Little Rock School Dist. v. State of Ark.

• Decision Date: 14 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-1350,97-1350
• Citation: 127 F.3d 693
• Parties: 121 Ed. Law Rep. 908 LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT and Pulaski County Special School District, Appellees, v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 693

127 F.3d 693

121 Ed. Law Rep. 908

LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT and Pulaski County Special School District, Appellees, v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, Appellant.

No. 97-1350.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted July 14, 1997.

Decided Oct. 14, 1997.

Timothy G. Gauger, Little Rock, AR, argued (Winston Bryant, Attorney General, on the brief), for appellant.

Christopher Heller, Little Rock, AR, argued (John C. Fendley, Jr., Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for appellee Little Rock School District.

M. Samuel Jones, III, Little Rock, AR, argued (Claire Shows Hancock, Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for appellee Pulaski County Special School District.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HEANEY and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

In 1994, the Little Rock School District (LRSD) and the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) sought to enforce the terms of their settlement agreement with the Arkansas State Department of Education ("the State") in the Pulaski County school desegregation litigation. The District Court found that the State had broken the settlement agreement in three respects: the disbursement of funds for the districts' workers' compensation payments; the treatment of majority-to-minority students in calculating loss funding for the districts; and the implementation of a statewide public school computer network. The State appealed the District Court's order. This Court affirmed the District Court's order with respect to the workers' compensation payment scheme and the calculation of loss funding. We reversed the order with respect to the computer network. The school districts filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied.

LRSD and PCSSD then applied to the District Court for successive extensions of the attorneys' fees deadline. The motion for fees was originally due on January 27, 1995. The school districts filed motions for, and the District Court approved, successive extensions to apply for fees. PCSSD filed its motion for fees in the District Court on August 19, 1996. LRSD filed its motion on August 30, 1996. Both school districts' fee requests included expenses incurred in appellate litigation.

For at least part of the services rendered to each district, their lawyers had charged hourly rates lower than their normal rates as of August 1996. PCSSD's motion showed that attorney Sam Jones's current and normal billing rate was $175 hourly, but that PCSSD had been charged $135 hourly during 1995 and 1996, and $110 hourly during 1994. Attorney Claire Hancock's current and normal billing rate was $145 hourly, but PCSSD was charged $110 hourly. Manager Angell Jones's current and normal billing rate was $75 hourly, but PCSSD was charged $55 hourly in 1994. Similarly, LRSD attorney Chris Heller's current and normal rate was $160 hourly, but LRSD was charged $105 hourly for his services. Attorney Clay Fendley's current and normal rate was $100 hourly, but LRSD was charged $85 hourly.

The District Court found that LRSD and PCSSD were entitled to fees as prevailing parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. PCSSD was awarded $28,854.50, based on the lower rates that it was actually charged by its lawyers. LRSD was awarded $42,520.00 in attorneys' fees, based on the higher current and normal rates, as well as $563.32 in costs. The District Court later amended PCSSD's attorneys' fees award to $36,464.00, to reflect at least partially the attorneys' higher current and normal rates: it increased Sam Jones's compensable hourly rate to $160 and Claire Hancock's to $145.

The State appeals the award of attorneys' fees to the school districts on three grounds. First, it argues that LRSD and PCSSD were not entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because they were not prevailing parties and because enforcement of the settlement agreement is not a cause of action for which fee-shifting is provided. Second, it argues that LRSD's and PCSSD's failure to make a motion to this Court, pursuant to Eighth Circuit Rule 47C, precluded the District Court's award of attorneys' fees for services rendered on appeal. Third, it argues that the District Court erred in calculating the amount of the fee award by including time spent unsuccessfully defending against the appeal on the computer-network issue and by using the attorneys' current and normal rates.

For the most part, we agree with the District Court's decision. It correctly granted the motions for an award of fees and expenses. We think a few details should be worked out more precisely, however, and for that purpose we remand for further proceedings.

I. Applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1988

We reject the State's argument that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not provide for a fee award in this case, which involves the interpretation of a settlement agreement. To the contrary, where a settlement agreement serves to particularize the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to a specific case originally brought under § 1983, we hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows attorneys' fee awards to a prevailing party.

First, LRSD and PCSSD are prevailing parties within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. LRSD was the original plaintiff in the interdistrict phase of the Pulaski County desegregation litigation. PCSSD, though a defendant, cross-claimed against the State. In response to their arguments, the District Court found that the State shared responsibility for the violation of Pulaski County's black students' constitutional rights. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 584 F.Supp. 328, 353 (E.D.Ark.1984); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 597 F.Supp. 1220, 1228 (E.D.Ark.1984), remanded by 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186, 106 S.Ct. 2926, 2927, 91 L.Ed.2d 554 (1986). LRSD and PCSSD thus prevailed.

Despite the Joshua intervenors' subsequent involvement, the school districts' continued prevailing-party status was confirmed by the District Court in 1989. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 726 F.Supp. 1544, 1555 (E.D.Ark.1989), rev'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir.1990). The District Court found that "LRSD was the principal prevailing party ... [PCSSD] has cross-claimed against the State for recompense for constitutional violations in the same manner as the LRSD.... PCSSD is also a prevailing party." Id. This holding is now the law of the case. ¹

Moreover, the payments sought by the districts will benefit the black schoolchildren of Pulaski County, because one of the purposes of the settlement agreement was to vindicate their rights. To disallow fee awards to the districts for vindicating the constitutional rights of these schoolchildren would wrongfully shift the State's burden to pay for remedial measures.

Further, the fees and costs associated with enforcing the settlement agreement are compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The settlement agreement embodied "significant relief" to which the plaintiff class was constitutionally entitled. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d at 1388. Enforcing the settlement agreement is the equivalent of enforcing a constitutionally required remedy. Because monitoring and enforcement are essential to desegregation remedies, a prevailing party may recover attorneys' fees and costs related to defending such a remedy: "Monitoring implementation of the remedy is a crucial part of the plaintiffs' function in these cases: 'Services devoted to reasonable monitoring of the court's decrees, both to ensure full compliance and to ensure that the plan is indeed working to desegregate the school system, are compensable services.' " Jenkins v. Missouri, 967 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting Northcross v. Board of Ed., 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980)).

The State argues that this case should be governed by DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525 (8th Cir.1990), which held that a prisoner could not in an independent action under § 1983 recover damages for the prison's violation of a consent decree entered against it in a previous class-action suit. Unlike the plaintiffs in DeGidio, LRSD and PCSSD did not file an independent action. They are seeking, by motion in the same case, to obtain specific performance of the very judgment they had won against the State. DeGidio thus does not bar the award of fees and costs to the school districts.

The settlement agreement marked the successful resolution of claims initially brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by LRSD and PCSSD, among others, against the State. The school districts remain prevailing parties. Further, the interpretation and enforcement of the settlement agreement are an extension of the original § 1983 suit. The District Court was correct to determine that LRSD and PCSSD were entitled to attorneys' fees.

II. Attorneys' Fee Procedure in the Eighth Circuit

The State argues that Rule 47C of the Rules of this Court deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees for work performed in this Court. Rule 47C provides:

(a) Motion for Fees. A motion for attorney fees ... shall be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the entry of judgment.... The court may grant on its own motion an allowance of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party.

(b) Determination of Fees. On the court's own motion or at the request of the prevailing party, a motion for attorney fees may be remanded to the district court or administrative agency for appropriate hearing and determination....

The usual practice for awarding fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is for this Court to fix the compensation for services rendered before it, and for the District Court to do so for services rendered before it. Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137, 138 (8th Cir.1982) (en...