Summers v. Abernathy
Decision Date | 11 April 1911 |
Citation | 136 S.W. 289,234 Mo. 156 |
Parties | Z. T. SUMMERS et al. v. JEROME ABERNATHY et al., Appellants |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Stoddard Circuit Court. -- Hon. J. L. Fort, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
K. C Spence and Andrew W. Hunt for appellants.
(1) The duty is devolved upon a plaintiff, in the first instance, to state a cause of action; if he fails to state a cause of action, the objection may be raised in this court. Young v. Scofield, 132 Mo. 650. Fraud and injury must concur and it must be so alleged, or plaintiff cannot succeed, and it was not so alleged in this case. 9 Ency. Pl. and Pr. 696 sec. 6. In a suit to cancel a deed because of false representations made by a grantee, plaintiff must plead an injury or damage; and this was not done in this case. Smith v. Brittenham, 98 Ill. 188; Joliffe v. Collins, 21 Mo. 338. The false representation must have been made to the injured person. If a false representation was made at all in this case, it was made to Proffer, while the injury, if any, was done solely to the widow and heirs of Elisha Summers, deceased. American Law Review, Jan.-Feb., 1910. (2) While the decree divests title out of appellants and vests it in respondent widow Louisa J. Summers, such allegations and facts found, and the theory upon which the cause was tried below, at the utmost would have justified a decree to the effect that the title be vested in the heirs of Elisha Summers, subject to the statutory rights of his widow. Louisa J. Summers, the widow, stated in the petition that she would hold such rights as the circuit court gave her for the heirs subject to her rights as widow. It is alleged in the petition that Abernathy owned all the interests of W. F. Summers and Marinda I. Baily, two of the heirs of Elisha Summers, in the land owned by the estate of Elisha Summers, yet the decree gives these interests to Louisa J. Summers, which is manifest error in the decree; and since such error appears upon the face of the record proper, it was saved to appellants by their motion in arrest of judgment. McGammon v. Ins. Co., 171 Mo. 143; 1 Black, Judgments, sec. 183. (3) Both limitations and laches bar plaintiffs from the relief sought, if not from all relief. Robinson v. Allison, 192 Mo. 366.
Rudolph Houck and A. T. Welborn for respondents.
This is a suit for the recovery of real property and as such could not have been barred in less than ten years. Dunn v. Miller, 96 Mo. 338; Cooper v. Deal, 114 Mo. 533; Hudson v. Cahoon, 193 Mo. 560; Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 191. Nor does the petition show on its face that the respondents are barred by their laches. Hudson v. Cahoon, 193 Mo. 562. Appellants state that because the deed was without consideration and this fact was alleged in the petition, it was void on its face and respondents had an adequate remedy at law. But there is a distinction between alleging in the petition that a deed is without consideration and alleging that it shows on its face that it was without consideration. No such allegation as the last is found in this petition. On the contrary it is alleged that the deed was a warranty deed in ordinary form, duly executed, and constituted a cloud on the title to the lands. This is certainly sufficient, especially after judgment. In such cases the rule is that where there is any defect, imperfection or omission in a pleading, if the issue joined be such as necessarily required proof of the facts so defectively or imperfectly stated, and without which it is not to be presumed that the verdict or judgment would not have been given, such defect, imperfection, or omission is cured. 31 Cyc. 764. And while it was not necessary that this deed should state a consideration on its face in order to be ostensibly a valid deed (Jackson v. Railroad, 54 Mo.App. 643), yet if it were necessary, there is nothing in the face of this petition to show that this deed does not recite such a consideration.
On January 20, 1907, plaintiffs filed in the circuit court of Stoddard county a petition alleging that a deed executed by the plaintiffs Moses Proffer and Eliza Proffer, his wife, conveying certain land in that county to the defendant Jerome Abernathy, was obtained by fraud and without consideration. The prayer of the petition was that said deed be cancelled, the defendants divested of the title to said land and said title vested in plaintiffs.
Upon a trial of the cause the circuit court found the issues for the plaintiffs, cancelled the deed, divested the defendants of the title to the land and vested the same in the plaintiff Moses Proffer, in trust for the plaintiff Louisa J. Summers. From this judgment the defendants appealed to this court. No bill of exceptions was preserved and filed and, therefore, only the record proper is before us for review. As the errors assigned by appellants all relate to the sufficiency of the petition, and the conformity of the judgment to the pleadings, the petition and the finding, judgment and decree will be set out at length.
The petition, omitting formal parts, is as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial