Rumbles v. Hill
Decision Date | 30 June 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-16794,PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,98-16794 |
Citation | 182 F.3d 1064 |
Parties | (9th Cir. 1999) MACARTHUR RUMBLES,, v. DONALD R. HILL; BLACK AND BECKETT, |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Jane Lamborn (argued) and Lisa Smiley (on the briefs), Deputy Attorneys General, Sacramento, California, for the defendants-appellants.
Michelle Anderson and Courtenay Keough McKeon, Certified Law Students; Susan Christian, Supervising Attorney; King Hall Civil Rights Clinic, University of California at Davis, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-97-05553-AWI
Before: Robert R. Beezer and Stephen S. Trott, Circuit Judges, and Samuel P. King,* District Judge.
Donald R. Hill, K. Black, and J. Beckett (collectively, "Hill") appeal interlocutorily an order denying their motion to dismiss MacArthur Rumbles' prisoner 42 U.S.C. S 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292, and we affirm. We hold that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies under section 1997e(a) does not deprive a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction where money damages is the sole relief sought and where such a remedy is not available through the prison's administrative grievance process.
This appeal concerns section 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA") (42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a)) . As amended by the PLRA, section 1997e(a) provides:
42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
Prior to the PLRA, section 1997e contained a comparatively lenient exhaustion requirement for prisoner cases that directed courts to if the court "believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of Justice." 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a)(1) (1994); see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 511 (1981). The pre-PLRA version of the statute also required the Attorney General to certify that those administrative remedies were "in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b)"1 or were "otherwise fair and effective." 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a)(2) (1994); see Patsy, 457 U.S. at 510-11. The PLRA, however, deleted the statutory phrase "plain, speedy, and effective" and eliminated the requirement that administrative remedies meet "minimum acceptable standards " or otherwise be "fair and effective." The amended version of section 1997e now simply requires the exhaustion of "such administrative remedies as are available." In contrast to the pre-PLRA version of section 1997e, this new exhaustion requirement is mandatory. See Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1997) ().
Rumbles' pro se complaint alleged, among other things, that a prison guard spit on him, called him racial epithets, and assaulted or threatened to assault him. He sought injunctivetype relief (an apology from Hill and a federal investigation into "new California laws that are stiffer on repeat offenders and [the] effect [of such laws] on the conduct of Correctional Officers"), as well as monetary damages for excessive force.2 The district court held that it had no power to conduct its own investigation into "how state laws might be affecting correctional officers" and that it could not compel a party to apologize. Because the only cognizable remedy was a claim for damages, the district court properly analyzed the action as one seeking only damages.3
The district court held that because California's administrative prison grievance process does not allow for monetary damages, this form of relief does not constitute an "available" remedy that must be exhausted before bringing a section 1983 action. The district court also held that exhaustion of state administrative procedures under the California Tort Claims Act is not required before filing a section 1983 action.
The primary questions on appeal are whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional requirement under 42 U.S.C. S 1997e and whether exhaustion is mandatory even where the process would be futile. What does "available" mean as that term is used in section 1997e(a)? These are all questions of law reviewed de novo. See Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997) ( ).
Initially, Hill argues that section 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. That is, Hill claims that a district court may never reach the merits of a prisoner's section 1983 claim unless all available administrative remedies have been exhausted. We disagree.
The Supreme Court case that provides guidance for determining whether a statutory exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional is Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 757 (1975). In Weinberger, the Court considered language from the Social Security Act that read: "No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under [section 1331 et seq.] of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under [Title II of the Social Security Act]." Id. at 756 (quoting 42 U.S.C. S 405(h) (1970)) (alterations in original). The Court rejected the interpretation that this was a non-jurisdictional provision that "amounted to no more than a codification of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies." Id. at 757.
Instead, the Court held that Id. Thus, a "statute requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies may be jurisdictional if it is `more than a codified requirement of administrative exhaustion' and contains `sweeping and direct' statutory language that goes beyond a requirement that only exhausted actions be brought." Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 757), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1809 (1999).
As the Fifth Circuit observed in Underwood, "S 1997e(a) contains no such sweeping and direct language barring federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331." Id. Section 1997e(a) Id. We agree with the Fifth Circuit and hold that section 1997e(a) simply codifies the administrative exhaustion doctrine that is "one among related doctrines -- including abstention, finality, and ripeness -- that govern the timing of federal-court decisionmaking." McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (emphasis added). The balance of existing authority supports this view. See Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir.) (), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 263 (1997); Lacey v. C.S.P. Solano Medical Staff, 990 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (section 1997e(a)
does not limit federal court jurisdiction). But see Morgan v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 976 F. Supp. 892, 895 (D. Ariz. 1997) ( ).
This Conclusion is further compelled by 42 U.S.C. SS 1997e(c)(1) & (2), companion provisions of the PLRA. Under those provisions, district courts are required to screen prisoners' complaints and to dismiss those that are "frivolous, malicious, fail[ ] to state a claim..., or seek[ ] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c)(2). The statute specifically permits district courts to dismiss such claims on the merits even where administrative remedies have not been exhausted. See id. "The court would not be empowered to do so if the exhaustion provision deprived the court of jurisdiction over the action." Underwood, 151 F.3d at 295; see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) ( ); see generally In re Burns, 974 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1992) ( ). In short, section 1997e(a) is not jurisdictional.
Even if exhaustion is not jurisdictional under the PLRA, Hill argues that a prisoner seeking monetary relief must nevertheless exhaust administrative remedies even where monetary relief is not available within the prison grievance system. Because the California Department of Corrections ("CDC") grievance procedures do not allow for monetary damage awards,4 see Lacey, 990 F. Supp. at 1205 (), the question is whether those procedures are an "available remedy"...
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