Crawford v. Tyrrell

• Citation: 28 N.E. 514,128 N.Y. 341
• Parties: CRAWFORD et al. v. TYRRELL.
• Decision Date: 06 October 1891
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

128 N.Y. 341

28 N.E. 514

CRAWFORD et al.

v.TYRRELL.^*

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 6, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, second department.

Action by John P. Crawford and others against Martin B. Tyrrell, to restrain defendant from keeping a house of ill fame, and to recover damages for injury sustained. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.Jas. & Thos. H. Troy, for appellant.

Alfred E. Mudge, for respondents.

GRAY, J.

In this action, which was brought to restrain the defendant from keeping a house of ill fame and from using his premises as an assignation house, and to recover damages for injuries sustained, the trial court found as facts that the house, as maintained by defendant, was a resort for prostitutes and licentious men, and that the persons occupying rooms acted in a boisterous and noisy manner, and indecently exposed their persons at the windows, ‘whereby the use and occupation of the plaintiff's premises have been interfered with and rendered uncomfortable, and whereby the occupants of the plaintiff's premises have been annoyed and seriously disturbed.’ Such a finding was amply justified by the evidence, and, indeed, it is not discussed by the appellant; but he argues that the plaintiffs could not maintain a civil action of this nature, inasmuch as the damage they suffered was a damage common to the whole community, and not special to them. If that position had been sustained by the facts, I do not doubt but that it would have been the duty of the trial judge to have denied the relief prayed for. The rule of law requires of him who complains of his neighbor's use of his property, and seeks for redress and to restrain him from such use, that he should show that a substantive injury to property is committed. The mere fact of a business being carried on which may be shown to be immoral, and, therefore, prejudicial to the character of the neighborhood, furnishes of itself no ground for equitable interference at the suit of a private person; and, though the use of property may be unlawful or unreasonable, unless special damage can be shown, a neighboring property owner cannot base thereupon any private right of action. It is for the public authorities, acting in the common interest, to interfere for the suppressionof the common nuisance. See Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. 152. If the business complained of is a lawful one, the legal question presented in a civil action for private damage is whether the business is reasonably conducted, and whether, as conducted, it is one which is obnoxious and hurtful to...