The State ex rel. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Woolfolk
| Decision Date | 21 December 1916 |
| Citation | 190 S.W. 877,269 Mo. 389 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON, & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY v. EDGAR B. WOOLFOLK, Judge, and THOMAS M. McGINNIS, Prosecuting Attorney |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Writ granted.
M. G Roberts and Hays, Heather & Henwood for relator.
(1) The real and vital question in the case is this: The facts pleaded in the information do not authorize the Pike Circuit Court as a court of equity to entertain the proceeding and pass a decree. (a) The bill exhibits no equity and is not susceptible of any conceivable amendment whereby it can be made to show jurisdiction in a court of equity over the subject-matter. The defect is not of form but of substance. It is true the bill may, by liberal construction, be held to state that relator's alleged acts constitute a "public nuisance." Such a conclusion upon the part of the pleader is negatived however by the very facts from which it is drawn. The presence of that allegation lends no support to the bill if the facts show the acts do not constitute a public nuisance. Ex parte Laymaster, 260 Mo 613; In re Chambers, 182 S.W. 775. (b) The bill does not allege any facts even tending to show that relator was conducting a public nuisance, as that term is known in law but, on the contrary, it shows upon its face that the primary purpose of the bill is to enforce a criminal statute by injunction. The injunctive relief sought against the relator is not a mere incident to the prevention of any particular place being so used as to constitute a public nuisance. This court has held that courts of equity have no jurisdiction to enjoin the mere breach of the criminal law. State ex rel v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439; State ex rel. v. Lamb, 237 Mo. 437; State ex rel. v. Kirkwood Club, 187 S.W. 819; Ex parte Laymaster, 260 Mo. 613. (c) Neither the illegal sale nor the transportation and delivery of intoxicating liquors was a public nuisance at common law, nor has either been made so by statute. The term "public nuisance" is necessarily applied and limited to a fixed place where something occurs or transpires which the law declares to be a nuisance to the community at large, because it is not only injurious to public safety and good morals but is also, and primarily, public in its nature and in its manifestations. State ex rel. v. Schweichardt, 109 Mo. 496; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), p. 318; Ex parte Laymaster, 260 Mo. 620; State ex rel. v. Kirkwood Club, 187 S.W. 819. (d) It is a matter of common knowledge that the commodities which a railroad transports it delivers at its stations or warehouses. There the relator's connection with the liquor shipments in question, presumably and so far as alleged in the bill, ends. There is no causal connection between relator's act as a common carrier in delivering the liquor and the subsequent sale by the consignee to consumers, and certainly no causal connection between the delivery to consignees and the acts done by the consumers of the liquor after they have purchased and consumed the liquor. To make the relator liable for maintaining a public nuisance it must appear that the relator's act was the direct and proximate cause of the final criminal result, and it must appear that the defendant intentionally set in operation a cause or agency that is adequate to accomplish the completed offense of maintaining a public nuisance. State v. Rankin, 2 S.C. 438, 16 Am. Rep. 737; Comm. v. Harrington, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 26.
Thomas B. McGinnis for respondent.
In Banc.
Prohibition. I. Upon the presentation of its petition for a writ of prohibition a provisional writ was awarded to relator by this court, whereupon the respondents, the judge and prosecuting attorney of Pike County, Missouri, filed a demurrer, on the ground, first, that the petition for prohibition included an allegation that other prosecuting attorneys had instituted like suits to the one sought to be prohibited in this case; second, that the petition itself stated no facts to warrant the issuance of the writ. Thereupon the parties entered into a stipulation that this proceeding should be considered at issue upon the demurrer to the petition and that if the demurrer should be sustained, then the provisional writ should be quashed, and if the demurrer should be overruled, that final judgment should go against respondents without further leave.
The object of this proceeding is to prevent the circuit court of Pike County from considering, on its own chancery side, the causes of action alleged in a petition, filed therein by the respondent prosecuting attorney, stating in substance, his official position, and that the defendant corporation is a railroad carrier in that county maintaining offices where it has heretofore delivered commodities, including intoxicating liquors, to persons to whom they were consigned; that on the 23rd of November, 1911, Pike County, outside the corporate limits of the city of Louisiana therein, adopted a Local Option Law of this State; that for many years divers persons in said county had been and are engaged in the illegal selling, storing and delivering of intoxicating liquors, including beer and whisky, in violation of said Local Option Law and without any authority so to do; that some of said persons maintain places of business nominally as drug stores and other places of business, when in truth they are not engaged in any legitimate business whatever; that other persons are engaged in the illegal sale and delivery of such intoxicating liquors without having or maintaining any places of business and are commonly designated as "boot-leggers;" that by reason of such illegal sales and delivery of liquors, including beer and whisky, divers persons have become and continue so to become intoxicated and "in such condition disturb and destroy the peace and endanger the persons and the property of the good people of said county at the places of Ashburn, Annada and Clarksville, and to the extent that the same has become a menace to society and to property and a great nuisance, and all greatly to the annoyance and inconvenience of the good people of said Ashburn, Annada and Clarksville, and their respective communities." Plaintiff further states that the defendant, knowing that such persons are and have been engaged in such illegal selling and delivering of such intoxicating liquors, and in such lawless and disorderly conduct, has transported and continued to transport and deliver to said persons large quantities of intoxicating liquors, including beer and whisky, at its stations at the said Ashburn, Annada and Clarksville, and its offices at said places in Pike County, Missouri, and will continue to so transport and deliver to such persons such intoxicating liquors, including beer and whisky, is in violation of the law, and that by so doing defendant aids and abets said parties in the illegal sale and delivery of and traffic in said intoxicating liquors, including beer and whisky, and in encouraging and promoting illegal sales and deliveries of such intoxicating liquors in said county, to the great scandal, inconvenience, annoyance and disturbance of the people of said county.
To continue reading
Request your trial