Shuler v. State

Citation161 So.2d 3
Decision Date19 February 1964
Docket NumberNo. 32244,32244
PartiesRobert SHULER and Jerry Chatman, Petitioners, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Francisco Rodriguez, Tampa, for petitioners.

James W. Kynes, Atty. Gen., and James G. Mahorner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The question presented for our determination herein are whether we should approve the findings of facts made by the Commissioner heretofore appointed by this Court as the trier of the facts and whether we should accept and follow his recommendation. We quote the Commissioner's report in full:

'COMMISSIONERS'S PEPORT

'A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed by Robert Shuler and Jerry Chatman in the Supreme Court of Florida on September 25, 1962; Rule to Show Cause was issued on September 26, 1962, and respondent's return to Rule to Show Cause was filed on or about October 11, 1962.

'The undersigned circuit judge (retired) was appointed commissioner to take such testimony and receive such evidence as should be deemed necessary, and make report to the court, with recommendations, on the following issues:

'A. Whether petitioner's capital conviction for the crime of rape (July 7, 1960) was illegally obtained in violation of rights assured them under either the Florida or Federal Constitutions.

'B. Whether the state attorney who prosecuted petitioners, the Honorable Gordon G. Oldham, Jr.; the sheriff of Lake County, Florida, wherein the crime was committed, Willis V. McCall and two of his deputies (Lucius Clark and James L. Yates) either independently or in some degree of concert violated their respective offices by suppressing evidence allegedly made available to them.

'C. Whether any or all of the individuals named immediately above falsified evidence of footprint impressions.

'D. Whether the atmospheric conditions at or about the time the crime was committed were such as would have obliterated any available footprint evidence.

'E. Whether said state attorney and/or said sheriff counseled, procured, suggested or in any way indicated that any evidence either could or should have been manufactured (falsely) so a to firm up the prosecutions case against petitioners.

'F. Whether deputies Lucius Clark and/or James L. Yates falsified the footprint (casts) evidence which ultimately was used in petitioners' trial.

'Pursuant to this Court's order dated November 21, 1962, a hearing as directed thereby, was held in the courtroom of the Circuit Court in and for the Fifth Judicial Circuit at Tavares, Lake County, Florida, on the 14th and 15th days of March, 1963. At said hearing, testimony and evidence was presented by and on behalf of the petitioners as well as the respondent; said testimony and evidence being heard and viewed by the undersigned.

'Petitioners were represented by counsel, the Honorables Francisco A. Rodriguez, H. L. Braynon, and G. E. Graves, Jr. and the respondent was represented by Assistant Attorneys General James G. Mahorner and George R. Georgieff.

'The proceedings were recorded and transcribed by the official court reporter and may be found within the bound volumes encompassing pages 1 through 270 plus the attached statements and testimony of certain individuals as well as the physical exhibits (number 1 through 10) introduced during the course of the hearing.

'With respect to the petitioner's allegations as summarized by Subsection B above, the evidence adduced at the hearing reveal the following:

'The matter embraced by this allegation appeared limited to the statement of the victim of the rape, one Charlotte Wass, the full text of which may be found in plaintiffs' (petitioners') Exhibit #10. Petitioners' insist that the content of said statement when read in conjunction with Exhibit A (the victim's subsequent note of November 1, 1960, sent to a Mrs. Claret from the state hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida) which was made a part of their original petition for writ of habeas corpus, reveals a calculated suppression of evidence on the part of prosecution and law enforcement. Historically, your commissioner observes that the victim's statement, though taken shortly after the rape occurred is so disjointed and susceptible to any one of several analyses, that its use as the basis for such a claim is almost valueless. It is observed that the victim did not even know whether she was conscious at the time she was raped. It is further observed that there would be little if any difference in the result even if her fragmentary recollection could be said to be possessed of any degree of accuracy whatever. Certainly petitioners were principals each to the other when they perpetrated this crime.

'Your commissioner further finds that the victim's holographic note as embraced in petitioners' Exhibit A was executed by her at a time when she was confined in the state hospital for the insane at Chattahoochee as a result of a court order declaring her to be incompetent. The date of her note, November 1, 1960, indicates that at least seven (7) months prior thereto she had been declared incompetent (Respondent's Exhibit K-Return to Writ of Habeas Corpus) by reason of which she was not even available as a witness for the state in the prosecution of petitioners.

