Hiers v. Mitchell
| Decision Date | 22 February 1928 |
| Citation | 116 So. 81,95 Fla. 345 |
| Parties | HIERS, Sheriff v. MITCHELL. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.
Application by Spencer Mitchell for habeas corpus to be directed to L. M Hiers, Sheriff. An order released the applicant from custody and the Sheriff brings error.
Reversed with directions.
Syllabus by the Court
In determining legality and effect of statute, court should ascertain legislative intent; if legislative intent permits statute should be construed to conform to, rather than violate, constitutional provisions; it must be presumed that Legislature intended statute to comport with fundamental law. In determining the legality and effect of a statutory regulation, the court should ascertain the legislative intent; and if the ascertained intent will permit, the enactment should be construed and effectuated so as to make it conform to rather then violate applicable provisions and principles of the state and federal Constitutions, since it must be assumed that the Legislature intended the enactment to comport with the fundamental law.
Where statute is susceptible of two interpretations, one constitutional and other unconstitutional, court should adopt first; where statute is susceptible of two constructions under one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and under other of which such questions are avoided, court should adopt latter. It is elementary when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity. And unless this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.
If possible, statute must be construed to avoid conclusion that it is unconstitutional or grave doubts on such score. A statute must be so construed, if fairly possible, as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.
In statute providing for license tax on automobile tire and tube dealers, section relating to penalty could, if necessary, be treated as surplusage to make title express statute's subject; statute's title need not detail provisions properly connected with subjects expressed in title; where statute's title is by any reasonable intendment sufficiently broad to include statute's provisions or for them to be properly connected therewith and is not misleading, such provisions will not be held inoperative (Acts 1927, c. 12412,§ 3; Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 5308; Const. art. 3, § 16). If the word 'tax' were given a more limited, in fact the most narrow, construction, we would still find that section 3 of the act which contains the provision here complained of may be treated purely as surplusage, because that section constituted a mere restatement of the law applying the penalty which would have obtained under the provision of section 5308, Revised General Statutes of Florida, and therefore this section of the act neither adds to nor takes from the law in such cases made and provided. It is not necessary to detail in the title of an act provisions contained in the act that are a part of, or are properly connected with, the subject expressed in the title, and where the subject expressed in the title is by any reasonable intendment sufficiently broad for the provisions of the act be embraced therein or to be properly connected therewith, and the title is not misleading, such provisions will not be held to be inoperative, as not being legally incorporated in the act.
State has wide discretion in imposing license taxes; unless there is no substantial basis for discriminations in classifications and in fixing amount of license taxes, courts will not interfere; statute imposing state and county license tax on automobile tire and tube dealers held not to deny equal protection of laws (Acts 1927, c. 12412; Const. U.S. Amend. 14). The state has a wide discretionary power in imposing license taxes, and unless there can be no substantial basis for discriminations made in classifications and in fixing the amount of license taxes so that such discriminations must be regarded as purely arbitrary and unreasonable under every conceivable condition in practical affairs, the courts will not interfere with legislative regulations of such matters.
Only limitations on statute imposing license or occupational taxes are that person may not be deprived of property without due process of law or denied equal protection of laws; ad valorem tax on property and license or occupational tax on use of same property held not double taxation; license fee is not 'tax' within meaning of Constitution requiring uniformity of rates and just valuation of property for taxation (Const. art. 3, § 20; Const. U.S. Amend. 14). In imposing license or occupational taxes, the only limitations upon a duly enacted statute are that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law or denied the equal protection of the laws. The levy of an ad valorem tax upon property and also a license or occupational tax upon the use of the same property is not double taxation. A license fee is not a tax within the meaning of the provisions of the organic law requiring uniformity of rates and just valuations of property for purposes of taxation.
Statute imposing license tax on automobile tire and tube dealers held general legislation (Const. art. 3, § 20). The act here under consideration is not a local act, but is general legislation affecting all persons engaged in the business to which it applies and who are like situated.
Equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit state from classifying in adoption of police laws but admits exercise of wide discretion therein; only purely arbitrary classification by state in exercise of police power constitutes denial of equal protection of laws; state's classification in exercise of police power having reasonable basis does not deny equal protection of laws merely because not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality (Const. U.S. Amend. 14). The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.
When classification in adoption of police law is questioned, existence of state of facts at passage sustaining it must be assumed if reasonably conceivable (Const. U.S. Amend. 14). When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
One assailing classification in license tax law as denying equal protection of laws must show that classification is essentially arbitrary (Const. U.S. Amend. 14). One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Statute authorizing each county to levy and collect certain tax from dealers in automobile tubes and tires and to pay it to county school fund held to comply with constitutional provision relating to county school fund (Acts 1927, c. 12412; Const. art. 12, § 9). In the act here under consideration the Legislature has authorized the levy and collection of a certain tax by each county in each county and has thereupon appropriated that tax to the county school fund of the county where collected, and in doing so, we think, has followed the provisions and accomplished the purpose of section 9 of article 12 of the Constitution as now existing.
Fred H. Davis, Atty. Gen., and John E. Mathews and Alston Cockrell, both of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.
Doyle Campbell, of Tampa, for defendant in error.
This is a writ of error to an order in habeas corpus proceedings, the effect of which was to hold chapter 12412, Acts of 1927, relating to and imposing a state and county license tax on automobile tire and automobile tube dealers, which was originally known as House Bill No. 1053, unconstitutional and void, and discharging the respondent, who is defendant in error here, from custody.
Perhaps no better rule may be stated to apply in the construction of the constitutionality of a statute when assailed than that which was enunciated by this court in the case of Burr v. Fla. East Coast Line Railway Co., 77 Fla. 259, 81 So. 464, in which it is said:
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...the particular classification and distinction made.' Anderson v. B. P. I., 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334, 335. See, also, Hiers v. Mitchell, 95 Fla. 345, 116 So. 81. classification of the counties of the state into two classes, viz., larger counties and smaller counties, for purposes of statuto......
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