Jenison, In re

• Decision Date: 08 March 1963
• Docket Number: No. 38940,38940
• Citation: 265 Minn. 96,120 N.W.2d 515
• Parties: In the Matter of Contempt Proceedings in re Mrs. Owen JENISON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 515

120 N.W.2d 515

265 Minn. 96

In the Matter of Contempt Proceedings in re Mrs. Owen JENISON.

No. 38940.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 8, 1963.

Rehearing Denied March 29, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Refusal to serve as a juror because of religious beliefs Held not to be warranted by Minn.Const. art. 1, § 16, and U.S.Const. Amend. I.

2. Failure to excuse a woman from jury service because of her religious beliefs Held not an abuse of discretion.

3. A venireman who without legal justification refuses to be sworn as a juror is guilty of a direct contempt.

4. A sentence which does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized by statute may not be reviewed on appeal.

John S. Connolly, St. Paul, Louis W. Claeson, Jr., Minneapolis, Otis H. Godfrey, Sr., St. Paul, of counsel, for relator.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Sol. Gen., St. Paul, Thomas J. Simmons, Co. Atty., Olivia, for respondent.

OTIS, Justice.

This matter is before the court on a writ of certiorari to review a conviction for contempt arising out of the refusal of relator, Laverna H. Jenison, to act as a petit juror for the assigned reason that such service is in conflict with her religious principles.

It appears that Mrs. Jenison was called for jury duty at the general term of the Renville County District Court on November 13, 1962, and was selected to sit on a civil case. When the clerk was about to administer the oath, the following colloquy occurred:

'MRS. JENISON: (Standing) Sir, I cannot serve on this jury. I cannot judge.

'THE COURT: The Court has told you that you must serve, and you will remain where you are and serve as a juror in this case.

'MRS. JENISON: Well, I'll pronounce no judgment. I can't. It's against may Bible teaching. My Bible tells me 'Judge not, so you will not be judged.'

'THE COURT: In view of your statements the Court holds you in contempt of Court. You will stay in the courtroom and the Court will deal with you summarily during recess time.'

A further interrogation of Mrs. Jenison disclosed that she had acted as a juror in the May term of court in 1948 but had subsequently experienced a change in her religious beliefs which prevented her from again serving. In adjudicating the relator guilty and imposing sentence, the court stated:

'Now, the Court has told you that the Court cannot excuse you. The law makes no provision for such an excuse, and the Court will ask you now once more whether you will now perform jury duty when called upon,' to which she answered, 'I cannot.'

Thereupon the court, in the following language, adjudged Mrs. Jenison to be in contempt of court:

'The Court finds and determines that Mrs. Owen Jenison is guilty of contempt of Court in refusing to serve as a juror and you may now step in front of the Clerk's desk and the Court will impose sentence.

'It is considered and adjudged that as punishment for contempt of Court you be sentenced to the Courty Jail of Renville County for a period of thirty days.

'It is further ordered that you may purge yourself of contempt at any time during said period if you will indicate to the Sheriff that you wish to be relieved and are willing to do your civic duty.'

After remaining in custody for 7 days, Mrs. Jenison was released pending a review of her conviction by this court.

There are three assignments of error: (1) That the conviction is in violation of Minn.Const. art. 1, § 16, and U.S.Const. Amend. I; (2) that relator was entitled to be excused under Minn.St. 628.49 governing women jurors; and (3) that the sentence was excessive.

1. Relator contends that the action of the trial court denied her rights which are secured by Minn.Const. art. 1, § 16, the applicable portions of which are as follows:

'* * * The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed, * * *; nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, * * *; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State, * * *.'

In addition it is claimed that the court's action contravened the provisions of U.S.Const. Amend. I, prohibiting any 'law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' which by the Fourteenth Amendment has been made applicable to the states. ¹ We are of the opinion that the duty imposed on every citizen who is otherwise qualified to serve on a petit jury does not prohibit the free exercise of religion or interfere with the right to worship God according to conscience, and that refusal to serve is inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.

The constitutional guaranty that every citizen may affiliate with whatever religious group teaches and practices doctrines which are consistent with his individual convictions, and that he may be governed by the dictates of his own conscience, is not an absolute, unfettered privilege. In striking down the contention that Federal laws prohibiting polygamy are in violation of the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held that while Congress is deprived of legislative power over mere opinion, it is left free to reach actions which are in violation of social duties or are subversive of good order. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164, 25 L.Ed. 244, 249. The Supreme Court there held that to excuse prohibited practices because of religious belief would in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. In a subsequent prosecution, also hinging on the practice of polygamy, the court stated (Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 S.Ct. 299, 300, 33 L.Ed. 637, 640):

'* * * It was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society.'

Under the First Amendment not even so serious a matter of personal conscience as bearing arms in time of war may be avoided because of religious principles. This question was determined adversely to a conscientious objector seeking naturalization in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623, 51 S.Ct. 570, 575, 75 L.Ed. 1302, 1310. There the United States Supreme Court held:

'* * * The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him.' ²

Notwithstanding defendants' contention that securing medical assistance for a child was inconsistent with their religious beliefs, the Maryland Court of Appeals in passing on a conviction for manslaughter arising out of the parents' refusal to provide the child with necessary medical attention emphasized the distinction between the unqualified constitutional freedom to believe and the limited freedom to act. Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 599, 155 A.2d 684, 690.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of whether refusal to act as a juror, based on a literal Biblical admonition, offends the peace, safety, good order, or morals of the community. Obviously the courts must have broad latitude in summoning qualified jurors if the constitutional right to a jury trial in civil and criminal cases is to be enjoyed by litigants in our judicial system. ³ The gravity of this responsibility has been well expressed by the Arizona court in County of Maricopa v. Corp, 44 Ariz. 506, 507, 39 P.2d 351, 352:

'Jury service is not a matter of choice, or right, but is a duty, imposed by the state. * * * It is analogous to military duty in time of war, in that the citizen designated by the state for jury duty must, like the soldier, serve whether he likes it or not, on such terms as the state may fix.'

No concept in our Anglo-Saxon tradition is more firmly entrenched or more an integral part of our democratic heritage than the right of every citizen to be tried by a jury of his peers. To sanction the disqualification of a juror because of a conviction which is at variance with such a basic institution is to invite the erosion of every other obligation a citizen owes his community and his country.

Of the two cases cited by relator for reversal, one is readily distinguishable, and the other, while squarely in point, we do not choose to follow. In Watson v. Charlton, 243 Iowa 80, 50 N.W.2d 605, the court reversed a conviction for contempt arising out of the attempt of a woman to avoid jury duty in a criminal case. She had been called initially on less than 4 hours' notice, and being the mother of small children who required her care, asked that she be excused from serving. In the face of the court's insistence that she remain, she adhered to her position that her domestic situation made it impossible, and was thereupon sentenced to 6 months in the women's reformatory. Notwithstanding the fact that within a few hours she relented and agreed to act, the court remained adamant and committed her to custody. The Iowa Supreme Court found a technical irregularity which warranted acquittal, but held that in any event it was clear she had effectively purged herself of contempt even if she were guilty. It is significant, however, that in so holding the court gave due recognition to the imperative need for responding to a jury summons in the following language (243 Iowa 93, 50 N.W.2d 612):

'* * * No higher responsibility rests upon the citizen than that of taking his place on the jury panel, when called, without evasion or complaint. * * *

'Only the most compelling circumstances will direct the good citizen to ask an excuse when summoned to the jury panel; and the court should grant such a request, when made, only upon the best of grounds. Any other attitude on the part either of the juror or the court destroys the effectiveness of the jury system. * * * If at...