Banks v. Block
| Citation | 700 F.2d 292 |
| Decision Date | 01 April 1983 |
| Docket Number | 81-5833,Nos. 81-5693,s. 81-5693 |
| Parties | Mrs. Mannie BANKS, on her own behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John R. BLOCK, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Jesse and Mrs. Deborah HOLLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John R. BLOCK, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Robert L. Huggins, Jr. (argued), Angela Sherbo, Richard L. Kaiser, Appalachian Research & Defense Fund of Kentucky, Inc. Hazard, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Mark B. Rotenberg (argued), Atty. Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Robert B. Shanks, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., Joseph L. Famularo, U.S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., Barbara Edelman, Marianna J. Read, Asst. U.S. Attys., Kay E. Sauer, Stanley A. Stratford, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Human Resources, Frankfort, Ky., Linda Cromwell, William Kanter, Frederick Geilfuss, Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Before KRUPANSKY and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Does a food stamp recipient whose certification has expired and who has been found ineligible for recertification, have a property interest in, and a constitutional right to, the continuation of food stamp benefits pending a hearing under 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2020(e)(4) & (e)(10)? This question is presented in two consolidated appeals. Appellants claim a due process property interest in the continuation of food stamps benefits under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. This is a question of first impression in this Circuit and we are cited to no cases from other circuits directly on point.
Two judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., London Division, and Honorable G. Wix Unthank, Pikeville Division, found that food stamp recipients have no such property right, and, accordingly, entered summary judgments in favor of defendants, John R. Block, Secretary of United States Department of Agriculture, the Secretary for the Kentucky Department of Human Resources and the Commission of the Bureau for Social Insurance, Kentucky Department for Human Resources. We affirm.
Mrs. Mannie Banks, a mother of two children and head of household, began receiving food stamps in February 1979. In July 1979, prior to the end of her certification period, Mrs. Banks reapplied for benefits to cover a new certification period. Without any interruption in her benefits, Mrs. Banks was recertified for a 90 day period, commencing August 1, 1979 and ending October 31, 1979.
On October 3, 1979, Mrs. Banks received written notice by the State agency informing her that because she was living with her mother she no longer could qualify as the head of a household and, consequently, her food stamps would cease at the end of her current certification period--October 31, 1979. On October 4, 1979, she requested an administrative "fair hearing" under 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2020(e)(4) & (e)(10) 1 to contest the adverse eligibility determination. This hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1979, the last day of her certification period; however, Mrs. Banks requested a continuance, pursuant to 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.15(c)(4), due to scheduling conflicts of her counsel. The continuance was granted and the hearing was rescheduled for November 14, 1979--two weeks beyond the expiration of her certification period. On October 31, 1979, Mrs. Banks' certification period expired and by operation of law her benefits ceased.
The administrative "fair hearing" was conducted and resulted in a decision favorable to Mrs. Banks. She was recertified as eligible for food stamps through December 31, 1979 and also was awarded retroactive benefits for the period from October 31, 1979 to the date of her "fair hearing" decision. Nonetheless, on November 15, 1979, Mrs. Banks filed a class action in district court alleging, inter alia, that 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2020(e)(10) deprived her of due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments because her food stamps were terminated prior to the hearing required by the statute. The case was certified as a class action.
The district court rejected Mrs. Banks' claim, and in granting summary judgment for the defendants held that a recipient has no property interest in receiving food stamps after the eligibility period has expired. This appeal ensued.
Jessie and Mrs. Deborah Holland began receiving food stamps in February 1980 and were certified as eligible through May 31, 1980. In April 1980, plaintiffs received notice that their certification period was soon expiring and that it would be necessary for them to reapply for food stamp benefits. During the processing of the Hollands' application it was discovered that Mr. Holland recently had become employed, resulting in a change of income for the household. In light of this change in reported income, the State agency requested Mr. Holland to submit his new payroll check-stub to verify the income change and thereby complete the application for benefits.
The State agency did not receive this information prior to the end of the Hollands' certification period, and, accordingly, benefits ceased at the end of their certification period. However, due to administrative error, no notice of the denial was sent to the Hollands as required by 7 C.F.R. Secs. 273.10(g)(2) & 273.14(c)(2). Mr. and Mrs. Holland were permitted to reapply for benefits. Nevertheless, on June 10, 1980, their application for benefits again was denied because Mr. Holland allegedly "voluntarily quit" his job.
Mr. and Mrs. Holland requested a "fair hearing" on this denial. On July 28, 1980, a State agency "fair hearing" was conducted, wherein it was determined that the denial of the benefits was erroneous. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Hollands be certified as eligible for food stamps through August 31, 1980, and that they be awarded retroactive benefits through the month of June 1980.
In the interim, on July 24, 1980, Mr. and Mrs. Holland filed a complaint in the district court raising the identical constitutional issue raised by Mrs. Banks. On September 14, 1981, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the merits. District Judge Eugene E. Siler, Jr., relying, in part, on the Banks order, held that a recipient does not have a property interest in the continued receipt of food stamps after the certification period has expired. The court also ruled that the granting of summary judgment for the defendants mooted the plaintiffs' class action request. This appeal follows. The cases were consolidated for purposes of appellate review pursuant to Rule 3(b), Fed.R.App.P.
In both the Banks and Holland cases, it would appear that the post-termination hearings mooted the plaintiffs' claims. However, we conclude that the issue presented could arise again between the named plaintiffs and defendants when future certification periods expire and benefits are discontinued. Further, since the Banks case was certified as a class action, a live controversy exists with regard to the class members who are currently being denied benefits pending a "fair hearing." Therefore, this case falls within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the law of mootness. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Basel v. Knebel, 551 F.2d 395, 397 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1977).
The Food Stamp Program was promulgated to encourage nutritionally adequate diets for low income households. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2011. As a joint federal-state effort, the program is administered by the appropriate State agencies, but is subject to federal regulation. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2020. As part of this joint effort the federal government absorbs the entire cost of food stamps, as well as fifty percent of the States' administrative costs. 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2013, 2025.
Recipients of food stamp benefits are eligible for only a limited "certification period," defined as the "period for which households shall be eligible to receive authorization cards." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2012(c). These cards, which are issued by the State agency, evidence the benefit allotment to which the household is entitled. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2012(b). Certification periods may range from three to twelve months in length, or as circumstance indicate the likelihood of changes in income or household status. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2012(c).
Once a household has made application and is found eligible to receive food stamps, the applicant is notified of the period of eligibility. The statute requires that a household must be notified of the expiration of its certification period "prior to the start of the last month of its certification period." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2020(e)(4). This notice provides each household with one month's warning that in order to be eligible for future benefits, a new application must be filed, an interview with an eligibility worker held, and a new certification period assigned. 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.14(b)(3).
In processing an application for recertification, changes in income and household circumstances which affect eligibility must be reported and verified. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2015(c). Basically, those seeking recertification are treated essentially like first-time applicants. See 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.2(f)(9). If a household reapplies for benefits before the fifteenth day of the last month of its certification period, an eligibility determination must be made in sufficient time so that, if found eligible, there will be no interruption in benefits between the old and new certification periods. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2020(e)(4); 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.14(c)(2). If a household fails to reapply, benefits will cease upon the expiration of its certification...
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