Watson v. Charlton, 47990

Decision Date13 December 1951
Docket NumberNo. 47990,47990
PartiesWATSON v. CHARLTON.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Ray R. Reed, of Waterloo, for petitioner.

Robert L. Larson, Atty. Gen., Robert Buckmaster and Harris, Van Metre & Buckmaster, all of Waterloo, for respondent.

THOMPSON, Justice.

For determination here is a certiorari proceeding in which the petitioner seeks to test the legality of the acts of the respondent, as judge of the district court of Iowa in and for Black Hawk county, in adjudging her guilty of contempt of court and sentencing her to confinement in the Women's Reformatory at Rockwell City for a period of six months. The propositions relied upon for reversal are that the respondent acted illegally, imposed excessive sentence, and exceeded the jurisdiction of the court. In determining whether any or all of these should be sustained, a statement of the facts is essential.

The respondent was the presiding judge at the trial of the case of State of Iowa v. Beckwith. The defendant therein was accused of the crime of murder; the case was of importance, and had attracted much attention because of the brutal nature of the acts charged as constituting the offense, and because it had been tried once previously, with the judgment of guilty and imposition of the death penalty having been reversed by this court. 46 N.W.2d 20. All of this resulted in wide publicity and brought about a situation in which it was difficult to obtain qualified jurors. The trial commenced on May 14, 1951, and the panel of jurors regularly called was soon exhausted, making it necessary to call talesmen. The petitioner was one of the latter group. She was notified sometime after 10:20 a. m. on May 16th that her name had been drawn, and was required to report at 2 p. m. on the same date. She appeared accordingly, accompanied by her five year old son.

The petitioner at the time was 38 years old, and was a housewife living in Waterloo with her husband and two small sons, one eight and the other five. Her husband was employed regularly, and there were no other members of the household. She had no one with whom to leave the children during her absence. The older boy was apparently in school during the day, but the younger attended kindergarten in the morning only. Petitioner testified that she had no one available or upon whom she could call to care for the children if she were away. After her appearance in the court room on May 16th, she was examined on voir dire sometime during the afternoon. At this time she told the prosecuting attorney that she hadn't had a 'baby sitter' for nine months; that when she had had one, it was in the evening; that they 'just weren't available in the day-time.' Counsel then remarked: 'Maybe the court will help you find one.' She replied: 'All right.' It is only fair to the respondent to say that upon oral argument in this court, it was claimed that this statement was made facetiously, and was so understood by petitioner. We are unable to determine this from the printed record. It should also be said that petitioner did not request an excuse from jury service.

Upon examination by defense counsel, petitioner again, in answer to the usual question as to whether there was anything not specifically inquired into which might show that she 'could not and should not sit as a juror in this case,' referred to her family situation. She said: 'The only thing is the family. Who will feed the family and take care of the family? My family?' She was not challenged for cause, and shortly after eleven a. m. on the next day, May 17th, was selected as one of the twelve jurors to try the case.

Thereupon, the clerk of the court directed the jurors to stand and be sworn. The petitioner then said: 'I cannot take the oath.' Upon being advised that she might affirm, she said: 'I won't do either. I don't want to do either.' Further: 'What do I do with my children? They are coming home at 11:30. They are going to roam around there. I don't have anybody to take care of them. And you talk about juvenile delinquency! I take care of my children.'

Prior to the direction to the chosen jurors to take the oath, there had been no announcement that they would be segregated during the trial. At that time, however, they were so advised by the court. Upon Mrs. Watson's refusal to be sworn, the respondent took her into his chambers, advised her of her duty to serve, told her that if she persisted in her attitude it would be necessary for him to put her in jail for contempt, and, about 12 M., told her that she might go home, returning at 2:30 p. m. He advised her to take the matter up with her husband and to see an attorney during the recess, and to make necessary arrangements for the care of her children. She went home, prepared lunch for her family, was advised by her husband to serve, called an attorney who was unable to see her, but did tell her, via the telephone, that she would probably be compelled to serve, found no one to stay with the children, and returned to the court room at 2:30 p. m. as directed.

