Lawrence v. Boston

• Decision Date: 10 November 1875
• Citation: 119 Mass. 126
• Parties: Leonard F. Lawrence v. City of Boston. William B. Fowle v. Same
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

119 Mass. 126

Leonard F. Lawrence v. City of Boston. William B. Fowle v. Same

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

November 10, 1875

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Suffolk. Two petitions to the Superior Court under the St. of 1871, c. 382, § 7, for a jury to assess damages for the taking by the respondent of the land on which the Boston Post building stood, on the corner of Water Street and Devonshire Street, in Boston, to widen Water Street, the petitioners having a leasehold estate therein. Trial in the Superior Court, before Putnam, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows:

The land and building belonged to James H. Beals and others. The petitioner Lawrence held a lease from them of a store on the first story on Water Street, which would terminate November 4, 1878. The petitioner Fowle held a lease from one Apthorp of a room on the second story on Devonshire Street, which would terminate May 1, 1875. Apthorp held a lease from the owners of the same and other premises which would terminate at the same time.

The city determined, April 18, 1873, to widen Water Street by taking a portion of the estate. On March 31, 1873, the owners notified the city that they objected to the proposed widening, and elected to surrender the entire estate to the city. On November 15, 1873, the city determined to take the entire estate for the purpose of the widening. Subsequently the owners settled with the city for the value of the estate, and in consideration of $ 325,000 paid to them, and of the use of the building till September 1, 1874, and the remission of taxes for that year, the owners conveyed the estate to the city, on April 15, 1874, and in their deed covenanted to indemnify the city against all claims for damages on account of the granted premises or the taking thereof. The owners notified the tenants that they must remove on September first.

It was conceded that in pursuance of this agreement the present suit was defended in fact by the owners of the estate.

At the trial James H. Beals was called as a witness for the petitioners, and testified that he appeared in behalf of himself and other owners before the city authorities during the negotiations which resulted in the settlement with the city. The petitioners then offered to show by this witness that he made representations to the committee that the owners would have to pay large damages to these tenants, and that these rooms could be let for more than the rent reserved in the existing leases, also as to the amount at which the office occupied by Beals, Green & Co. in the building, which office adjoined Lawrence's store, could then be let. The counsel offered this evidence, not as in any way controlling Beals's statements at this trial. He was not asked his opinion as to the value of the leases, but counsel stated that they offered this evidence as admissions heretofore made by the said Beals. The judge excluded the testimony, and the petitioners alleged exceptions.

The respondent called Charles W. Freeland to testify as to his opinion of the rental value of premises occupied by the petitioners. The witness testified that he was lessee under a long lease of a building known as the City Exchange, on Devonshire Street, about one hundred and fifty feet from the corner of Water Street and Devonshire Street, which building he underlet, and that he made it a part of his business to underlet this building, and that he attended to letting tenements not exceeding twenty in that building; that his knowledge of the value of leases outside of his own building was not very extensive; that he was not in the habit of making any inquiries as to what other people were doing; that he had general knowledge of what certain things would rent for per square foot; that for the purpose of letting this building he had informed himself generally of the rents of buildings; that knowledge came to him by the way of people coming to make inquiries, and when he talked about the rent of his building they would tell him what they could hire in such a building for such a price; that he had not sought the knowledge, but it came to him in that way; that he had been consulted a great many times by owners of buildings as to rents, but he could not state any particular territories as to which he was thus consulted, and that he had hired a building for his business on Winthrop Square. It did not appear that the witness had examined the Boston Post building. The petitioners thereupon objected that the witness was not qualified to testify as to his opinion of the value of the petitioners' premises. But the judge permitted him to testify thereto, and the petitioners excepted.

The judge instructed the jury as follows: "The value of the leases is their market value; 'market value' means the fair value of the property, as between one who wants to purchase and one who wants to sell any article, not what could be obtained for it under peculiar circumstances, when a greater than its fair price could be obtained; not its speculative value; not a value obtained from the necessities of another. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be limited to that price which the property would bring when forced off at auction, under the hammer. It is what it would bring at a fair public sale, when one party wanted to sell and the other to buy. The fact, therefore, that one of these lessees Lawrence, as had been argued by his counsel, did not want to move, wanted to stay there, would have paid a very large sum to stay there, is not a test of market value, because it is not a case of one who wants to sell and one who wants to buy. If Lawrence had wanted to go out, the question is, what would his lease have brought? Not what it would have been worth to him if he had wanted to stay there, because it may have been of greater value or of less value to him than its value upon the market. That simply determines its value to him, not its market value. The question for you to consider is, if Lawrence wanted to sell this lease, what could he have obtained for it upon the market, from parties who wanted to buy and would give its fair value?" No specific objection was taken to this charge, but the counsel for the petitioners then asked the judge to give this instruction: "In determining the value of the leasehold estate, the jury are to consider among other things the amounts which persons desiring to take the leases would be willing to pay for the same, not excluding from such consideration the amounts which the petitioners themselves would give." The judge stated...