Bradley v. Hall

• Decision Date: 23 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-35844,94-35844
• Citation: 64 F.3d 1276
• Parties: 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6644, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,410 Jeffrey BRADLEY, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank HALL, Director, Oregon Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1276

64 F.3d 1276

95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6644, 95 Daily Journal

D.A.R. 11,410

Jeffrey BRADLEY, Individually and on behalf of all other

similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank HALL, Director, Oregon Department of Corrections,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 94-35844.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 11, 1995.

Decided Aug. 23, 1995.

Kaye Sunderland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, OR, for defendant-appellant.

Spencer M. Neal, Ginsburg, Neal & Lasage, Portland, OR, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before: GOODWIN and HUG, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER ^*, District Judge.

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

Jeff Bradley, an Oregon prisoner, sued Frank Hall, the director of the Oregon Department of Corrections ("ODOC") under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 to challenge the constitutional validity of prison regulations prohibiting the use of "hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening" language, Or.Admin.R. 291-105-015(2)(f) and (g). Bradley contended that subjecting him to discipline under these rules for his use of disrespectful language in a written prison complaint form violated his right to petition for redress of grievances. The district court denied the director's motion for summary judgment, granted Bradley's cross-motion for summary judgment, and enjoined the ODOC from punishing Bradley for the wording of his written grievance under any of the ODOC disrespect rules, except to the extent that his grievance may include criminal threats. The district court found that the challenged regulations, though facially valid, were unconstitutional as applied to the contents of prisoner grievances. The director appeals and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

When a prison guard failed to retrieve Bradley from his room for his law library call-out as the guard promised, Bradley submitted a written grievance to the guard's superior in accord with the formal grievance procedures established by the ODOC. After receiving a copy of Bradley's complaint, the accused guard filed a disciplinary report against Bradley, charging him with violating Or.Admin.R. 291-105-015(2)(f) (Disrespect II). The guard cited Bradley for the following language in his grievance:

Her [the guard's] actions shows her misuse of her authority and her psychological disorder needs attention. Then you wonder why things happen like that guard getting beat down? I suggest you talk to this woman and have her act professionally instead of like a child. [sic]

Bradley was found guilty of, and punished for, the lesser offense of violating Or.Admin.R. 291-105-015(2)(g) (Disrespect III).

The Oregon rules prohibiting the use of disrespectful language by prisoners, Or.Admin.R. 291-105-015(2)(e), (f), and (g) respectively, provide:

Disrespect I: An inmate commits Disrespect I if he/she directs hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening language or gestures, verbal or written, towards or about another person involving a physical threat to the other person;

Disrespect II: An inmate commits Disrespect II if he/she directs hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening language or gestures, verbal or written, towards or about another person involving a threat to the safety security and orderly operation of the facility (including, but not limited to, when other inmates or employees are present, or in a location such as a dining hall or recreation yard);

Disrespect III (minor violation): An inmate commits Disrespect III when he/she directs hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening language or gestures, verbal or written toward another person.

Bradley brought this civil rights action to challenge the validity of the disrespect rules as applied to statements made in a written grievance, on the ground that fear of discipline

                impermissibly burdened his constitutional right of access to the courts and right to petition the government for redress of his grievances. 1  The director argued that the disrespect rules do not hinder a prisoner from filing a grievance or suit, but merely from using inappropriate language within the grievance itself.  The district court ruled that "[p]unishing an inmate for the content of his grievance rather than for the act of filing the grievance is a distinction without a difference."   The district court concluded, "Prisoners should be allowed to file grievances within the prison system without fear of being sanctioned for an unhappy choice of words, except to the extent that [the words include] criminal threats."   The court granted summary judgment to Bradley and enjoined prison officials from applying the disrespect rules to the language within Bradley's written grievances
                

DISCUSSION

1. The Prisoner's Rights Burdened by the Disrespect Rules

It has long been "established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). A prisoner's right to meaningful access to the courts, along with his broader right to petition the government for a redress of his grievances under the First Amendment, precludes prison authorities from penalizing a prisoner for exercising those rights. In some instances, prison authorities must even take affirmative steps to help prisoners exercise their rights. Id. at 821-832, 97 S.Ct. at 1494-1500; Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir.1993).

The right of meaningful access to the courts extends to established prison grievance procedures. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir.1989). See also Hines v. Gomez, 853 F.Supp. 329, 331-332 (N.D.Cal.1994) and cases cited therein. The "government" to which the First Amendment guarantees a right of redress of grievances includes the prison authorities, as it includes other administrative arms and units of government. Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1989). Moreover, in some cases a prisoner may be required to exhaust the established prisoner grievance procedure before securing relief in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997 et seq. In those cases, a prisoner's fundamental right of access to the courts hinges on his ability to access the prison grievance system.

We are not persuaded by the director's argument that punishing a prisoner for the content of his grievance does not burden his ability to file a grievance. From the prisoner's point of view, the chilling effect is the same. Whether the content of the grievance or the act of filing the grievance is deemed to be the actus reus of the offense, the prisoner risks punishment for exercising the right to complain. Without question, the application of the ODOC disrespect regulations to Bradley's written grievance impacts his constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth and First Amendments.

2. The Turner Test and Analysis

Prison regulations that infringe a prisoner's constitutional right are valid so long as they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d at 1520. The Supreme Court has identified four factors to consider when determining the reasonableness of a prison rule: 1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it"; 2) "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates"; 3) "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources generally"; and 4) the "absence of ready alternatives" or, in other words, whether the rule at issue is an "exaggerated response to The record highlights several legitimate penological interests furthered by the ODOC disrespect regulations. According to expert testimony and the director's brief, the disrespect rules "help prison staff display the high degree of self-control necessary in the correctional profession," by heading off situations in which inmates may bait or goad guards into unprofessional conduct. The record evidence shows that the disrespect rules were adopted to aid in "prison control through encouragement and enforcement of respect by inmates toward staff and other inmates, and rehabilitation of inmates through insistence on their use of socially acceptable ways of solving their problems." There is no question that these are legitimate penological interests and the disrespect rules further each of these interests.

prison concerns." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62 (internal quotations omitted).

Stressing the deference we owe prison officials, the director argues that, at a minimum, the articulation of these legitimate penological interests served by the rules and the evidence that the rules, in fact, were adopted to serve those interests makes summary judgment for Bradley inappropriate.

The Turner case makes clear that it is not our job to second guess the details of prison management. "[P]rison administrators ..., and not the courts, are to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. We have also said that for a prison regulation to pass muster "[p]rison officials need merely put forward a legitimate government interest, and provide some evidence that the interest put forward is the actual reason for the regulation." Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d at 1520-21 (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, this deferential standard, which the director has met, does not necessarily tell the full story of the analysis...