At this time, the jury being again ordered to stand and take the oath, petitioner at once said: 'First of all I have to have someone to take care of my children before I can take the oath. I have no one to take care of them.' Respondent then said: 'Is the court to understand, Mrs. Watson, that you refuse to take the oath?'; to which petitioner replied: 'I'll have to. I don't know what to do with them. I'm sorry sir.' Here respondent ordered petitioner to take the witness chair, where the voir dire oath was administered to her. After eliciting her name, and the fact that she had appeared for examination as a prospective juror, respondent asked: 'Without ever having made any application for excuse from jury service?' Petitioner answered: 'I didn't know that you could do that. I had never had any dealings with any legal matters.' She then admitted her refusal to be sworn, and that the court had advised her, at noon, to consult an attorney. Respondent then sentenced her, in these terms: 'Defendant before the Court for contempt in that she refused to take an oath as juror in the case of State of Iowa versus Edward James Beckwith, in which she had been duly selected as a juror. Defendant examined in open Court. Defendant found guilty of contempt and sentenced to be confined in the Women's Reformatory at Rockwell City, Iowa, for the period of six months. Mittimus to issue forthwith.'

At this point, William E. Watson, petitioner's husband, appeared, was sworn, and said that he had 'tried to talk her into serving;' but he also said that he couldn't take care of the two children, but that he 'would go out of his way to hire somebody.' Respondent replied that she had 'never brought up this matter in regard to the children until after she had been selected and until after she had been directed to assume her place in the jury box and to assume her duties as such.' Here petitioner spoke up, saying that she had told of the children upon her examination, that she had said she had no one to care for them; that she had had insufficient time to find anyone, that her husband had to make the family living, but perhaps he could go home and stay with the children, and she would serve if the sentence were 'taken back.' To this, respondent's only reply was: 'Your exception has been noted, and bond on appeal fixed in the sum of $1,000.00.'

Within perhaps fifteen to thirty minutes after this, an attorney representing Mrs. Watson appeared in the court room and asked that she be heard in an effort to purge herself of any contempt. The court agreed to hear her, stipulating that it was agreeable to counsel for both the state and defendant that he do so. Counsel were allowed to dictate into the record certain interrogatories which the court was to ask petitioner concerning her attitude of fairness to the opposing parties in case she should purge herself of contempt and be permitted to serve. Upon interrogation by her own counsel petitioner then said that it was not her intention to refuse to serve under any circumstances; that she was thinking of her children and would have been willing to serve if someone could be found to care for them; that her husband's employer had now agreed that Mr. Watson might stay home with the children, without loss of pay. She then said that she was ready to serve upon the jury, to take the oath, and that she could and would serve fairly. That the trouble she had had would in no manner influence or prejudice her for or against either party.

At this point the court, before ruling upon her effort to purge herself, called the attorneys for the state and defense into his chambers, and asked them if they were willing that Mrs. Watson should serve, if purged of contempt. Counsel for the state agreed to accept her, but defense counsel would not. In this connection, in an 'Amendment to the Record' in affidavit form, filed herein by respondent, we are told that, when Attorney Ray R. Reed, for petitioner, told respondent that arrangements had been made to care for the children and that she was willing to serve, and desired an opportunity to purge herself of contempt, that he, respondent, advised Mr. Reed 'the situation created by Mrs. Watson's refusal to take the oath was beyond the exclusive control and power of the court to correct, as she could not, in fairness to the other eleven jurors, be permitted to purge herself unless she could and did sit on the jury.' Respondent says that he then suggested to petitioner's counsel that he confer with the attorneys in the principal case, to determine the possibility of Mrs. Watson sitting on the jury, which would 'of necessity depend upon whether or not either or both of such parties made objection to her doing so.'

Following the refusal of the defense to accept petitioner as a member of the trial jury, the court made an order finding that she had not purged herself of contempt, and...

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