Murphy v. Shaw et al

• Decision Date: 12 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-35989,97-35989
• Citation: 195 F.3d 1121
• Parties: (9th Cir. 1999) KEVIN MURPHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT SHAW, Unit Sergeant; LARRY BEARLEY, Hearings Officer; MICHAEL MAHONEY, Bureau Warden; MYRON BEESON, Bureau Warden; and RICHARD S. DAY, Director, Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1121

195 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1999)

KEVIN MURPHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT SHAW, Unit Sergeant; LARRY BEARLEY, Hearings Officer; MICHAEL MAHONEY, Bureau Warden; MYRON BEESON, Bureau Warden; and RICHARD S. DAY, Director, Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-35989

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted March 12, 1999--Seattle, Washington

Filed November 4, 1999

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Jeffrey T. Renz, Montana Defender Project, University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana, for the plaintiff-appellant.

David L. Ohler, Assistant Attorney General, Montana Department of Corrections, Helena, Montana, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montanal; Charles C. Lovell, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.CV 95-00062-CCL

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Stephen Reinhardt, and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Murphy ("Murphy") is an inmate law clerk at the Montana State Prison ("Prison"). In early 1995, he sent a letter containing legal advice to fellow inmate Pat Tracy ("Tracy"). Murphy was subsequently disciplined based on the content of that letter. In this action, Murphy alleges that the discipline imposed by the Prison violated his First Amendment rights, his right as an inmate to access to the courts, and his rights under the Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all his claims. Because the provision of legal assistance to fellow inmates is an activity protected by the First Amendment, and because the prison regulations challenged here are "an exaggerated response" to otherwise legitimate security concerns, we reverse and remand with instructions that summary judgment be entered in Murphy's favor.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In early 1995, Murphy, who had been trained as an inmate legal clerk by the Prison, became aware that Tracy, a fellow inmate, had been charged with assaulting Correctional Officer Glen Galle ("CO Galle"). Murphy had provided legal assistance to Tracy on several prior occasions, and learned that Tracy had requested his assistance in connection with the assault charge. Because Tracy had been transferred to the maximum security wing of the Prison, however, Murphy could not visit him directly. Murphy also knew that counsel had been appointed to represent Tracy. Nevertheless, Murphy began investigating the assault incident, and discovered that other inmates had previously complained about CO Galle's conduct.

On February 16, 1995, Murphy wrote a letter to Tracy which included the following:

. . . I do want to help you with your case against Galle. It wasn't your fault and I know he provoked whatever happened! Don't plead guilty because we can get at least 100 witnesses to testify that Galle is an over zealous guard who has a personal agenda to punish and harass inmates. He has made homo sexual advances towards certain inmates and that can be brought up into the record. There are petitions against him and I have tried to get the Unit Manager to do something about what he does in Close II, but all that happened is that I received two writeups from him myself as retaliation. So we must pursue this out of the prison system. I am filing a suit with everyone in Close I and II named against him. So you can use that too!

Another poiont [sic] is that he grabbed you from behind. You tell your lawyer to get a hold of me on this. Don't take a plea bargain unless it's for no more time....

Murphy knew that the letter would be read by prison officials pursuant to prison regulations. The letter was, in fact, intercepted and read by defendant Robert Shaw¹.

As a result of the February 16 letter, Murphy was "written up." Defendant Shaw completed three Major Misconduct Violation Reports (also known as "Class IIs") charging Murphy with violating the following Prison regulations: Rule 009 (Insolence), Rule 022 (Interference with Due Process Hearings), and Rule 025 (Conduct which Disrupts or Interferes with the Security or Orderly Operation of the Institution). After a hearing, defendant Larry Bearley found Murphy guilty of violating Rules 009² and 022. ³ Murphy was given a suspended sentence of 10 days detention and received three "reclassification points." Murphy's appeal was denied by defendant Michael Mahoney.

In October 1995, Murphy filed a complaint against Robert Shaw, Larry Bearley, Michael Mahoney, Myron Beeson, and Richard Day, all employees of the Montana Department of Corrections (collectively, "Defendants"). The complaint, filed as a class action on behalf of all inmate law clerks at the Prison, seeks injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The complaint alleges that the Prison's imposition of discipline on Murphy (1) violated the First Amendment; (2) abridged the right of inmates to access to the courts and to present habeas petitions; and (3) relied on prison regulations that are void for vagueness on their face and as applied to legal advice rendered by law clerks.

The case was referred for recommendation to a magistrate judge, and Murphy and Defendants subsequently filed crossmotions for summary judgment. Murphy also filed a motion to certify the class. The magistrate judge recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to Murphy's "right of access to the courts" claims, and that all other motions be denied. Murphy and Defendants each timely filed objections to the magistrate's recommendation. On de novo review, the district court concluded that Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted in its entirety, and that Murphy's motion for class certification should be denied.⁴Final judgment was entered by the district court on September 23, 1997. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed denovo. See Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1998). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291 and must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. See id.

I. Murphy's First Amendment claim

The viability of Murphy's First Amendment claim turns on the application of two established legal principles. First, this court has held that inmates have a First Amendment right to assist other inmates with their legal claims. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). Second, where a prison regulation, otherwise generally justifiable, implicates a constitutional interest when applied to a protected class of expression, this court applies a balancing test to insure that the regulation is not an "exaggerated response. " See Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)). From these two principles flows the conclusion that the district court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants here.

A. Was Murphy acting as a law clerk?

Defendants focus their attention on what they perceive as a threshold issue. In their view, Murphy was not acting as a law clerk when he wrote and sent the February 16 letter to Tracy. Defendants accordingly argue that this case involves merely an unremarkable instance of discipline for inmate-to-inmate correspondence, comfortably within the general rule that prisons may, in the pursuit of the interest of prison security, intercept and confiscate inmate-to-inmate correspondence without running afoul of the First Amendment. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89 (inmate-to-inmate correspondence may be banned so long as the policy is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest).

To support their view, Defendants point out that Murphy was not formally assigned by the Prison's law librarian to serve as Tracy's law clerk. Moreover, Murphy was aware that he could not visit Tracy in the maximum security wing, and that counsel had been appointed for Tracy in connection with the assault charge. The district court also noted that Murphy had not been trained to handle criminal cases. Murphy, in response, notes that Tracy specifically asked for his legal assistance. It is undisputed that Murphy had served as Tracy's law clerk on several occasions in the past. Murphy also contends that law clerk assignment procedures were considerably more informal than indicated by the regulations, and that Murphy responded to Tracy's request for assistance in the usual manner.⁵ The contents of the February 16 letter, moreover, plainly relate to Tracy's assault charge, suggesting to Tracy a self-defense theory that he might raise.

On the basis of the undisputed facts, we reject Defendants' threshold argument that Murphy was not acting as a law clerk when he wrote the February 16 letter. Murphy was a trained inmate law clerk responding to a legal inquiry from a fellow inmate, an inmate he had advised on several prior occasions. The letter he sent to Tracy was plainly related to the pending assault charges, and conveyed both factual and legal information that was potentially relevant to Tracy's defense. As will be discussed below, this circuit in Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985), recognized that the provision of legal assistance to a fellow inmate is an activity protected by the First Amendment. The undisputed facts here are enough to raise the First Amendment right recognized in Rizzo. Cf. Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 531 (plaintiff offered legal advice informally, outside any "inmate law clerk" program sponsored by the prison).

B. Does the Prison's conduct implicate Murphy's First Amendment rights?

The Prison's imposition of discipline on Murphy implicates his First Amendment rights for at least two reasons. First, the letter itself...