Young v. Cook
| Decision Date | 24 February 1887 |
| Citation | 10 N.E. 719,144 Mass. 38 |
| Parties | YOUNG v. COOK. HIGGINS v. SAME. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Tort for slander. The plaintiff's declaration in the action of Jerusha A. Young against the defendant set forth she has been for a long time, and now is, a resident of Wellfleet, in said county of Barnstable, and that, during said time, she has been held in great respect by the inhabitants of said Wellfleet; that on or about March 12, 1886, certain workmen engaged in digging on a certain street in said Wellfleet discovered, protruding from a bank of earth on which they were digging, at the side of the road, something which seemed to be the arm or leg of an infant; that thereupon, upon further digging, the body of a child of about the age of four days was then and there dug out of said bank of earth; that upon investigation then and there it appeared that a piece of folded cotton cloth had been tied around the neck of said infant so tightly as to strangle it, and that its head had been beaten in by some kind of instrument; that, at the time the defendant made the statements hereinafter set forth, the above facts relative to said infant were well known in said Wellfleet by all its inhabitants; and that it then was the common belief of the town authorities and of the said inhabitants that said infant had been brutally murdered by some person or persons, and had been surreptitiously buried in said bank of earth for the purpose of concealing the commission of the crime. The plaintiff further alleged that neither before nor after the discovery of said infant did the defendant have any reasonable ground for believing, or expressing an opinion, that the plaintiff was the mother of said infant, or was in any way connected with the murder or burial of said infant, and, as a fact, the defendant did not have such an opinion or belief; notwithstanding all which, the defendant, with the intent to cause it to be believed that the plaintiff was the mother of said infant, and was a participant in its murder and burial, and also with the intent to bring the plaintiff into hatred, contempt, and disgrace, and also with the intent to incite and instigate criminal proceedings against her, and thereby to cause her mental and physical suffering and great pecuniary expense, and with the intent to injure her mentally and physically, did, on divers times, in presence of divers persons, and in divers places, before the bringing of this writ, publicly, falsely, and maliciously accuse the plaintiff of being the mother of said infant, and of being a participant in its murder and burial, by words spoken of and concerning the plaintiff substantially as follows: “That child is Aunt Jerusha's, and Eliza Higgins took it away.”“It is my opinion that Aunt Jerusha had that child, and Eliza Higgins took it away.”“In my opinion, that child belonged to Aunt Jerusha, and Eliza Higgins was her aid.”“In my opinion, Jerusha Young had that baby, and Eliza Higgins buried it.” The plaintiff further alleged that, in consequence of vile and slanderous statements of the defendant as aforesaid, she became an object of suspicion to the authorities of said Wellfleet, and to the inhabitants thereof, causing her great mental and bodily suffering and serious damage to her reputation.
The declaration in the action of Eliza H. Higgins against the defendant alleged that the plaintiff was the lawful wife of Soloman R. Higgins, of Wellfleet, and in other particulars was substantially like that in the case of Young v. Cook, the additional allegation being made that the defendant in speaking of the plaintiff added: “My boy told me that Liza Higgins had that young one in her cellar two or three days, and he says that Bart Oliver told him so.” The defendant filed a demurrer in each case, which was sustained, and the plaintiff appealed.George W. McConnell, for plaintiffs.
If the theory of the defendant is correct, then it is necessary in all cases to allege that a plaintiff was known by the name used in the slanderous statement, whether the fact were so or not, and, if such an allegation be not made, the declaration would be demurrable. See Pub.St. 979; Chenery v. Goodrich, 98 Mass. 228. If it be conceded that the words used, in their primary sense, are not defamatory, still, if there were any facts existing at the time they were spoken, which were known both to the defendant and those who heard him speak them, which would reasonably lead the latter to understand the words in a secondary and a defamatory sense, and the declaration set forth such facts, then it is a question for the jury to determine whether the words were defamatory, provided there is any evidence to go to them of such facts. Snell v. Snow, 13 Metc. 278;Fitzgerald v. Robinson, 112 Mass. 371, 382;Brettun v. Anthony, 103 Mass. 37. It is submitted that, under the Public Statutes, all a plaintiff is required to do is to set forth in his declaration the defamatory words used, and, where such words are not in themselves intelligible in the same sense in which he claims them to have been spoken, to make them so by inserting a concise and clear statement of such things as are necessary to make the words relied on intelligible to the court and jury in the same sense in which they were spoken; and “such things” are not required to be set forth with such precision of averment as would have been necessary under the old common-law rules of pleading. Pub.St. 979; Chenery v. Goodrich, 98 Mass. 228;Chace v. Sherman, 119 Mass. 387;Riddell v. Thayer, 127 Mass. 487. Under the declarations in these cases, it is not material here to consider whether the defendant, at the time he uttered the words complained of, believed, thought, or suspected that the infant had been murdered. The declarations fairly and reasonably set forth that he spoke the words after the discovery of the infant, to persons who knew of the discovery, and believed the infant had been murdered; that he spoke the words intending that said persons should believe that these plaintiffs were participants in its murder and burial; and that said persons thereupon suspected these plaintiffs. It is a question for the jury to say whether these allegations are sustained.
It is not absolutely material to consider whether the infant was or was not murdered. The authorities and...
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