Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 23 December 1912
• Citation: 202 F. 512
• Parties: HITCHMAN COAL & COKE CO. v. MITCHELL et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

202 F. 512

HITCHMAN COAL & COKE CO. v. MITCHELL et al.

United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia.

December 23, 1912

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

George R. E. Gilchrist, of Wheeling, W. Va., for plaintiff.

Charles E. Hogg, of Morgantown, W. Va., for defendants.

DAYTON District Judge.

On September 21, 1909, I filed a written opinion in this cause reported in (C.C.) 172 F. 963. I there stated the purposes and objects of the bill and the proceedings had thereon and in the cause to that date. I do not, because of the necessary length of this opinion made necessary by the gravity and importance of the questions involved, deem it expedient to reiterate the statement of the case there made, but refer to this prior opinion therefor. Suffice it to say that to my order refusing to modify and in part dissolve the injunction based upon the reasons set forth in that opinion an appeal was taken by the served defendants to the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit. That court, on March 11, 1910 dismissed such appeal for want of jurisdiction. 100 C.C.A. 137, 176 F. 549. The parties then proceeded to mature the cause for final hearing. The evidence was taken in open court before me. This evidence and the record in bulk is now estimated to be equivalent to between 7,000 and 8,000 pages. Briefs of counsel filed are equivalent to near 800 more such pages, and the learning, research, and legal ability displayed by counsel on both sides in these briefs are such as to command not only the court's gratitude, but its highest admiration. The sincere purpose to aid, in every possible way, the true and right determination of the cause on the part of these counsel, deserves special commendation.

I have given several months' consideration and study to the questions involved. Because of their importance, I have, upon this final hearing, deemed it proper to review, as briefly as possible, the origin of labor unions in England, and the legislation and judicial decisions touching their rights, privileges, and obligations in that country, as well as under our federal and local state laws and judicial decisions.

Without tracing the distinction recognized in England between guilds and combinations of common laborers from which spring substantially the labor unions of to-day, it is sufficient to say that the emancipation of the serfs in the time of Edward III increased largely the number of laborers and the competition in the labor market, but in the middle of the fourteenth century, when the plague carried off 2,000,000 souls, near half the population of the realm, conditions became reversed-- labor became very scarce, food rose in price, and higher wages were demanded by labor. In consequence the Statutes of Laborers were passed in 1349 and 1350, fixing wages absolutely for the summer months, and authorizing the justices of the peace to fix them for the winter ones. These acts further designed to accomplish the other purpose of tying down the liberated serfs who had become laborers to the soil. A laborer was required under pain of imprisonment to remain in his parish, and it was made an offense to refuse to work or to receive or offer higher wages than those fixed by the statutes. These statutes were passed clearly in aid of the agricultural interests of a kingdom with limited resources in that regard, seeking to supply food products for its people. They looked especially to the interest of the consuming public, and not to those of the laborer. In the reign of Henry VIII the monasteries were suppressed, and, in consequence, a large number of unemployed persons were turned out to wander over the country. Thereupon the Statute of Apprentices was enacted 'in great hope, that being duly executed, it shall banish idleness, advance husbandry and yield unto the hired, both in the time of scarcity and in the time of plenty, a convenient proportion of wages. ' This act confirmed the former ones regulating work and wages, and, in addition, fixed the hours of labor, and required the laborer to secure from the master a certificate that he had completed his work for him before seeking work in a new district. These acts fell into desuetude by the beginning of the last century, and state regulation of wages became superseded by contractual relationships between master and servant. The result was that labor, which had before that time opposed state regulation of wages, changed front, and began petitioning Parliament for such regulation and the enforcement of the Apprentice Act. Human nature is the same substantially yesterday, to-day, and forever. It was very natural that laboring men, seeking to better their condition in life, should a century age clamor for the legislative regulation when work was dull and the laborers many, which they had opposed the preceding century when harvests were plenty and laborers few. It is just as natural to-day that from the vast army of laborers engaged in the coal mining industry constantly depressed by over production demands should come for legislative enactment of wage scales minimum at least, and, in the absence of such legislation. efforts on their part should be made by combination to achieve the same result. The question always recurs whether either method can best supersede the natural law of supply and demand. The English courts at the time manifestly thought not, for when organized trade societies, about 1800, instituted actions and sent petitions to Parliament to enforce the Apprentice Act (fixing wages), they held that the act only applied to industries existing at the time of its passage in 1563, thereby rendering it practically ineffective, and, in 1813, Parliament formally repealed it. During these two and a third centuries the Apprentice Act, fixing wages, necessarily forbade labor combinations having for their purpose the securing of wages beyond the limit fixed by the law.

In addition, the common-law doctrine 'of restraint of trade' rendered such combinations illegal. In 1797 an act, reaffirmed in 1800, known as the Combination Act, was passed, making unlawful every combination seeking to secure advance of wages, to change or decrease the hours of work, to prevent any employer from hiring any one he chose, to prevent workmen hiring themselves, to induce workmen to leave their work to attend any meeting called to advance any of these objects, or to spend any money for these purposes.

It is important to pause here, and bear in mind that the three charters granted to Virginia in 1606, 1609, 1611-12, all expressly provided that the laws and ordinances enacted by it should conform to those existing and in force in England; that under its six state Constitutions (1776, 1830, 1850, 1864, 1870, and 1902) the fact has always been recognized that the common law of England in force prior to the Revolution was the basic law of the state, save and except so far as repealed or modified by either constitutional or legislative enactment; that in the first Constitution of West Virginia (1861-63) it is enacted:

'Such parts of the common law and of the laws of the state of Virginia as are in force within the boundaries of the state of West Virginia when this Constitution goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto, shall be and continue the law of the state until altered or repealed by the Legislature. ' Article 11, Sec. 8.

The same provision was incorporated in the Constitution of 1872.

This being true, it is all-important to the correct determination of the questions here involved to determine (a) just what the common law was at the time prior to the birth of Virginia as regards these labor organizations; and (b) how far that law has been repealed or modified by legislative enactment in Virginia and West Virginia. While there have been very many conflicting decisions in the different states of the Union, it seems to me that the questions are essentially local in character, and must be determined by local law. It is certainly an inherent power of each state to determine for itself how law and order shall be maintained and crime punished. This power necessarily carries with it the right to determine what assemblies meeting within its limits are lawful or unlawful, for what lawful purposes organization may be had, and for what purposes it may be unlawful to organize and operate within its limits. This inherent power in the state can only be superseded by the very limited power of the national government to interfere provided for by the federal Constitution. For this reason, it seems clear to me that I must determine what constitutes a lawful organization in West Virginia by its laws, and not by either statutes or judicial decisions of other states. What may be lawful in one may be unlawful in another, what may be criminal in one may be permissible in another. In this view of the matter, the subsequent legislation and decisions in England become immaterial, except so far as they may aid us in defining the true principles of the common law existing prior to 1776, and still existing in this state. It will be sufficient to say that the Combination Act of 1800 was, in 1825, repealed by the English Parliament, and conspiracy alone became the combination liable to prosecution. For common-law conspiracy a number of the members of trades unions were prosecuted for combining to raise wages and for other of their declared purposes, and convictions were had.

'That all combinations tending directly to impede and interfere with the free course of trade were not only illegal but criminal.'

In 1859 Parliament passed an act more closely defining the offense of 'molestation and obstruction' used in the act of 1825. It rendered peaceful persuasion to induce workmen to abstain from working, in order to raise their wages,...