Buhl v. Hannigan

• Decision Date: 30 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. G012245,G012245
• Citation: 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 740,16 Cal.App.4th 1612
• Parties: , 2 A.D. Cases 1385, 2 A.D.D. 421, 4 NDLR P 103 Timothy BUHL et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Maurice HANNIGAN, as Commissioner, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 740

20 Cal.Rptr.2d 740

16 Cal.App.4th 1612, 2 A.D. Cases 1385, 2 A.D.D. 421,

4 NDLR P 103

Timothy BUHL et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Maurice HANNIGAN, as Commissioner, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. G012245.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

June 30, 1993.

As Modified July 15, 1993.

Lascher & Lascher, Wendy C. Lascher, Matthew P. Guasco and Susan B. Lascher, Ventura, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Robert Mukai, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Henry G. Ullerich, Interim Asst. Atty. Gen., Martin H. Milas, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and Thomas Scheerer, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendants and respondents Maurice Hannigan and Frank Zolin.

Terry C. Andrus, County Counsel, and Barbara H. Evans, Deputy County Counsel, for defendant and respondent Brad Gates.

Edward J. Cooper, City Atty., and Paul R. Coble, Deputy City Atty., for defendant and respondent Paul Walters.

SONENSHINE, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs and Appellants Timothy Buhl, Jerald Bowman, Guru Bir Singh Khalsa and Peter Daniels appeal from a court order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. ¹ Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the State from enforcing California's Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet Law, Vehicle Code section 27802 et seq. ² (helmet law) during the pendency of their action to have the law declared unconstitutional. Defendants and respondents, sued in their official capacities, are Maurice Hannigan, Commander of the California Highway Patrol (CHP), Frank Zolin, Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), Brad Gates, Sheriff of Orange County, and Paul Walters, Chief of Police of Santa Ana.

Appellants contend the helmet law is unconstitutionally vague. They further claim it impermissibly discriminates against the handicapped, interferes with the free exercise of religion, and infringes on the individual's right to privacy and freedom of expression. They argue the intrusion is not justified by any legitimate State concern. They contend if the injunction does not issue, they will suffer irreparable harm in that they will be forced to choose, during the pendency of the action, either to ride without their helmets, and thus risk being ticketed for traffic violations, or to forego motorcycle riding entirely. ³

Standard of Review

The trial court has wide discretion to decide whether to issue a preliminary injunction; its denial of relief must be affirmed in the absence of abuse of discretion. (King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1226, 240 Cal.Rptr. 829, 743 P.2d 889.) We reverse only if the court has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, beyond the bounds of reason. (In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 85, 98 Cal.Rptr. 307, 490 P.2d 819.)

On a request for a preliminary injunction, "the trial court must consider 'two interrelated factors,' specifically, the likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits at trial, and the comparative harm to be suffered by plaintiffs if the injunction does not issue against the harm to be suffered by ... [the people of the State of California] if it does." (King v. Meese, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1226, 240 Cal.Rptr. 829, 743 P.2d 889.) The order is affirmed "if either the balance-of-hardships analysis or plaintiffs' likelihood of success considerations would alone support the ruling. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1227, 240 Cal.Rptr. 829, 743 P.2d 889.) But when the trial court's decision is based on only one factor--here, the likelihood of success,--we must decide if that ground conclusively supports the order. (Ibid.)

In examining the likelihood-of-success factor, we consider the legal merits of the underlying claims. We start with the presumption that legislation regulating motorists' rights is constitutional. (Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 76-78, 177 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917.) The helmet law constitutes an exercise of the state's police power, therefore " 'we simply determine whether the statute reasonably relates to a legitimate governmental purpose.' " (Id. at p. 78, 177 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917.) We do not judge the wisdom of the law; we find it valid if, under any reasonable set of facts, it is rationally related to a proper legislative goal, here, insuring the welfare and safety of those who travel the public highways. (Id. at pp. 78-79, 177 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917.)

Discussion

The trial court denied the preliminary injunction on the basis that appellants were not likely to prove the helmet law unconstitutional at trial. It discussed its reasons at considerable length. It correctly observed it is the court's function not to decide whether a law is effective, but only to ascertain whether the Legislature acted within the proper course and scope of its constitutional powers when it enacted the law. It added: "Albeit that there may be times when it might be wiser to pursue other avenues to accomplish a particular goal, you have to look at the statute and the purpose, and if there's a reasonable relationship between the two, then the statute does not violate due process." The court found the State of California has a legitimate interest in highway safety and there is no fundamental right to operate a motor vehicle; rather, driving is a privilege, "subject to extensive legislative regulations." It further found section 27803 was enacted pursuant to the police powers of the State, with the goal of preventing injuries to motorcyclists and their passengers, and the statute is rationally related to that goal. It then analyzed and rejected each of the remaining challenges asserted by appellants, finding the law does not unlawfully discriminate against the handicapped, or impermissibly infringe on the appellants' rights to privacy, freedom of religion or freedom of expression. The trial court ran a true course and reached the only right result. We affirm.

I THE HELMET LAW IS RATIONALLY RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE STATE CONCERN

Appellants' first challenge is that the law violates their right to due process because it is not rationally related to the object the Legislature expressly sought to achieve, i.e., "additional safety benefits" for those who ride motorcycles. (§ 27803, subd. (f).) The underlying predicate to appellants' argument is that because they presented evidence the helmet law does not accomplish its intended safety purpose, the State had to come forward with controverting evidence justifying the propriety of the Legislature's choice. That predicate is absolutely wrong.

In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973) 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, an obscenity case, the United States Supreme Court rejected petitioners' assertion that state regulation must be validated by concrete data if it is to pass constitutional muster. It stated: " 'We do not demand of legislatures "scientifically certain criteria of legislation." [Citation.]' Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist.... [p] From the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions. Such assumptions underlie much lawful state regulation of commercial and business affairs.... The same is true of the federal securities and antitrust laws and a host of federal regulations.... [p] Likewise, when legislatures and administrators act to protect the physical environment from pollution and to preserve our resources of forests, streams, and parks, they must act on such imponderables as the impact of a new highway near or through an existing park or wilderness area.... The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people ... is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional." (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, 413 U.S. 49, 60-62, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2637-2638, emphasis added.)

Continuing, the court noted: "Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching ... [a conclusion] and acting on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data. [p] ... We do indeed base our society on certain assumptions that people have the capacity for free choice. Most exercises of individual free choice--those in politics, religion, and expression of ideas--are explicitly protected by the Constitution. Totally unlimited play for free will, however, is not allowed in our or any other society.... [Blue sky securities laws, for instance,] are to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition. Nor do modern societies leave disposal of garbage and sewage up to the individual 'free will,' but impose regulation to protect both public health and the appearance of public places.... [p] 'We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.' " (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973) 413 U.S. 49, pp. 63-64, 93 S.Ct. 2628, pp. 2638-2639, 37 L.Ed.2d 446.)

Clearly, even if we agreed with appellants that the helmet law is unwise, we do not have the power to relieve them of their obligations to comply with it. It matters not that they presented evidence that (1) helmets do not always make all motorcyclists safer, (2) helmets may actually create additional hazards to riders in some situations, (3) there are other less intrusive, far more effective ways to make motorcycling safe, and (4) the evidence the Legislature considered was not as "good" as appellants' evidence. ⁴ Assuming all of that to be true, we still would not be authorized to find the law unconstitutional: It is not the function of the courts to decide whether the Legislature properly weighed the evidence offered by proponents and opponents of a law, or whether it selected the "correct" remedy for a...