'Quite apart from the above, it seems apparent from both of petitioners' confessions as to their complicity in the rape of the victim that her subsequent statement is at least open to serious doubt. This is particularly so since there seems to be little question that she was unconscious throughout the two rapes perpetrated upon her.

'Your commissioner further finds that the state attorney had the right and duty to assess the value of the statement in question and in so doing, if he found it wanting in any material particulars, to reject it as the basis of any proof or evidence whether in favor of petitioners or against them. This is so especially when viewed in light of the fact that the victim herself simply was not available (and is not even now) as a witness to bear out any of the remarks attributed to her either in her statement or in her subsequent letter.

'It is your commissioner's conclusion that insofar as an alleged suppression of evidence with reference to this matter is concerned, I specifically find against petitioners' contention, there having been no proof or evidence of sufficient magnitude adduced which would cause me to reach any other conclusion.

'With respect to the petitioners' allegations as summarized by Subsection C above, the evidence adduced at the hearing reveals the following:

'The allegations in the petition which embrace this matter are, in essence, that former deputies Lucius G. Clark and James L. Yates poured the plaster of paris footprint impressions which were ultimately used as evidence against petitioners in the backyard of Clark's home rather than at the scene of the victim's home where the rape occurred. See petition for writ of habeas corpus and the attached statement of former deputy Thomas L. Ledford and Noel E. Griffin, Jr.

'In answering the aforesaid allegations, the respondent in his return to the writ issued by this Court included the sworn statements of deputies Clark and Yates as Exhibits E. and I, both of which reveal unqualified denials of every allegation bearing on their alleged falsification of the footprint evidence either in the manner suggested by petitioners or in any other way. Neither dputy Yates or Clark testified at the hearing in the above cause, electing instead to implead their rights against self-incrimination as insured by Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the State of Florida (Tt. 111-127). Your commissioner execused each of them from testifying for the aforesaid reason (Tt. 126-127). The only testimony presented to me at the aforesaid hearing with reference to these alleged admissions as to the falsification of the footprint casts was of a most sketchy nature and was hardly as pointed as originally made out in the original statement of deputies Ledford and Griffin. See pages 5 through 32 and 33 through 58. The admittedly unusual delay in making known their claims raises grave doubt as to their motives; then or now. Their respective testimony, when compared with the allegations made in their original statement, reveals that while they were once quick to draw a series of conclusions therein, they were not ready or willing to give forth sworn testimony in that same regard. There is a notable absence of any testimony by either of them bearing on the state attorney's known use of any allegedly falsified footprints. There is a similar absence of any testimony in that regard as to Sheriff Willis McCall. They did not testify that either the state attorney or the sheriff counseled or procured either deputies Yates or Clark or anybody else to create evidence of footprints or any other type. In any case, it appears to your commissioner that much of what they claim, even if taken as true, is now little more than unexplained conclusions on their part.

'Adverting to the sworn statements of deputies Yates and Clark made a part of respondent's return, it is noted that each of these men, by these sworn statements, denied any and all allegations pertaining to their alleged criminal complicity.

'The claims and testimony of the former deputies, Ledford and Griffin, relative to an alleged remark by State Attorney Oldham at the pre-trial conference that deputy Griffin made no reference to the word 'rain' because it would 'mess things up' was denied by all of respondent's witnesses, who themselves were present at said pretrial conference save and except Deputy Sheriff Douglas Sewell (Tt. 219-230). He seemed to recall that deputy Griffin made some mention of 'rain' but he did not believe that his remark related to rain at the scene of the crime at the pertinent time in question but rather just a general reference thereto (Tt. 227-228). All of the parties present at said pre-trial...

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2 cases
  • Shuler v. Wainwright
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • May 4, 1972
    ...7 (1961). 3 Id. at 8. 4 Shuler v. Cochran, Fla., 146 So.2d 380 (1962); Chatman v. Cochran, Fla., 146 So.2d 380 (1962). 5 Shuler v. State, Fla., 161 So.2d 3 (1964). 6 Pertinent portions of this Court's order of December 1, 1971, are the Counsel for the parties attended a conference before th......
  • Shuler v. Wainwright
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • March 27, 1974
    ...filed his written report with the Supreme Court of Florida, which we do not repeat here since it is set forth in full, Shuler v. State, 161 So.2d 3 (Fla., 1964). The Supreme Court of Florida approved the report, held that the petitioners had failed to carry their burden, that the record evi......

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