Shvartsman v. Apfel

• Decision Date: 16 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-3364,97-3364
• Citation: 138 F.3d 1196
• Parties: Sarra SHVARTSMAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, and Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1196

138 F.3d 1196

40 Fed.R.Serv.3d 6

Sarra SHVARTSMAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration, and Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary

of the United States Department of

Agriculture, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-3364.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 5, 1997.

Decided March 16, 1998.

John M. Bouman (argued), National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, Inc., Chicago, IL, Linton Joaquin, National Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles, CA, Herb Simmel, National Senior Citizens Law Center, Los Angeles, CA, Sue Augustus, SSI Coalition for a Responisble Safety Net, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jacob M. Lewis (argued), Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, Thomas P. Walsh, Office of the United States Attorney, Civil Division, Chicago, IL, Mark Stern, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, only U.S. citizens are eligible to receive Food Stamps. The plaintiffs in this case are permanent resident aliens who received Food Stamps prior to the statute's effective date and whose applications for U.S. citizenship are pending with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). They argue that the transition procedures implementing the new citizenship requirement violate their due process rights, for INS processes citizenship applications too slowly for them to have a meaningful opportunity to meet the new criterion. The district court denied their claim on summary judgment. The court also denied their request for certification of a nationwide class, deciding instead to certify a class limited to plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit. We affirm the district court's decisions on these points.

I.

The Food Stamps program entitles qualified recipients to benefits for a specified period of time, known as a "certification period," which may not exceed 12 months (or 24 months if all the members of the adult members of the household are elderly or disabled). 7 U.S.C. § 2012(c). Benefits terminate automatically at the end of the certification period. Id. § 2020(e)(4). As the end of the certification period approaches, recipients may elect to engage in a "recertification process" to establish their continuing eligibility for Food Stamps. The recertification process provides recipients with, among other things, notice of impending termination of benefits, an opportunity to submit all information necessary to determine eligibility, and a face-to-face interview. Id. § 2020(e)(4); 7 C.F.R. § 273.14. The process is streamlined to enable Food Stamp recipients who successfully recertify to maintain a continuous flow of benefits from one certification period to the next. 7 C.F.R. § 273.14(d).

Section 402(a)(1) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("the Act"), Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2262, added for the first time a citizenship requirement to the Food Stamp program's eligibility criteria. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(1). The Act also provided transition procedures for applying the new citizenship requirement. Id. § 1612(a)(2)(D)(ii)(I)-(III) (as amended by § 510 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-673). Under the transition procedures, all recipients whose eligibility could be affected by the new law were required to complete the recertification process, which requires proof of citizenship, between April 1, 1997 and August 22, 1997. Thus, legal aliens who had been receiving Food Stamps were cut off on August 22, 1997 unless they became citizens prior to that date.

The plaintiffs in this class action are impoverished permanent resident aliens who applied for citizenship before August 22, 1997, and who are awaiting resolution of their citizenship applications by INS. INS processes citizenship applications slowly and, the plaintiffs argue, ineptly. In the summary judgment proceedings below, the plaintiffs presented evidence of INS processing delays ranging from several months to over three years. The plaintiffs also presented evidence that INS ultimately approves over 80% of citizenship applications. As a result of INS's long delays in processing applications, the vast majority of which ultimately are approved, the plaintiffs--who claim to meet all the requirements for citizenship--have not been able to become citizens prior to implementation of the new Food Stamps citizenship eligibility requirement.

The plaintiffs filed suit in the district court seeking certification as a nationwide class and alleging that the statutory transition procedure, coupled with INS's delay in processing their citizenship applications, violates their due process rights to a fair opportunity to prove continuing eligibility for food stamps through the statutory recertification procedures. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a protected property interest and that, even if there were a property interest, the legislative process afforded plaintiffs all the process that was due. The district court also declined to certify a nationwide class and instead certified a class limited to plaintiffs residing within the Seventh Circuit.

II.

To prevail on their due process claim, the plaintiffs must first demonstrate that they were deprived of a protected property interest; if they make this showing, then we proceed to determine what process they were due in connection with that deprivation. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153-54, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). The plaintiffs argue that they have a property right established by the recertification procedures set forth in the Food Stamp statute and regulations. These procedures, according to the plaintiffs, guarantee recipients a fair opportunity to prove that they continue to meet the program's eligibility requirements, thereby affording them the chance to receive a continuous stream of benefits. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the plaintiffs' asserted interest is not a property right protected by the Due Process Clause. This purported right is, in reality, a claim of entitlement to a set of procedures that allow a fair opportunity for recertification. Recognition of a property right in the recertification procedures themselves would run afoul of the central distinction in due process jurisprudence between substantive rights and the procedures that must be followed in connection with the deprivation of those rights.

The nature of the plaintiffs' asserted property right requires some explication. The plaintiffs emphasize that they do not claim a property right directly in a continuous stream of benefits, which they concede would be a losing claim given the time-limited nature of the entitlement to Food Stamps. See Holman v. Block, 823 F.2d 56, 59 (4th Cir.1987); Banks v. Block, 700 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.) (holding that a household receiving Food Stamp benefits "has no protectable property interest in the continuous entitlement to food stamps beyond the expiration of its certification period"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934, 104 S.Ct. 341, 78 L.Ed.2d 309 (1983). Rather, the plaintiffs claim a property interest only in the fair opportunity--as guaranteed by the Food Stamp recertification procedure--to establish their continuing eligibility for benefits. This distinction is significant, for the purported "fair opportunity" property right will not necessarily result in a continuous stream of benefits for every plaintiff; some plaintiffs will fail to meet the substantive eligibility requirements and will not be recertified even after receiving a fair opportunity to seek recertification.

Thus, the plaintiffs assert a property interest not just in the recertification procedures, but in meaningful recertification procedures--that is, recertification procedures that afford them a fair opportunity to prove continuing eligibility. Plaintiffs argue that they were deprived of this property right because the transition procedures implementing the citizenship requirement virtually eliminated any fair opportunity to establish continuing eligibility in time to avoid a break in benefits. According to the plaintiffs, the strict August 22nd deadline, together with INS's alleged ineptitude and delay, converted the recertification process into a sham, for plaintiffs had no chance to become citizens in time to meet the deadline.

The plaintiffs rely on Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), as support for their asserted property interest. In Logan, the Court found a due process violation when the plaintiff was prevented from using state adjudicatory procedures to redress a claim of discrimination on the basis of handicap. Appellant Logan was a participant in an administrative process established in Illinois that required litigants to bring their discrimination claims before the state Fair Employment Practices Commission. Logan filed a timely complaint with the Commission, but the Commission erroneously held the initial conference between the parties after the 120-day period specified by the statute had lapsed. The Illinois courts determined that the Commission's failure to hold the conference within the mandated period deprived the Commission of jurisdiction over Logan's claim, and the complaint was dismissed. Id. at 424-27, 102 S.Ct. at 1151-53.

The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of Logan's complaint violated Logan's due process rights to use the statutorily-mandated procedures for adjudicating his discrimination claim. Following its customary two-pronged due process...