Whitney v. Twombly

• Decision Date: 22 November 1883
• Citation: 136 Mass. 145
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles Whitney, executor, v. Sophia G. Twombly & others

136 Mass. 145

Charles Whitney, executor, v. Sophia G. Twombly & others

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

November 22, 1883

[Syllabus Material]

Middlesex. Appeal from a decree of the Probate Court allowing a certain instrument as the last will and testament of Abigail D. Place. The case was tried in this court, before C. Allen J., upon the following issues: 1st. Whether the alleged will was duly executed. 2d. Whether Abigail D. Place at the time of the execution of the alleged will, was of sound and disposing mind and memory. 3d. Whether she was unduly influenced to make the alleged will. The judge allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows:

The will offered for probate was dated January 2, 1877, when said Abigail was nearly sixty-three years of age. She died in 1882.

Upon the question of the testamentary capacity of said Abigail, certain testimony was introduced by the appellants tending to show eccentric conduct at times on her part, great despondency from severe domestic affliction, and two shocks of paralysis, one of which, a comparatively slight shock, was in January, 1876, and the other in June, 1878.

There was evidence tending to show that, for several years before she executed the instrument purporting to be her last will and testament, and up to the time of her death, her pecuniary affairs, such as the collection of dividends, &c., were managed by other persons. There was conflicting evidence as to the extent to which she managed her household affairs, or transacted other business herself, during the period above stated; but there was evidence tending to show that from the time of her husband's death, in 1872, down to the second attack of paralysis, she kept house, hired and paid her own servants, purchased her groceries, provisions, &c. herself, and generally managed her household affairs.

There was evidence on the one side and on the other tending to show interviews, conversations about her business and property, friends and relations, with various persons at various times, and her conduct, frequent visits, interviews, and conversations with her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces, and other persons; her disposition, temperament, griefs and bereavements in the death of her father, mother, child, and husband; her manner of living and associating with neighbors, relatives, and friends, down to the time of the making of the alleged will, and also her conduct, intelligence, and understanding when the will was made, and for a considerable time thereafter.

There was also evidence tending to show that all the provisions of the alleged will were dictated by her without suggestions from any one, and that legacies were given to all her relatives.

The appellants requested the judge to instruct the jury as follows: "1. The highest degree of mental soundness is required in order to constitute capacity to make a testamentary disposition of property. 2. If from grief, disease, melancholy, paralysis, old age, or any other cause, the memory or mind of the testatrix was so much impaired as to render her incompetent for the management of her ordinary affairs, then she was not of sound and disposing mind and memory."

The judge refused to rule as requested, but instructed the jury as follows, as to what constitutes soundness of mind "Soundness of mind, such as will enable a person, under the statute, to make a will, has relation to the business to be transacted, namely, the disposition of her property by will. Her mind must have been sound with reference to whatever is...