Hudson v. Cahoon
Decision Date | 22 February 1906 |
Parties | HUDSON v. CAHOON, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court. -- Hon. Samuel Davis, Special Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Moses Whybark, Robert A. Anthony and David M. Tesreau for appellant.
Plaintiff's action, be it legal or equitable, is, as to the Statute of Limitations, governed by the five-year limit, i. e., by the fifth subdivision of section 4273, R. S. 1899; that is the only statute which would entitle respondent in any event to any relief; the petition after alleging the recording of Hudson's deed to Cahoon on August 27, 1892, and Cahoon's deed to Parks of November 24, 1892, is barred on its face because such allegations were and are a complete discovery on and from said dates to plaintiff of every fact he alleges. And, further, the reservation of minerals, etc and right of way in the land had no effect on plaintiff's action because it was not known, nor is it alleged in the petition that any minerals, etc., are in that ground now. Further, the right of plaintiff to recover for any profits Cahoon derived from his sale to Parks was and is not an express trust such as are alone cognizable in equity, to which only the third subdivision of Revised Statutes 1899 section 4277, applies. Keeton v. Keeton, 20 Mo. 530; Landis v. Saxton, 105 Mo. 490; Newton v Rebenack, 90 Mo.App. 660. We further contend that Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 445, on which respondent relies, was attempted to be based on the ten-year-limit in the third sub-division of section 4272, Revised Statutes 1899; that that section does not apply even to that case, much less to this case, and that as an authority it is criticised and practically overruled by Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 194. Hughes v. Littrell, 75 Mo. 573.
Wm. D. Hudson and E. D. Anthony for respondent.
(1) An action to establish a trust growing out of lands, or to recover the proceeds of a re-sale of lands held under a constructive resulting trust, ought to be governed by the same rules as to length of time necessary to set aside a fraudulent conveyance and recover possession of land. Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 450; Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 191; Zoll v. Carnahan, 83 Mo. 41; Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 296. (2) Where one occupies a fiduciary relation towards the owner of land, all gains acquired by him by means of his position, whether through conveyance to him of an adverse interest, or otherwise, belongs to such owner, whether in land or in money. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 294. (3) The relation of client and attorney is one of especial trust and confidence in the attorney. Davis v. Klein, 96 Mo. 401; Eoff v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 378; Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Lorring, 76 Mo.App. 66. (4) A reservation of mineral and mining rights is construed as an actual grant thereof. Coal and other minerals in place are land, and may be conveyed as such, and, when thus conveyed, constitute a separate and distinct inheritance. Wardell v. Watson, 93 Mo. 107; Kirk v. Mattier, 140 Mo. 31; Manning v. Coal Co., 181 Mo. 377. (5) The courts have cited and affirmed Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 445, in the following and other cases: Lewis v. Schwenn, 93 Mo. 31; Burdett v. May, 100 Mo. 20; Sherwood v. Baker, 105 Mo. 478; Newton v. Rebenack, 90 Mo.App. 660.
This is an action to divest out of defendant, and vest in the plaintiff, the right and title to all the mineral, marble and granite on or under a certain tract of land in Madison county, in the State of Missouri, together with a right of ingress and egress from the same to mine and work said land, and to recover $ 584.55 profits, alleged to have been received by the defendant while acting as the agent of the plaintiff in respect to said land. There was no motion for new trial or bill of exceptions filed so far as is disclosed by the record here, and therefore the case stands for adjudication, in this court, upon the record proper.
On the 20th of February, 1902, the plaintiff instituted this suit. The petition (omitting caption) is as follows:
The defendant demurred to the petition, and the demurrer being overruled, he answered over. The answer is a general denial of all allegations not expressly admitted. It then admits that on the 6th of June, 1892, the plaintiff owned the surface, timber and agricultural rights in and to the lands described in the petition, and the right of ingress and egress; that, on said date, the plaintiff acknowledged a deed to said land, leaving the name of the grantee blank, for a consideration of one hundred and eighty dollars, and that the defendant filled in his name as grantee, and caused the deed to be filed for record in Madison county, on the 27th of August, 1892, but denies that he thereby defrauded or attempted to defraud the plaintiff; admits that the consideration named in the deed was one hundred and eighty dollars, which he alleges he paid as follows: cash to the plaintiff one hundred and thirty-one dollars and thirty-five cents; services to the defendant for making the deed and for payment of taxes, fifteen dollars; thirty-three...
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