People v. Brown

• Citation: 479 N.Y.S.2d 113,125 Misc.2d 132
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Samuel BROWN, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 25 June 1984
• Court: New York County Court

Page 113

479 N.Y.S.2d 113

125 Misc.2d 132

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Samuel BROWN, Defendant.

Westchester County Court.

June 25, 1984.

Robert N. Isseks, Middletown, for defendant.

Kenneth Gribetz, Rockland County Dist. Atty., New City, for the People.

DAVID S. RITTER, Judge.

Defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment as a matter of law alleging that his neck was broken by corrections personnel during five continuous days of systematic and brutal beatings at the Rockland County Jail. Moreover, defendant contends that he was denied necessary medical treatment for approximately 75 days after his neck was broken.

On November 7, 1983, I ruled that defendant was entitled to a post-trial hearing and an opportunity to establish that the alleged violations of his constitutional rights so tainted the prosecution's case that dismissal of the charges is mandated. ¹

Initially, I will summarize the facts that are relevant to defendant's claim that he was the victim of official brutality. Defendant was one of a group of individuals jointly charged and ultimately found guilty of three counts of felony murder in connection with the October 20, 1981 fatal shooting of two police officers and a security guard following an aborted robbery of a Brink's armored truck and a shootout with police at a roadblock. After the shootout, defendant jumped into the rear seat of a waiting tan Honda automobile. The Honda was being driven by one of the other participants in the robbery. Defendant crouched down along the floor of the rear seat as the Honda led police on a high speed chase. The Honda ultimately crashed into a concrete barrier and the occupants were arrested. Defendant says he was semi-conscious when he was removed from the rear seat of the Honda. He was immediately taken to Nyack Hospital and treated for injuries apparently caused by the accident. Medical records from Nyack Hospital indicate that defendant was given a cervical collar to wear, but x-rays of the cervical spine were negative for any evidence of fracture as of October 20, 1981.

On the next day, October 21, 1981, defendant was discharged from Nyack Hospital and taken to the Rockland County Jail. At the post-trial hearing held on June 20, 1984, defendant testified that he was placed in a cell by himself. Soon after his arrival, defendant overheard some of the corrections officers whispering about his alleged role in the robbery and shootings. A little while later several guards entered the cell and began hitting him repeatedly with police sticks and batons in the head and neck areas. The beatings continued for five consecutive days and were repeated as often as five to six times each day. Defendant cannot identify any of his assailants.

On October 26, 1981, defendant was transferred to the Federal Correctional Institute in Otisville, New York. He made daily complaints of severe pain that was caused by the beatings at the Rockland County Jail. The Otisville medical staff treated him with pain killing medications, but x-rays were not ordered until sometime in December, 1981, when defendant was examined by another doctor. The x-rays show that defendant sustained a broken neck that could only have occurred while he was in custody. ² Defendant required spinal fusion surgery that was performed in January, 1982, at the Westchester County Medical Center. After his discharge from the hospital, defendant was housed at a different State correctional facility. Although the Rockland County Jail would have been the usual place for defendant's pre-trial detention, he persistently sought to avoid being returned there because he claimed to fear that he would be beaten again. It was this fear, diagnosed by a team of attending psychiatrists, that led me to order him removed from the Rockland County Jail after he had been returned there during the trial. Based upon all of the evidence offered at the hearing just concluded, I find that the defendant has established that he was, in fact, a victim of brutality during his detention at the Rockland County Jail.

Defendant has not specified what evidence he claims was tainted by the beatings or any other official misconduct. The gravamen of his claim is that the official misconduct itself, namely, the brutality and violations of his right to counsel, were so egregious that dismissal is mandated as a matter of law. Defendant relies primarily on the fundamental constitutional concept of due process as interpreted by both the Federal and State judiciaries. In my view, defendant's contention and the record before me also raise the question of whether the indictment should be dismissed in furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL § 210.40.

Although I am satisfied that defendant's constitutional and civil rights were violated, I do not believe dismissal is warranted as a matter of due process absent some causal linkage between the illegality and the evidence offered to secure his conviction (see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183; People v. Pobliner, 32 N.Y.2d 356, 365, 345 N.Y.S.2d 482, 298 N.E.2d 637). A causal connection is required because, as past decisions of the United States Supreme Court demonstrate, "the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor." (Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 L.Ed.2d 78.)

Fundamental fairness, which is the essence of due process, prohibits the government from exploiting any deliberate lawlessness on its part. Thus, an exclusionary rule has been fashioned to suppress the fruits of government misconduct and, in effect, obligates the prosecution to...