Sawyer v. Davis

• Decision Date: 09 January 1884
• Citation: 136 Mass. 239
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Henry Sawyer & another v. Charles G. Davis & others

136 Mass. 239

Henry Sawyer & another v. Charles G. Davis & others

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

January 9, 1884

Argued October 16, 1883

Plymouth. Bill of review, alleging the following facts:

The plaintiffs, who were manufacturers in Plymouth, were restrained by a decree of this court, made on October 1 1881, upon a bill in equity brought by the present defendants, from ringing a bell on their mill before the hour of six and one half o'clock in the morning; which decree was affirmed by the full court on September 7, 1882. [See Davis v. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289.] On March 28, 1883 the Legislature passed an act, which took effect upon its passage, as follows: "Manufacturers and others employing workmen are authorized, for the purpose of giving notice to such employees, to ring bells and use whistles and gongs of such size and weight, in such manner and at such hours as the board of aldermen of cities and the selectmen of towns may in writing designate." [St. 1883, c. 84.] On April 18 1883, the selectmen of Plymouth granted to the plaintiffs a written license to ring the bell on their mill in such manner, and at such hours, beginning at five o'clock in the morning, as they were accustomed to do prior to the injunction of this court.

The prayer of the bill was that the injunction might be dissolved, or that the decree might be so modified as to enable the plaintiffs to act under their license without violating the decree of this court; and for other and further relief.

The defendants demurred to the bill, assigning, among other grounds of demurrer, that the St. of 1883, c. 84, was unconstitutional, so far as applicable to the defendants.

Hearing on bill and demurrer, before Colburn, J., who reserved the case for the consideration of the full court.

Demurrer overruled.

C. G. Davis, for the defendants.

F. D. Allen for the plaintiffs.

C. Allen J. Field & W. Allen JJ., absent.

OPINION

C. Allen J.

Nothing is better established than the power of the Legislature to make what are called police regulations, declaring in what manner property shall be used and enjoyed, and business carried on, with a view to the good order and benefit of the community, even although they may to some extent interfere with the full enjoyment of private property, and although no compensation is given to a person so inconvenienced. Bancroft v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 438, 441. In most instances, the illustrations of the proper exercise of this power are found in rules and regulations restraining the use of property by the owner, in such a manner as would cause disturbance and injury to others. But the privilege of continuing in the passive enjoyment of one's own property, in the same manner as formerly, is subject to a like limitation; and with the increase of population in a neighborhood, and the advance and development of business, the quiet and seclusion and customary enjoyment of homes are necessarily interfered with, until it becomes a question how the right which each person has of prosecuting his lawful business in a reasonable and proper manner shall be made consistent with the other right which each person has to be free from unreasonable disturbance in the enjoyment of his property. Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 219. In this conflict of rights, police regulations by the Legislature find a proper office in determining how far and under what circumstances the individual must yield with a view to the general good. For example, if, in a neighborhood thickly occupied by dwelling-houses, any one, for his own entertainment or the gratification of a whim, were to cause bells to be rung and steam-whistles to be blown to the extent that is usual with the bells and steam-whistles of locomotive engines near railroad stations in large cities, there can be no doubt that it would be an infringement of the rights of the residents, for which they could find ample remedy and vindication in the courts. But if the Legislature, with a view to the safety of life, provides that bells shall be rung and whistles sounded, under those circumstances, persons living near by must necessarily submit to some annoyance from this source, which otherwise they would have a right to be relieved from.

It is ordinarily a proper subject for legislative discretion to determine by general rules the extent to which those who are engaged in customary and lawful and necessary occupations shall be required or allowed to give signals or warnings by bells or whistles, or otherwise, with a view either to the public safety, as in the case of railroads, or to the necessary or convenient operation and management of their own works; and ordinarily such determination is binding upon the courts, as well as upon citizens generally. And when the Legislature directs or allows that to be done which would otherwise be a nuisance, it will be valid, upon the ground that the Legislature is ordinarily the proper judge of what the public good requires, unless carried to such an extent that it can fairly be said to be an unwholesome and unreasonable law. Bancroft v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 438 at 441. It is accordingly held in many cases, and is now a well-established rule of law, at least in this Commonwealth, that the incidental injury which results to the owner of property situated near a railroad, caused by the necessary noise, vibration, dust, and smoke from the passing trains, which would clearly amount to an actionable nuisance if the operation of the railroad were not authorized by the Legislature, must, if the running of the trains is so authorized, be borne by the individual, without compensation or remedy in any form. The legislative sanction makes the business lawful, and defines what must be accepted as a reasonable use of property and exercise of rights on the part of the railroad company, subject always to the qualification that the business must be carried on without negligence or unnecessary disturbance of the rights of others. And the same rule extends to other causes of annoyance which are regulated and sanctioned by law. Presbrey v. Old Colony & Newport Railway, 103 Mass. 1, 6, 7. Walker v. Old Colony & Newport Railway, 103 Mass. 10, 14. Bancroft v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 438 at 441. Call v. Allen 1 Allen 137. Commonwealth v. Rumford Chemical Works, 16 Gray 231, 233. Struthers v. Dunkirk, Warren & Pittsburgh Railway, 87 Pa. 282. Hatch v. Vermont Central Railroad, 28 Vt. 142, 147. Brand v. Hammersmith & City Railway, L. R. 1 Q. B. 130; 2 Q. B. 223; 4 H. L. 171. Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway, 5 H. & N. 679, 685, 687. Rex v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30. Sedgw. St. & Const. Law, 435, 436.

The recent case of Baltimore & Potomac Railroad v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, is strongly relied on by the defendants as an authority in their favor. There are, however, two material and decisive grounds of distinction between that case and this. There the railroad company had only a general legislative authority to construct works necessary and expedient for the proper completion and maintenance of its railroad, under which authority it assumed to build an engine-house and machine-shop close by an existing church, and it was held that it was never intended to grant a license to select that particular place for such works, to the nuisance of the church. Moreover, in that case, the disturbance was so great as not only to render the church uncomfortable, but almost unendurable as a place of worship, and it virtually deprived the owners of the use and enjoyment of their property. We do not understand that it was intended to lay down, as a general rule applicable to all cases of comparatively slight though real annoyance, naturally and necessarily resulting in a greater or less degree to all owners of property in the neighborhood from a use of property or a method of carrying on a lawful business which clearly falls within the terms and spirit of a legislative sanction, that such sanction will not affect the claim of such an owner to relief; but rather that the court expressly waived the expression of an opinion upon the point.

In this Commonwealth, as well as in several of the United States and in England, the cases already cited show that the question is settled by authority, and we remain satisfied with the reasons upon which the doctrine was here established. Courts are compelled to recognize the distinction between such serious disturbances as existed in the case referred to, and comparatively slight ones, which differ in degree only, and not in kind, from those suffered by others in the same vicinity. Slight infractions of the natural rights of the individual may be sanctioned by the Legislature under the proper exercise of the police power, with a view to the general good. Grave ones will fall within the constitutional limitation that the Legislature is only authorized to pass reasonable laws. The line of distinction cannot be so laid down as to furnish a rule for the settlement of all cases in advance. The difficulty of marking the boundaries of this legislative power, or of prescribing limits to its exercise was declared in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85, and is universally recognized. Courts, however, must determine the rights of parties in particular cases as they arise; always recognizing that the ownership of property does not of itself imply the right to use or enjoy it in every possible manner, without regard to corresponding rights of others as to the use and enjoyment of...