of Persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, a foreign corporation; United Blood Services, a division of Blood Systems, Inc., a foreign corporation; Council of Community Blood Centers, a foreign corporation; the University of Arizona; S. Gerald Sandler, M.D., Alfred Katz, M.D., and Roger Dodd, M.D., in their individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees. Jane DOE, for and on behalf of herself, surviving spouse, and on behalf of the surviving children, A Doe, B Doe, and C Doe, of decedent John Doe, and independently as representative of the Estate of John Doe, and as the Representative of Plaintiff Classes of Persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, Defendant-Appellee, and United States of America, Appellant, and Dennis Donohue, M.D., in his individual and official capacities, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

J. Patrick Butler, Tucson, AZ, and Roy G. Spece, Jr. and Rose Marie Ibanez, Ibanez & Wilkinson, for plaintiffs-appellants/cross-appellees.

Ellen K. Wheeler, Tucson, AZ, for defendant-appellee Council of Community Blood Centers.

Joseph E. Mais, Brown & Bain, Phoenix, AZ, and Tracy L. Merritt and William H. Forman, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellee American Red Cross.

Tom Manning, San Francisco, CA, and Christopher J. Smith, Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Redhair, Tucson, AZ, for American Association of Blood Banks.

Nikki Calvano, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellant United States.

Barbara L. Herwig, Richard A. Olderman, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant Dr. Dennis Donohue.

Foster Robberson, Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, AZ, for Amicus Curiae Blood Systems, Inc.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Richard M. Bilby, Chief Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-94-00521 RMB.

Before: FLETCHER and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges, and KING, * District Judge.

SAMUEL P. KING, District Judge:

Plaintiff/appellant/cross-appellee Jane Doe ("Doe" or "Appellant") appeals the decision of the district court, granting Defendant/appellee/cross-appellant Dr. Dennis Donohue's ("Donohue" or "Appellee") motion to dismiss based on Donohue's qualified immunity. Doe filed suit against Donohue, then-director of the United States Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") Division of Blood and Blood Products, and others, alleging common law negligence, fraud, and constitutional torts related to the death of her husband from Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"), which he contracted after receiving a blood transfusion at a University of Arizona Hospital in 1984. The dismissal of Donohue from Doe's action was certified for immediate appeal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Donohue cross-appeals the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. We affirm the district court's dismissal of Donohue on grounds that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction.

I. Background

Doe brought a class action against the American Red Cross, the University of Arizona, various doctors, several blood banks, and Donohue, after her husband died of AIDS. In her suit, Doe alleged that Donohue, in his capacity as Director of the FDA's Division of Blood and Blood Products, failed to properly ensure a blood supply free from the AIDS virus. Doe claimed that as a result of this failure, her husband contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion he received in 1984 at an Arizona Hospital.

In Count VII of her complaint, Doe alleged that Donohue committed a constitutional tort by intentionally and wilfully conspiring with the "voluntary" blood sector to subvert the regulatory process and hide the risk of blood transfusions from the public. Doe's complaint further alleged that Donohue violated her and her husband's right to due process by intentionally and wilfully deviating from his responsibilities to ensure a safe blood supply. Specifically, Doe claimed that he failed to bar certain high-risk groups from donating blood, failed to publicize the risks of having a blood transfusion, and failed to encourage blood companies to develop the best procedures for ensuring a safe blood supply. 1

Appellee filed a motion to substitute the United States as the proper defendant and a motion to dismiss. 2 The district court denied the former motion, finding that substitution was not warranted because Appellant's suit was not brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but rather alleged a constitutional tort. However, the district court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss, finding that, although Doe's complaint alleged a constitutional tort, Appellee was protected by qualified immunity. 3 Doe then moved for reconsideration, to amend the complaint, 4 and for entry of final judgment against Donohue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The district court denied Doe's motions to reconsider and to amend the complaint, and entered final judgment in favor of Donohue on July 17, 1995. 5

II. Discussion

Although the district court granted Donohue's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, we affirm the decision based on other grounds. The district court found that it had personal jurisdiction over Donohue, and Donohue appeals this finding. We hold that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over Donohue.

The Arizona long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of federal due process. Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 736 P.2d 2, 4 (1987). Due process requires that nonresident defendants have certain minimum contacts with the forum state, so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). A court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may be either general or specific. "If the defendant's activities in the state are 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic,' general jurisdiction may be asserted even if the cause of action is unrelated to those activities." Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (citation omitted).

The district court incorrectly found that it had general jurisdiction over Donohue. 6 Donohue's activities were not pervasive enough to subject him to general jurisdiction. Our inquiry, however, does not end there. Without general jurisdiction, we must look to whether the court had specific jurisdiction over Donohue. In this Circuit, a three-part test determines whether specific jurisdiction may be applied to a defendant:

(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws[;] (2) [t]he claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities [; and] (3) [e]xercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). All of these requirements must be met for jurisdiction over the defendant to comply with due process. Id.

"Purposeful availment requires that the defendant engage in some form of affirmative conduct allowing or promoting the transaction of business within the forum state." Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir.1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991). This requirement ensures that a defendant "will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or third person." Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Assuming that Appellant's allegations are true, Donohue was only peripherally involved in the dissemination of blood products into Arizona. He did not promote the transaction of business and his contacts were, at best, attenuated. There was no reason for Donohue, a government employee working and living in the Washington, D.C. area, to believe that his role in the regulatory process would expose him to the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
171 cases
  • Allstar Marketing Group v. Your Store Online, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • August 10, 2009
    ...Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (9th Cir.1997). Plaintiffs assert conclusorily that defendants are subject to general jurisdiction.27 The analysis in their oppos......
  • Brink v. First Credit Resources
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • July 12, 1999
    ...justice. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir.1997); Data Disc v. Systems Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d at 1287. "By requiring that individuals have `fair warning that a particu......
  • Travelars Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Telstar Const. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • March 5, 2003
    ...to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); see Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir.1997); see also Uberti v. Leonardo, 181 Ariz. 565, 892 P.2d 1354, 1358, cert, denied 516 U.S. 906, 116 S.Ct. 273, 133 L.......
  • Amini Innovation Corp. v. Js Imports Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • May 22, 2007
    ...Nacionales de Colombia S.A v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); see also Doe v. American National Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (9th Cir.1997). 3. General As noted, a court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant has "substant......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT